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ABSTRACT 
The successful launch of the European Monetary Union (EMU) raised an already ever growing 
interest in the economics of monetary integration and the formation of monetary unions around 
the world. Following the EMU experience, countries have considered forming a monetary union 
amongst themselves. The East African Community (EAC), comprising the three original member 
countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and now including Burundi and Rwanda, is an example 
of such a group of countries that seek to form a monetary union. This study aims to identify the 
current level of fmancial integration amongst the East African countries. In order to do so the 
study examines whether the pass-through of monetary policy in the five countries has become 
similar over time. This is to provide an indication of the extent to which the nominal 
convergence criteria amongst the member countries have been met. The results of the study 
provide an indication of whether the formation of a monetary union in East Africa is possible. 
The empirical analysis used in this study included stationarity tests, four tests of co integration 
and an asynunetric error correction model to investigate whether the pass-through of monetary 
policy transmission in the five countries has become more similar over the ten year sample 
period from 1999 to 2008. The analysis uses three interest rates and 6-year rolling windows to 
identify the extent of macroeconomic convergence that prevails within the EAC, and 
consequently whether the formation of a monetary union is possible. 
The results suggest that the magnitude of the convergence amongst the countries remain low and 
there are significant rigidities in the deposit and lending rates over time, however the pass-
through has improved with respect to the lending rate but not the deposit rate. The overall 
conclusion of the study suggests that an EAC wide monetary union is currently not possible 
based on the evidence provided from the pass-through analysis. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
The successful launch of the Euro as the single currency of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) saw increasing international interest in monetary integration. Honohan and Lane (2000) 
note that the emergence of the EMU has also raised interest in the development of similar 
arrangements in various parts of the world. According to Aryeetey (2004: I) this includes 
African nations who are interested in developing financial and monetary cooperation 
arrangements that would help strengthen their own financial institutions so as to reach out to a 
fast globalising world. 
Moreover, integration confers benefits on members both individually and collectively, and a 
number of economists have evaluated the costs and benefits derived from forming monetary 
urtions.' For instance, integration could assist in eliminating the transaction costs of exchanging 
one currency for another as well as eliminating the risk of exchange rate uncertainty amongst 
members. This uncertainty is with regard to the future exchange rate which could lead to 
UIlcertainty amongst firnls about their future incomes (Rwaknnda, 2004: 33). Exchange rate 
unification will reduce this source of uncertainty and therefore increase welfare. Member 
countries also benefit from increased scale and competition whereby the combination of markets 
allows firms to expand and be more competitive, leading to an increase in efficiency and 
productivity. An increase in investment is another advantage that may be achieved by reducing 
distortions, enlarging markets, and enhancing the credibility of economic and political reforms 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2004: 10-15). When establishing a monetary urtion, member 
countries commit to working together, which raises the issue of the ' commitment mechanism ' 
which is an advantage of forming a monetary urtion (Guillaume and Stasavage, 2000: 1393; 
Alesina et ai., 2002: 7). The idea here is that exit from monetary urtions should be made costly 
and that other member states must be willing to oppose any attempt by their neighbours to break 
ilie rules of the arrangement. Lastly, the formation of a supranational monetary auiliority or a 
I See Fielding and Shields, 1999; Grandes, 2003; De Grauwe, 2003: 78-83; Aryeetey, 2004: 6; Horvath and 
Komarek, 2002: 13-14). The benefits and costs of forming a monetary union are discussed in greater detail in 
section 2.3 of Chapter 2. 
Common Central Bank (CCB) acting as an agency of restraint would enhance the credibility of 
monetary policy. 
Though the potential benefits of fonning monetary unions are numerous, they do not come 
without any costs. The major cost of joining a monetary union is the loss of monetary 
independence, which is the country's ability to implement national monetary and exchange rate 
policies. Further costs involved are the administrative costs of setting up a separate currency, and 
the fear of losing benefits in parallel regional agreements in areas such as trade, security or the 
technical and financial assistance of industrial countries (Oyejide, 2000: 8; Wakeman-Linn and 
Wagh, 2008: 3; Buigut and Valev, 2005b: 2119; Afxentiou, 2000: 251). 
Despite the potential costs of fonning monetary unions, regions including Africa have been 
attracted to the numerous potential benefits of integration and are seeking to follow the EMU 
example by setting up similar institutional frameworks and establishing processes of 
convergence so as to meet the requirements for wider monetary integration (Tsangarides and 
Qureshi, 2008: 1261). Consequently, the majority of sub-Saharan African countries are now 
members of one or more regional or sub-regional 8lTangements2 (Maruping, 2005: 129). One of 
these regional groups is the East African Community (EAC) comprising Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania which has achieved a free trade area status. After its decline in 1977 and subsequent 
resuscitation in 2000, the member states agreed to establish the EAC and began the process by 
establishing a customs union which became effective from I $I January 2005. The EAC has 
already established institutions and has a working committee on fiscal and monetary policies. 
There has been progress in hannonising fiscal and monetary policies, banking regulations and 
pre-shipment requirements, amongst other things (Maruping, 2005: 140). 
As of July 2008, Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC after having waited for ten years, boosting 
the membership of the organisation to five countries (Neil, 2007: I). Members have the goal of 
fonning a monetary union amongst the five countries by 2012 (Edmund, 2008: I). However, the 
extent to which these countries have met the pre-conditions for fonning a monetary union 
remains doubtful. Such pre-conditions are mutually agreed upon amongst a given number of 
2 See World Bank (2004: 10) for the African economies that are part of regional and sub-regional integration 
arrangements. 
2 
countries that satisfy certain convergence criteria, like the Maastricht Criteria in the case of the 
EU. The traditional criteria for convergence according to Maruping (2005: 139) pertaining to 
East Africa include: 
• A reduction of current account deficit to GOP ratio to a sustainable level; 
• Reduction of budget deficit (excluding grants) to GOP ratio ofless than 5 percent; and 
• Maintenance of stable competitively determined exchange rates. 
To date empirical studies establishing the extent of integration in the East Africa have been very 
limited. The few attempts that have been made include the works of Buigut and Valev (2005b) 
and Mkenda (2001). The former study assessed the suitability of the East African countries for a 
monetary union using a structural vector autoregression (SV AR) analysis to focus on shocks on 
aggregate output growth and inflation. They found ultimately that further integration of the 
economies might lead to favourable conditions for a monetary union. Mkenda (200 I) employed a 
Generalised Purchasing Power Parity (GPPP) model to analyse the suitability of the EAC for a 
monetary union. He found that the real exchange rates between the EAC countries were 
co integrated during the period 1980-98, suggesting that the EAC is an optimum currency area. 
However, these studies did not document the extent of integration among the EAC countries. In 
particular they did not assess the extent to which convergence in East Africa has been achieved 
over time. Furthermore, none of the earlier studies included Burundi and Rwanda in the analysis. 
Considering that these five countries are seeking to form a monetary union in a few years time, it 
is imperative to determine the extent of convergence over time among the countries so as to 
ascertain whether the cOlmtries are making progress towards monetary integration by 2012. This 
is where the contribution of this study lies. 
In gauging the extent of integration, authors have employed different approaches. For instance 
Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) made use of a cluster analysis approach to study the possibility 
of integration in West Africa. Nielsen e/ at. (2005) used the concept of the uncovered interest 
parity to study the level of financial integration within the Common Monetary Area (CMA). 
Aziakpono (2008a) examined the degree of financial and monetary autonomy and 
interdependence between South Africa and the other Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) 
countries using interest rate parity analysis. The methodology employed by Aziakpono (2008) 
3 
was based on the Johansen co integration and error correction modelling techniques. Aziakpono 
et al. (2008) applied a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as well as an Interest Rate Pass-
Through (PT) methodology to investigate banking and monetary market integration in the South 
African Development Community (SADC) countries. 
Amongst the methodologies identified above, one notable method that has gained popularity in 
investigating the degree of financial integration is the interest rate pass-through PT analysis, 
based on the work of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). PT estimation can reveal how fast and how 
completely changes in monetary policy rates are passed on to bank lending and deposit rates. 
FurthelIDore, PT studies also reveal information about competition in banking markets, and in an 
international context, PT studies reveal asymmetries across countries under a single monetary 
policy (Sander and Kleimeier, 2006a: 216). This methodology has been applied extensively to 
the euro zone and important contributions include studies by Borio and Fritz (1995), Toolsema et 
al. (2002), De Bondt (2005), Sander and Kleimeier (2004, 2006b) and Heinemann and Schuler 
(2003). 
In addition to the euro zone where pass-through analysis has been used extensively, the method 
has become increasingly popular in measuring the extent of integration amongst African regional 
blocs. A few notable studies include the work by Aziakpono (2006) that focuses on the PT 
results as a measure of fmancial integration by investigating how the central bank and bank 
interest rates depend on each other across the SACU countries. Aziakpono et al. (2008) 
investigate banking market integration in the member conntries of the SADC using a principal 
component and PT analysis. Sander and Kleimeier (2006a) employ the PT methodology in the 
CMA countries of the SACU during the period 1991 to 2005. With regard to the East Africa 
countries, there is to date, no study that has employed this method to gauge the degree of 
fmancial integration among the countries. This study aims to fill this gap by employing the 
interest rate pass-through analysis to establish over time the extent of their financial integration 
and to determine the feasibility of the five countries forming a monetary union. 
4 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The research aims to identifY the current level of financial integration amongst the East African 
countries. This will be achieved by: 
• Examining whether the pass-through of monetary policy measures in the 5 countries 
(Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda) has become more similar over time, 
indicating the level of convergence in monetary transmission. The effectiveness of the 
transmission of monetary policy is based on two critical elements: the magnitude and the 
speed with which changes in the official policy rate affect the cost of borrowing, and 
varions other money market rates. 
• Measuring the progress over time and the extent to which the convergence criteria have 
been met. The differences in the interest rate pass-through over time, if any, whether an 
increase or a decrease, would be an indication of the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
• Identifying the feasibility of integration amongst these countries and ultimately the 
establishment of a single East African central bank. 
For the empirical analysis3, the study will make use of monthly data spanning 10 years, for the 
period 1999 to 2008. The data used consist of the lending, deposit, and discount rates for all East 
African countries. The discount rates are used as variables representing the central bank rates. In 
the case of Kenya, owing to limitations of discount rate data, the Treasury-bill rate is used as a 
proxy ofthe official policy rate. The interest rate series are obtained from Thompson DataStream 
and the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) except for Kenya's Treasury-bill rate which 
is obtained from the Central Bank of Kenya. 
In investigating the primary goal of the research the interest rate pass-through of monetary policy 
in each of the five countries, the study will follow the model by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) 
which has been used by numerous authors such as Toolsema et al. (2002); De Bondt et al. 
3 A fun discussion of the method is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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I 
(2002); Sander and K1eimeier, (2004, 2006a) and Aziakpono (2008a) to study convergence 
amongst conntries . 
The analysis involves tests for cointegration, and then the model will be estimated using a rolling 
regression technique in an error correction model (ECM). The point of the rolling regression 
technique is to measure the progress over time, using rolling windows. These results should 
provide long run and speed of adjustment parameters, which will indicate whether the monetary 
policy transmission has been stable over time in each of tl,e countries under consideration. A 
comparison will tl,en be made between the various parameters across the countries in ilie sample. 
This will help to identify wheilier or not convergence has occurred and wheilier such 
convergence has increased over time. 
Furthermore, the research will indicate the degree of interest rate stickiness in ilie conntries and 
the relationship between the interest rate stickiness and ilie financial system, which will help to 
identify appropriate policy intervention iliat could facilitate eventual monetary integration. 
The structure of ilie thesis takes the following fonn. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical literature 
and empirical studies surronnding monetary unions and monetary integration. The ilieory of 
interest rate pass-tlrrough is also discussed. Chapter 3 is essentially an overview chapter that 
provides a historical background of ilie East African Community (EAC). The chapter also 
discusses the convergence criteria necessary for the East Afiican countries to achieve in order to 
be eligible to form a monetary nnion. Finally, an individual country analysis is carried out in 
order to identify any factors that may impact the pass-through of interest rates in each country. 
Chapter 4 describes the meiliodology and empirical framework used to gauge tl,e extent of 
integration over time in East Africa, while Chapter 5 provides the results of the analysis. The 
final chapter, Chapter 6, provides a summary of the fmdings and discusses any implications for 
policy. Furthermore, possible areas for future work are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL ISSUES AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews both the theoretical literature and the growing number of empirical studies, 
with the focus is on monetary unions and monetary integration. The aim of the theoretical review 
is to discuss the concept of monetary integration and to identify the potential benefits and costs. 
The theory of interest rate pass·through is also looked at in this chapter. The chapter begins with 
the theoretical literature, followed by a review of the empirical evidence. 
2.2 MONETARY UNIONS: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
According to Tavlas (1993 : 664) there is no generally accepted definition of 'monetary 
integration ' in the literature. Accordingly, Jefferis (2007: 85) notes that monetary integration is a 
process that involves the progressive harmonisation and linking of monetary and exchange rate 
policies by a group of countries. Vaubel (1990: 936) notes that this process is said to be complete 
when the markets with different currencies are not separated by different exchange controls or 
other discriminatory government interventions. A wide reading of the literature4 further 
highlights that monetary integration can cover different spectrums, which emphasise the different 
stages and forms of monetary unions . Jefferis (2007: 86) identifies these different spectrums of 
monetary unions in terms of the stages of monetary integration, and notes that these stages were 
attributed mainly to the nature of exchange rate policy, which would have implications primarily 
for monetary policy. The stages can be grouped as follows : 
Stage 1: No Monetmy Integration 
With no monetary integration, there is no attempt to link or co·ordinate the monetary policies of 
different countries, thus all countries have independent monetary policies. The countries ' 
exchange rates would be market-determined, in other words freely floating exchange rates, and 
countries would have autonomy with regard to monetary policy. However, if countries have 
4 See Cobham and Robson (1 994), Appleyard and Field (2001), Masson and Pattillo (2005), and Jefferis (2007). 
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similar economic structures and experience similar external shocks, then the national monetary 
policies may move in tandem with each other (Jefferis, 2007: 86). For example, external factors 
such as oil price shocks or, in a more recent case, the global financial crisis, may cause countries ' 
monetary policies to move together, not necessarily due to deliberate co-ordination of their 
policies. 
Stage 2: Weak Monetwy Integration 
In the second stage, involving weak monetary integration, the exchange rates are in some ways 
linked, perhaps by a crawling peg arrangement or a managed float that constrains the exchange 
rates within a predeternlined range. Here the linkage of exchange rates may impose restrictions 
on the independence of national monetary policies but the autonomy of national monetary policy 
will depend on the extent of capital mobility across the countries. If capital controls are retained, 
there may still be monetary policy autonomy (Jefferis, 2007: 86). 
Stage 3: Strong Monetary Integration 
In stage 3, strong monetary integration, the exchange rates of the national currencies are pegged 
to one another, either with some degree of adjustment permitted, or at the extreme end an 
irrevocable peg i.e. a fixed peg (Jefferis, 2007: 86). Strong monetary integration can take the 
form of exchange rate unions, which can be formal or informal. According to Masson and 
Pattillo (2005: 4) an informal exchange rate union would consist of different currencies whose 
parities would be fixed but only within certain margins, for example the European Monetary 
System's (EMS) exchange rate mechanism (after August 1993). A formal exchange rate union 
may have separate currencies, but the rates can fluctuate within narrow or zero margins, with a 
strong degree of coordination amongst the central banks5 A long standing example would be the 
CMA, with the currencies of Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland being linked one for one with the 
South African rand (Aziakpono, 2008a: 190; Masson and Pattillo, 2005: 4). 
As in the stage two, if there is full capital mobility which would imply no capital controls and 
well-developed capital markets among the nations, then a single monetary policy will be 
5 Cobham and Robson (1994: 286) note that a crucial difference between an informal and a formal exchange rate 
union is that the formal exchange rate union has a central agency coordinating the national central banks. They also 
note that the difference between the fonnal exchange rate union and a full monetary union (as seen in stage 4) is that 
the full monetary union has a single currency and a single central bank. 
8 
followed by all countries, for instance by harmonizing movements in interest rates. If monetary 
policy is not co-ordinated, it would result in unmanageable capital flows that could make the 
exchange rate impossible to maintain (Jefferis, 2007: 86). Hence, under this foml of monetary 
integration, capital will flow freely among members and interest rates will move in tandem with 
one another. Furthermore, some central banks will not have much control of their monetary 
policy. 
Stage 4: Full Monetmy Union 
The final stage, a full monetary union, is the "peak" of the process of monetary integration" A 
full monetary union would involve all member nations committing themselves to the monetary 
union and adopting a common cnrrency and a single central bank to manage monetary policy 
(Jefferis, 2007: 87; Cobham and Robson, 1994: 286; Masson and Pattillo, 2005: 4; and Robson, 
1998). Therefore, individual member states would have no autonomous monetary or exchange 
rate policy'. The most notable example of such a union is the EMU, with the euro as the common 
currency. Thus monetary policy is coordinated from a central point, for example, the executive 
board of the European Central Bank (ECB) which coordinates the monetary policy for the entire 
EMU. 
The above stages of monetary integration bring to light the different spectrums of monetary 
unions. At one end, all countries have a freely floating exchange rate and are independent of each 
other. With further progression of monetary integration, countries move from this floating 
regime to one that is fixed and finally to a single currency where each country relinquishes its 
ability to control the exchange rate and monetary policy. Under these situations, the member 
countries have a common central bank, and thus all money supply decisions will be directed 
solely by the common central bank, with a governing board with representatives from each 
country who will decide on monetary policy (Appleyard and Field, 2001). 
With regard to the East Africa Community (EAC), the goal is to achieve the final stage of 
monetary integration - the establishment of a fully fledged monetary union - by the year 2012. 
6 1t is also regarded as the third type of monetary integration arrangement, according to Cobham and Robson (1994: 
286) and Masson and Pattillo (2005: 4). 
7 The loss of monetary policy independence is one of the major costs associated with the fannation of monetary 
unions discussed fwther in the chapter. 
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The questions that arise include what the benefits of fonning sucb a union would be and 
furthennore how well the countries are prepared to join and fonn a monetary union. In order to 
answer these questions, the following two sections examine the benefits and costs of fonning 
monetary unions and what criteria should be place for membership. 
2.3 THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FORMING MONETARY UNIONS 
The interest in forming a monetary union and seeking macroeconomic convergence is motivated 
because of the benefits that it provides to member countries, either individually or collectively. 
The basic literature on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA)8 pioneered by Mundell (1961), 
addresses the benefits and costs of adopting a common currency (cf. Tavlas, 1993; Tjirongo, 
1995; Afxentiou, 2000; Maruping, 2005; Jefferis 2007). These are discussed in the following 
sections. 
2.3.1 Benefits of Forming a Monetmy Union 
A wide reading of the literature9 identifies several benefits of fonning monetary unions. It is 
important to note that a benefit in one area may also have an impact on other key areas in the 
economy via a "ripple effect", thus the benefits should not necessarily be seen in isolation to one 
another. The benefits can be categorised under the following headings: 
(i) reduction in transaction costs; 
(ii) elimination of the risk of exchange rate uncertainty among members; 
(iii) reduced costs of fmancial services arising from the large size of available pools of 
financial assets: this involves supporting the exploitation of economies of scale in the 
financial sector; 
S An DCA is defined as an optimal geographic domain of a single currency, or of several currencies, whose 
exchange rates are irrevocably pegged and might be unified (Mongelli, 2002: 7). Mongelli (2002: 7) further notes 
that optimality is defined in terms of several OCA properties. including the mobility of labour, wage, and price 
flexibility, diversification in production and fiscal integration, among others. 
9 Cobham and Robson (1994), Afxentiou (2000), Economic Commission for Africa (2004), Aryeetey (2004) and 
Buigut (2006), These studies also aid in identifying the costs of monetary unions. 
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(iv) increased investments; 
(v) commitment from member countries; and lastly 
(vi) an agency of restraint. 
Other benefits according to Maruping (2005: 136) include the attainment of macroeconomic 
stability, for example through sustainable fiscal deficit, as well as low and stable levels of 
inflation which are among the key pre-conditions for achieving strong and sustainable economic 
growth. 
i. Reduction in Transaction Costs 
A number of authors have considered the elimination of the costs of exchanging one currency for 
another as the most visible gain of a monetary union (cf. Cobham and Robson, 1994; Maruping, 
2005; Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2007; Jefferis, 2007 and Drobyshevskii and Polevoi, 2008). 
Tjirongo (1995: 13) notes that transaction costs involved in converting one currency into another, 
and the gathering and processing of information regarding forecasting future exchange rate 
developments, represent a deadweight loss. Using a common currency as a medium of exchange 
would significantly reduce such transactions costs. Weimann (2002: 6) and Mongelli (2008: 10) 
further point out that with the adoption of a single currency, the extent to which money fulfils its 
basic function grows. A single currency would enhance the function of money as a means of 
exchange due to reduced transaction costs of conversion, as a store of value due to reduced 
uncertainty and as a measure of value due to reduced information costs. Furthermore, companies 
face lower costs as a result of not having to fulfil multi-currency bookkeeping (Weimann, 2002: 
6). Alesina and Barro (2000: 5-12) show that reduced transactions costs lead to higher output and 
consumption gains, thereby improving welfare. 
ii. Elimination of the Risk of Exchange Rate Uncertainty among Members 
The elimination of the exchange rate risk due to monetary integration can lead to welfare gains 
from less uncertainty with regard to the future exchange rate which would lead to firms being 
unsure about their future incomes (Rwakunda, 2004: 33). De Grauwe (1992) argues that in a 
world populated by risk-averse individuals, the uncertainty would lead to a loss of welfare. 
Individuals would naturally prefer a future return that is more certain to one that is less so, hence 
exchange rate unification as a result of monetary integration will reduce this source of 
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uncertainty and therefore increase welfare. Moreover, once risk-averse individuals are assured 
about their future revenues, they will be less reluctant to part with their capital in terms of 
investment, which could have the potential of further stimulating growth and welfare in the 
economy. 
Tjirongo (1995: 15) and Rwakunda (2004: 33) both argue that exchange rate uncertainty also 
introduces uncertainty about future prices of goods and services. Considering that economic 
agents make their decisions regarding production, investment, and consumption on the 
information that the price system provides for them, if such prices become more uncertain the 
quality of the decisions would decline. Price uncertainty can result in increases in risk which will 
cause the real interest rate to rise as investors will require a higher risk premium to compensate 
them for the increased riskiness of the project. These high interest rates lead to increased 
problems in selecting investment projects in an efficient way, and the problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection'O become significant, which could lead to the selection of more risky 
projects thereby increasing systemic risk. Thus according to Tjirongo (1995: 16) a monetary 
union would eliminate this exchange rate uncertainty, allowing the price mechanism to serve as a 
better guide to making informed economic decisions, and thus reduce the amount of risky 
projects selected by the market. Hence, the elimination of exchange rate risk would lead to a 
larger welfare gain especially in small and open economies (Tjirongo, 1995: 16). 
With the reduction in exchange rate uncertainty and the assurance provided to risk averse 
individuals regarding the certainty of their future revenues, accompanied by an efficient price 
mechanism, economic agents will be able to make better informed decisions as a result of 
monetary integration. Tavlas (1993: 668) argues that this could further reduce the costs of trade 
and FDI and, according to Weimann (2002: 7), would result in an improvement in capital 
allocation and would also increase economic growth. The Economic Commission for Africa 
(2004: 13) adds that this FDI could further promote knowledge spillovers and technology 
transfers raising productivity in member countries. 
10 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for more elaborate discussion on these concepts. 
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iii. Benefits Resuitillgji-om Economies of Scale 
Monetary integration reduces distortions and enlarges markets, allowing firms to become more 
competitive. The increase in competition may encourage firms to eliminate internal inefficiencies 
and raise productivity" (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004: 12). Tavlas (1993: 668) points 
out that there are also further economies of scale to be derived from the move to monetary 
integration which come about from the enlargement of the foreign exchange market which 
deceases the volatility of prices and the ability of speculators to influence them, and thus to 
disrupt the conduct of monetary policy. The elimination of the need for reserves for intra-area 
transactions and the improved allocational efficiency of the financing process would provide 
both borrowers and lenders with a broader spectrum of financial instnunents enabling them to 
make more efficient choices in terms of duration and risk (Tavlas, 1993: 669). 
iv. Increased Investment 
The benefit of increased investment can be viewed as a result of the two previous advantages 
mentioned above. Saville et al. (2005: 684) add that the increase in investment and trade flows 
due to unionisation is a result of reduced exchange rate uncertainty and transaction costs. This 
idea stems from the fact that reduced transaction costs and the increase in investment by risk-
averse economic agents will help facilitate the free movement of capital amongst member states. 
Additionally, with a well-functioning price mechanism, agents are able to screen out good 
projects from bad ones, and as a result revenues from investments will increase, making larger 
investments more attractive, and contributing to economic welfare and growth. Furthermore, 
monetary integration would encourage foreign investors to invest in one member country with 
the intention of trading freely with all members, also known as tariff jumping (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2004: 12-13). 
v. Commitment Mechanism 
The concept of the commitment mechanism can be understood in light of two aspects described 
by Aziakpono (2008b: 87), namely macroeconomic discipline and signalling. In the case of 
macroeconomic discipline, monetary integration forces member countries to follow a strict set of 
II A consequence of this may be a reduction in staffing but the increase in competition will increase worker 
productivity and thus be an attractive benefit for small and low income countries such as in the case of East Africa 
(Economic Commission for AtTica, 2004: 12). 
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convergence criteria before they can be admitted to the monetary union (as will be seen further in 
this chapter). Therefore member countries will be committed to following good macroeconomic 
policies and, at the same time, can be penalised for bad policies. The commitment to sound 
policies by members would lead to macroeconomic stability (e.g. a low inflation rate) and capital 
inflow into the union which would further stimulate growth, for example via investment. With 
regard to signalling, the policies adopted as a result of monetary integration serve as an 
indication or signal to investors outside, that the countries are committed to adopting sound 
macroeconomic polices in the future. Once again, this leads to capital inflows resulting in an 
increase in the level of domestic investment within the union as well as foreign investment into 
the union (Aziakpono, 2008b: 87). 
vi. Agency of Restraint 
The fOI1llation of a supranational monetary authority or a Common Central Bank (CCB) acting 
as an agency of restraint would enhance the credibility of monetary policy. Monetary 
mismanagement in most African countries offers a strong case for the delegation of monetary 
policy to a suitable supranational monetary authority (Honohan and Lane, 2000; Masson and 
Pattillo, 2005). When monetary policy is ceded to a CCB, the influence of any single government 
on the CCB would be less than in the case of national central banks. This could enhance its 
independence and its ability to resist pressure for monetary financing (Masson and Pattillo, 2005) 
forcing governments to adhere to more sound fiscal policy as well (Buigut, 2006: 302). 
In light of the above, the fact that member countries have 'given their word ' to pursue sound 
macroeconomic policies does not necessarily mean that it will be done. Thus the effectiveness of 
regional integration arrangements as a ' commitment mechanism' depends on their provisions 
and how enforceable those provisions are. For example, the costs of breaking the rules of a 
monetary union, or leaving it, or being expelled from it should be high and would make the 
agreements more effective. At the same time, strong economic ties among members and the 
willingness by those members to punish violations of rules also create effective arrangements 
(Economic Commission of Africa, 2004: 14; Guillaume and Stasavage, 2000: 1393; Alesina et 
ai., 2002: 7). Hence, under these circumstances, members would have no choice but to put in 
place and actually follow sound policies. 
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2.3.2 Costs of Forming a Monetmy Union 
Despite the numerous gains just discussed, the literature also highlights possible costs of 
monetary integration and the fonnation of monetary unions. A review of the literature'2 suggests 
that the benefits may outweigh the costs of monetary integration. The most notable cost 
identified is the loss of monetary policy independence and exchange rate policy among countries. 
This and other potential costs are exarrtined next. 
i. Loss of National Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy Independence 
The most crucial drawback associated with forming a monetary union, according to Buigut and 
Valev (2009: 591), is the loss of independent monetary policy. Countries would have to 
relinquish their monetary policy autonomy and follow a common monetary policy and exchange 
rate regime. If exchange rates are pennanently fixed and capital is highJy mobile, domestic and 
foreign assets become perfect substitutes. As a result, national interest rates are equalised across 
members of the union . The consequence of this is that an independent effort by an individual 
central bank to reduce its domestic interest rates would result in an outflow of funds to more 
attractive assets in other countries. Thus members of the union cannot conduct a monetary policy 
independent from the rest of tile other union members and vice versa (Glick, 1991: I). 
Mkenda (2001: 4) further notes that a country surrendering the exchange rate as an instnunent 
loses a mechanism for protecting itself from economic shocks. This would not be a problem if 
the shocks were symmetric (i.e. they affect all countries equally) as a common policy response 
would be appropriate. However, if the shocks are asymmetric (i.e. they affect the members 
differently), for example due to different industrial structures, then a common policy may not be 
appropriate, and tlms the inability of a country to use the exchange rate and monetary policy to 
make the necessary adjustments may result in greater instability in output and employment. 
Considering that countries in a monetary union have lost their ability to use monetary and 
exchange rate polices, one may wonder what tools would be available for these countries to 
combat negative external shocks. The literature on OCA theory argues that members should have 
the flexibility to use fiscal policy under such circunlstances. However, according to Jefferis 
" In addition to the studies that helped categorise the benefits, further studies include Glick (1991), Tjirongo (1995), 
Mkenda (2001), and Buigut and Valev (2009). 
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(2007: 88), tile use of fiscal policy is limited for two main reasons. First, the use of fiscal 
expansion to compensate for negative shocks can lead to problems of public debt sustainability. 
Second, budget deficits in one country may have negative externalities for other members of the 
monetary wlion, if additional borrowing and recow'se to capital markets pushes union wide 
interest rates upwards. Thus this is a problem with any monetary union with centralised 
monetary policy decision making and decentralised fiscal policy decision making. 
In order to rectify the above problems, limits on budget deficits were adopted under the EMU, 
which constrained the use of fiscal policy as a stabilisation policy by EMU member states. It is 
evident that none of the three macroecononuc policies (monetary, exchange rate and fiscal) are 
available to national governments witlun a union. Therefore, tile loss of monetary policy and the 
exchange rate as a stabilisation policy can have further negative effects such as adjustment 
problems, and the difficulty of responding to econonlic shocks, especially opposing shocks 
across monetary union members (Jefferis, 2007: 88). 
ii. Loss of Seignorage Revenue 
The loss of seignorage revenue has mOfe relevance to African countries. In such countries the 
role of the government as the sole issuer of money is important. Because countries face different 
allocation costs for taxes, and hence their optimal inflation rates differ, this suggests that any 
common currency constraint that makes the inflation rates of two countries couverge must 
decrease the revenue of at least one of the countries (Goldberg et ai., 1993). Tjirongo (1995: 18) 
adds that the less developed the tax system, the greater the economic costs in raising revenue by 
increasing taxes, and the lower the cost of increasing revenues through inflation. This would 
imply that for a high inflation country converging to a lower rate of the currency union there will 
be a cost in terms of seignorage revenue l3 . Afxentiou (2000: 250) argues that tlus loss in 
J3 Hanahan and Lane (2000: 12) argue that monetary unions targeting low inflation will generate a limited amount 
of seignorage, and that Africa relies more on seignorage than Europe. They further add that loss of seignorage is a 
major fiscal consequence of monetary discipline. Therefore in order to prevent this loss in revenue for African 
countries, the new arrangements will need to anticipate and make adequate provision for net benefits. For example 
the Franc and Rand zones both include a seignorage sharing mechanism. 
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seignorage mainly affects countries with a high rate of inflation, that print money to finance their 
budget deficits instead of borrowing money in the markets 14. 
Despite the costs of the formation of a monetary union, evidence according to Saville et al. 
(2005: 684) suggests that countries that unionise enjoy net economic benefits. The authors 
further note that considering that unionisation is a multilateral exercise, countries that are 
considering unionisation must contemplate the feasibility of entry into a monetary union. 
Furthermore, according to Maruping (2005: 131), integration can be complicated by perceived or 
real gains or losses among the members that may lead to disputes and a sense of loss of national 
sovereignty. 
Therefore, for integration to be successful, it requires strong comntitment in implementing the 
agreed arrangements, fair mechanisms to solve disputes and equitable distribution of the gains 
and costs of integration (Maruping, 2005: 131). One way to achieve this commitment is to follow 
a set of convergence criteria that countries set for themselves in order to form a monetary union. 
Not only will this allow countries to better contemplate the feasibility of entry into the monetary 
union, it will also allow them to reap the benefits of joining the monetary union once they have 
adhered to the convergence criteria. The convergence criteria pertaining to the East African 
countries will be discussed in the following chapter together with the historical background of 
the East African Community. 
However, at this point the critical question raised is, to what extent have the East African 
countries achieved their convergence criteria? In looking at convergence, traditionally, studies 
have tried to examine such a question in different ways. Some studies employ the interest rate 
pass-through analysis (PT), while others have used the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) 
in their analysis (cf. Tjirongo, 1995; Mkenda, 2001 and Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008). This 
study, however, draws more on PT analysis, which forms part of the nominal convergence 
criteria. For this reason the study will first review the theory of pass-through analysis and show 
how it can be used to gauge the extent of integration amongst countries. Thereafter, the empirical 
literature will be reviewed. 
14 This however may not be a problem as the convergence criteria require countries to reduce their inflation rates in 
their efforts to qualify for membership into the monetary union. 
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2.4 THE THEORY OF INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH 
The PT process can be regarded as extremely important for the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Central banks have a dominant influence on money market conditions and can steer money 
market rates. Changes in the official central bank rates affect the interbank market rate (first 
stage of the PT process), which in turn, affects retail bank rates to different degrees (second stage 
of the PT process, both stages discussed below). Furthermore, bank decisions regarding the 
yields paid on their assets and liabilities have an impact on expenditure and investment 
behaviour of deposit holders and borrowers and thus economic growth (De Bondt, 2005 37-38). 
The process that describes how changes in the official rates affect other retail rates is best 
explained via the monetary policy transmission mechanism (MPTM). 
The MPTM describes a process through which a change in monetary policy is transmitted to 
achieve the ultimate goal of monetary policy, such as stable and low inflation and economic 
growth (De Angelis et al., 2005: 5)15. The literature highlights that the transmission of monetary 
policy can take place via the different channels and stages. According to Aziakpono et al. (2007: 
I) the effectiveness of the process would depend on the speed and magn.itude of the transmission 
of official rates to other retail rates. 
Aziakpono et al. (2007: 2) highlight that tbe importance of the speed and magnitude of 
transntission process lies in the fact that if the response of the market rates are not noticed 
because they are too small, or if the response is delayed or sluggish, then monetary policy may 
not achieve the desired goal, regardless of the size or magnitude of the change in the official 
interest rate. In relation to this study, if the East African countries market rates are able to 
respond quickly to changes in their official rates, it may be an indication that the countries are 
achieving nominal convergence, a necessary condition for a monetary union. Therefore, the 
speed and size of the response are not only important for effective monetary policy but may 
indicate if countries are ready to form a monetary union 
Faure (2006) identifies six stages in the transmission process, 16 however, for the purposes of this 
study it is the transmission of monetary policy via the first two stages that is of relevance. The 
15 The literature on the MPTM has been reviewed extensively by authors such as Mishkin (2005) and Faure (2006). 
16 See Faure (2006) for detailed description of each of the six stages. 
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first stage has to do with the transmission of the central bank lending rate to the private bank-to-
bank interbank market, and the second stage is concerned with the transmission of interbank 
rates to other market interest rates . A number of studies 17 have focused on the first two stages in 
order to examine the speed and magnitude of bank interest rates adjnstment and the possibility of 
asymmetric adjustment in these rates. 
Of the varying methodologies used to identify the speed and magnitude of changes in interest 
rates, the PT estimationl8 has been used extensively in the euro area. Sander and Kleimeier 
(2006a: 216) note that the fmancial part of the monetary transmission process can be investigated 
by means of PT estimation which may reveal how fast and how complete changes in monetary 
policy rates are passed on to retail bank lending and deposit rates. The authors note that PT 
analysis is important because it can reveal information abont competition in banking markets. 
From an international context, PT analysis can further reveal asymmetries across countries under 
a single monetary policy. However, the PT of official rates to market rates can be slowed down 
due to rigidities in market rates, which may impede the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Additionally, market rates may respond differently to increases or decreases in the official rate. 
The literature identifies a number of factors that canse rigidity in interest rate adjnstments to 
changes in official interest rates . These are discussed next. 
2.4.1 Financial Structure 
According to Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994: 590) the concept of financial structure is a broad one 
and can be attributed to a number of factors such as the degree of competition within the banking 
system, and between banks and other non-fmancial institutions. They note tl,at the factors that 
may affect competition levels may include the regulatory environment, tl,e number and size of 
inteffilediaries, ownership structure of the financial intermediaries and the openness of the 
fmancial system. The authors note that if the bank loan market is competitive, then their lending 
17 See Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992) and Scholnick (1996). 
18 Sander and Kleimeier (2006a: 216; 200Gb: 406) note that PT studies have been based on the pioneering work by 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). Other important contributions include Cottarelli el al. (1995), de Bondt e/ al. (2002), 
Toolserna el al. (2002), Heinemann and Schuler (2003), and de Bondt (2005). 
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rates would adjust to changes in the official rates without delayl9, but if there is a lack of 
competition, for example due to baniers to entry, then this may lead to rigidities in interest rates 
(Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994: 592). 
Another factor that may reduce competition has to do with the ownership structure of the banks. 
Aziakpono and Wilson (2008: 8) note that state-dominated banks can sometimes result in some 
form of monopoly which, as noted above, can result in interest rate rigidities. 
Further factors that may impede the PT of interest rates can be explained with the aid of two 
competing hypothesis developed by authors in their asymmetric price rigidity framework. The 
first hypothesis, developed by Hannan and Berger (1991), focused on collusion by banks. 
Essentially, their hypothesis was based on the premise that in a market dominated by a few banks 
it would be very costly for them to break price agreements due to the extra payments made to 
depositors if tllere was an increase in the deposit rate. The second hypothesis was developed by 
Neumark and Sharp (1992) and centred on tlle negative reactions of customers, whereby the 
commercial banks would take into account the views and reactions of their customers before 
adjusting any of their retail rates. According to Aziakpono and Wilson (2008: 8), the two 
competing hypotheses would imply certain movements in the interest rates. The collusion 
hypothesis would imply that the deposit rates would be rigid upwards when the official rates are 
reduced, whereas the lending rates would be more rigid downwards following a reduction in the 
official rates. In similar light the adverse customer reaction hypothesis would inlply that tlle 
deposit rates would be rigid downwards following a reduction in the official rates, while the 
lending rates would be rigid upwards following an increase in the official rates. 
The last factor that falls under the financial structure is the openness of the fmancial system. 
Essentially, if the financial system is open, then banks have access to alternative sources of 
finance. As a result there is no need for banks to rely on the accommodation facilities provided 
by the central bank. This lack of reliance on the central bank as a source of flllance would lead to 
a slower response of bank interest rate changes following changes in the official rates (Fourie et 
al., 1999; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2008). 
Iq However, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994: 592) note that this is not always the case, for instance, state-owned banks 
lending rates can be delayed due to political pressures or just inefficiency. 
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2.4.2 Asymmetric b?(ormation 
Asymmetric infonnation problems of adverse selection and moral hazard increase 
uncertainty/risk in lending transactions. The greater the threat of defaulrlO, the greater the 
perceived need by banks to maintain a large spread between lending and deposit rates. In such a 
case efforts by the central bank to influence market rates may be fiercely resisted by banks. An 
expansionary monetary policy, for example, would lower official interest rates but not 
necessarily translate into lower lending rates by banks (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
2.4.3 The Stage of Financial Development 
If a financial system is well developed and carries out its operations efficiently and effectively, 
then even the services it offers to its customers (the savers and investors) will be of a high 
standard. The financial system will be able to offer a diverse range of alternative financial 
instruments and intennediaries. These intennediaries in turn would also offer different 
investment opportunities, such as bond and equity markets. With a large number of altemative 
fmancial instruments and intennediaries, which may even result in competition amongst these 
intennediaries to offer innovative financial instruments for their customers, then it would not be 
possible for just one financial intennediary to obtain a monopoly status, therefore interest rates 
would be more flexible and respond more readily to changes in market conditions (Aziakpono 
and Wilson, 2008: 9). 
The above set out to review some of the factors that may lead to interest rate rigidities. It is 
important to note that these factors do not affect all countries in a similar way as the financial 
system in some countries may he more or less developed or the financial environment may 
differ. However, analysis of the above factors can to some degree aid in identifying the extent of 
integration amongst a group of countries, and thus a number of empirical studies have set out to 
examine the relationship hetween the official and money market interest rates. The next section 
reviews these studies, beginning with a world wide analysis and narrowing down to the East 
African case. 
20 This threat of default could be associated with an undeveloped financial system and a weak legal environment. 
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2.5 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
To date a number of empirical studies have been carried out to assess the optimality of potential 
or actual currency areas and whether different countries are suitable to join and form monetary 
unions (cf. Fielding and Shields, 1999; Phylaktis, 1999; Haug et al., 2000; Mkenda, 2001; 
Maskay, 2001; De Bondt el al., 2002; De Bondt, 2005; Grandes, 2003 ; Zhang et ai., 2003 ; 
Buigut and Valev, 2005a and 2005b; Alm el al., 2006 Aziakpono, 2006; Egert et al., 2007 
Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008; Aziakpono et al., 2008; Aziakpono, 2008a; Marotta, 2008). 
However, with regard to East Africa, Buigut and Valev (2005b: 2120) argue that there is a 
glaring scarcity of empirical work for the EAC. The few studies on the EAC include those of 
Buigut and Valev (2005a; 2005b and 2009) and Mkenda (2001). Thus there is a vital need to add 
to the scant empirical literature relating to monetary integration in East Africa. Therefore, the 
following section reviews empirical studies that have tried to gauge the extent of integration 
amongst countries around the world. As has already been noted, this will serve as an indication 
of whether members are making progress in achieving their convergence cl1teria and indicate 
whether they are suitable to join or form a monetary union and reap the benefits of monetary 
integration. 
The studies will be outlined in tenns of empirical methodology used and findings will be 
discussed. The studies differ in terms of their methodologies, variables used and sample periods, 
which may make comparison somewhat difficult. Thus in order to distinguish between the 
findings and make comparisons, the empirical review begins by reviewing studies carried out in 
the rest of the world, such as the euro area, and then narrows down to the African region and 
more specifically to East Africa. 
2.5.1 The Illternationai Case 
Essentially, authors21 have used a number of approaches by making use of the nominal 
convergence criteria of a group of countries. As noted above, one of the most dominant and well-
known approaches used is tl,e interest rate pass-through analysis, especially in the euro zone. 
21 See Mkenda (2001) and Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008). 
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Studies have also recognised the theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) as another dominant 
method to analyse the extent of integration among countries. 
Bergman (1999) examined whether the countries which fornled the Scandinavian Currency 
Union (SCU) - Denmark, Norway and Sweden - constituted an optimum currency area from the 
period 1873-1921. He investigated the behaviour of six macroeconomic aggregates during the 
years of the SCU: output growth, money growth, inflation, long term nominal and real interest 
rates and the discount rate. Furthermore, to investigate whether the single currency area inlposed 
stronger restrictions on macroeconomic behaviour, two additional countries were included -
England and Germany - as they were the most important trading partners of the Scandinavian 
countries during this period (Bergman, 1999: 367). The author further estimated a structural 
V AR model to examine the symmetry of country-specific structural shocks in each of the three 
countries. For comparison purposes, a model was estimated for Belgium, which belonged to the 
gold standard and was a member of the Latin muonn 
The empirical results suggested that country-specific structural shocks in the Scandinavian 
countries were not highly symmetric during the SCU period. Results also showed an absence of 
clear-cut differences between the pattern of structural shocks in Belgium, and structural shocks 
in the three Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, it was found that macroeconomic perfonnance 
in the three countries was not different from the behaviour of England and Germany, which 
suggested that the gold standard imposed strong restrictions on monetary policy such that the 
addition of a single currency within the Scandinavian countries only affected macroeconomic 
perfoilllance slightly. Given these findings, Bergman (1999) concluded that the Scandinavian 
countries did not constitute an optimum currency area. 
Toolsema et al. (2002) examined how the pass-through of monetary policy measures in six of the 
largest EMU countries23 had evolved over time, i.e. whether or not the pass-tlrrough had become 
more sintilar in these countries indicating whether there was convergence in monetary 
22 Bergman (1999: 370) noted that a problem associated with siudying the symmetry of country-specific structural 
shocks is that the shocks in two countries may be correlated due to their economic structures being similar or 
because both countries depend on economic developments outside the two countries (foreign shocks). To control for 
this problem, Bergman (1999) included German output in the model such that the author's measure of country 
specific shocks wouJd be net of foreign influence. 
BThe six EMU countries included were Belgium. Germany, Spain, France. Italy and The Netherlands. 
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transmission. Using monthly data from the peliod 1980-2000, the authors first estimated the long 
run relationship between money market and lending rates using the Fully Modified ordinary least 
squares (FM-OLS) estimator and test for parameter stability. The results of the test indicated that 
the relationship between the money market and the lending rates was not stable in all countries, 
meaning that changes did occur over time. The relationship was therefore examined in more 
detail using rolling regression techniques in an Error Correction Model (ECMi4 . The authors 
found that there were major differences in pass-tilough in the sample used in temlS of initial and 
long-run responses to policy-induced interest rate changes. However, there was some evidence 
for convergence of monetary policy transmission. 
Sander and Kleinleier (2004) investigated the pass-through process for ten different loan and 
deposit rates in ten eure-zone countries over the period 1993-2002. In order to carry out the 
study of the pass-through analysis, the authors employed a unifying approach that utilised V AR 
and cointegration metilOdologies allowing for asymmetric and threshold adjustment. TIle results 
of the study suggested that the euro-zone pass-through mechanisms have undergone structural 
changes in the past decade, however these changes do not coincide with the introduction of a 
single currency. Their findings showed that during the post-break period the pass-through of 
monetary policy impulses had inlproved with respect to lending but not to deposit rates. 
Furtheffilore, an incomplete long-run pass-through for most retail rates was observed, and 
interestingly the shorter the maturity tile higher the pass-through of the lending rate. The autilOrs 
noted that while the pass-through has remained heterogeneous across the eure-zone countties, 
the market for short-tenn corporate lending had become more homogenous, indicating a more 
integrated market. 
In another study, Sander and Kleimeier (2006b) investigated the interest rate pass-through 
convergence for eight Central and Eastern European Countries" (CEECs) that joined the 
European union, the aggregate euro zone and four countries chosen as representative for the 
different legal families26• For the CEECs data for a number of retail interest rates were used for 
24 The method involves adding one observation at the end of the sample, and dropping one at the beginning. 
;::S The eight countries were the Czech Republic. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia. 
2<> The four countries were Finland, Germany, Ireland and Spain. 
24 
the period 1993-2003, and for the euro zone, due to lack of data, the sample period started from 
1996. The authors utilized VAR and cointegration methodologies that allowed for thresholds, 
asymmetric adjustment and structural changes. In order to account for any structural changes in 
the CEECs banking markets, they conducted their analysis for 5-year rolling sub-periods from 
1993-1997, 1994-1998, and so on until 1999-2003. The authors further investigated convergence 
towards a structural break-free "post-break" period for the aggregate euro zone and the four 
representative euro zone countries. This was done in order to investigate convergence towards 
the euro-zone. The structural breaks were detem1ined using a rolling Chow-test methodology 
(Sander and Kleimier, 2006b: 407-408) . 
The results of this study can be explained based on the two stages that were carried out. The fIrst 
stage looked at the pass-through of interest rates, and the second incorporated fmancial structure 
and macro variables into the model to detem1ine whether they affected the pass-through of 
interest rates. Based on the flISt stage analysis, the authors found that the pass-through in many 
of the CEECs had become faster over time and was more complete than in the euro zone. The 
results from the second stage analysis suggested that convergence across the CEECs could be 
predicted with market concentration, bank health, foreign bank participation and monetary policy 
regime as conditioning factors, however there was no evidence for convergence towards the euro 
zone (Sander and Kleimeier, 2006b: 422). 
A final study conducted by De Bondt (2005) examined the interest rate pass-through at the euro 
area level in order to analyse the impact of the introduction of a common monetary policy in the 
euro area (De Bondt, 2005: 38). From the period 1996-200127, three different empirical 
frameworks were used to identify the robustness of the empirical results. First, a VECM was 
applied to model both stages of the interest rate pass-through process sinmltaneously8 
27 De Bondt reviewed nine studies afeuro area countries, namely. BIS (1994), Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Borio 
and Fritz (1995), Kleimeier and Sander (2000), Hofmann (2000), Mojon (2000), Donnay and Degryse (2001), and 
Toolsema el al. (2002), and concluded that although all studies showed cross-country differences in interest rate 
pass-through, the pattern remained unclear. 
2& Central banks have a dominant influence on money market conditions and thus steer the short-term money market 
interest rates, which, in turn, may affect market interest rates with a longer maturity. This is considered as the first 
stage. Furthermore, th is change in market interest rates, in turn, affects retail bank rates to varying degrees, and is 
considered as the second stage of the interest rate pass-through process (De Bondt, 2005: 43). 
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Secondly, these two stages of the interest rate pass-through process were separately examined by 
performing an impulse response analysis based on a V AR model of interest rate pairs in levels. 
The third empirical framework was an ECM, which examined the inunediate or within one-
month pass-through, the [mal pass-through, and the average speed at wltich the final pass-
through is reached. 
The empirical results based on the VECM and VAR model suggested that the pass-through of 
official interest onto market interest rates was complete for money market interest rates up to 
three months, but not for interest rates with longer maturities. Furthermore, the immediate pass-
through of market interest rates to retail bank rates was incomplete and the proportion of the 
given market interest rate change that was passed through in the short run (i.e. witltin one month) 
was around 50 percent. The pass-through was found to be higher in the longer term and notable 
for bank lending rates close to 100 percent (De Bondt, 2005: 65-66). 
In light of the studies examined above, although the methodologies employed differed, one can 
single out that the dominant method utilised was the interest rate pass-through analysis which 
examined how fast market rates would respond to changes in the official rates. Based on the 
studies reviewed above, it can be concluded that although it seems that the pass-through in the 
euro zone has improved over time with respect to varying retail rates, one cannot safely conclude 
that there was convincing evidence of complete convergence in the euro zone in both the long 
and short term. The next sections review the empirical work carried out in Afiica so as to 
identifY whether any inferences can be made regarding the extent of integration in African 
regIons. 
2.5.2 The Case of Africa 
In an attempt to identifY and compare macroeconomic shocks to different members of the 
Afiican CFA Franc Zone and to Kenya, Fielding and Sltields (1999) estimated the degree of 
cross-country correlation between shocks to aggregate output growth and to consumer price 
inflation. The two CFA monetary unions are the West Afiican Economic and Monetary Union 
and the region of the Central Bank of Equatorial Afiica29• The authors modified the traditional 
~Q The two recent additions to the CF A, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, were not included in the study due to 
inadequate data. 
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Blanchard and Quah (1989) framework and constructed a structural V AR representation of the 
macro-economy for the 13 countries: the 12 CFA countries for which data was available plus 
Kenya for the period 1962-1991. Furthermore, the model was estimated by imposing identifying 
restrictions on a reduced forn1 V AR, the restrictions being imposed on the long run equilibrium 
model not the short run coefficients. Finally, using the V AR model the authors carried out an 
impulse response analysis for the impact of each shock on each variable in the 13 countries. 
The results of the study show a high degree of correlation between inflation shocks to different 
CFA members, but not between inflation shocks to the CFA and those of the representative 
country, Kenya. Furthermore, it was found that the correlation of inflation shocks across the two 
monetary tmions in the CF A was as high as the correlations within them, thus there was no 
particular advantage to having two currencies rather than just one. The authors note that this 
conclusion is not necessarily applicable to potential future members of an enlarged monetary 
union, and more work is required in estinlating shocks conditional on monetary policy over the 
wide variety of policy regimes encountered in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Fielding and 
Shields (1999), the conclusions of the study are conditional on the way the monetary authorities 
in the CFA conduct their policy (Fielding and Shields, 1999: 18). 
By making use of a two step VAR model, Buigut and Valev (2005a: 10) examined the possibility 
of forming monetary unions in 21 Eastern and Southern African countries. The sample period for 
most of the countries was 1971 -2002, and the study aimed at identifying and comparing 
macroeconomic shocks to aggregate output growth and inflation. In doing so, the authors made 
use of the VAR identification scheme which was based on the aggregate demand and supply 
framework (AD-AS). If the correlations are positive, then they were considered symmetric, and 
if negative they were considered asymmetric. The more symmetric the shocks, the more feasible 
it becomes for a group of countries to establish a monetary union (Buigut and Valev, 2005a: 12). 
The authors found that South Africa showed significant correlations in the supply shocks it faced 
with those faced by its neighbouring states of Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. Based on 
the correlations and geographical proximity, the authors suggest a tripolar route to monetary 
integration. The first is a monetary tmion to encompass the southern cone, consisting of the 
existing CMA expanded to include Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. The second is an East 
African monetary union with the nucleus as the proposed EAC monetary tmion. The authors note 
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the EAC could be expanded gradually to include Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. 
Buigut and Valev (2005a: 14) note that though the EAC might not seem to be the natural anchor 
for the region it might still be the right nucleus since the EAC shows the necessary political will 
and has taken steps towards a monetary union. Lastly a third monetary union could be based on 
the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) for the Island economies3o (Buigut and Valev, 2005a: 14). 
In an extension to the above study, Buigut (2006) attempted to find a solution to the overlaps in 
membership of monetary integration initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) in a study 
which made use of the VAR and cluster analysis methods3 1• The clusters generated described the 
country groupings most suitable for a monetary union based on the variables used32 The study 
considered the region's features by analysing three separate scenarios, namely when there is no 
anchor currency, when South Africa assumed the role of the anchor economy with other 
countries pegging to the Rand (as is currently the case in the CMA), and when the euro is 
assigned the role of the anchor currency (Buigut, 2006: 303). 
The overall results indicated that the ESA region had not converged enough for an ESA-wide 
monetary union. Instead two distinct clusters, one in ti,e Southern cone around South Africa and 
ti,e other around the EAC, were identified. With regard to the EAC, which comprised the 
original three members (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) plus Rwanda, the author found that this 
group was a viable entity for a monetary union. The results supported the EAC monetary union 
initiative and suggested a step-wise approach to monetary union for COMESA with the EAC as 
the nucleus . This meant that Tanzania would have to abandon SADC membership for COME SA. 
Another significant finding was that Rwanda was consistently being grouped with the EAC. At 
the time the study was carried out, Rwanda was pursuing EAC membership, and the result in fact 
supported its admission into the community (Buigut, 2006: 310). 
30 The IDe cOWltnes included were Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius (Buigut and Valev. 2005a: 20). 
31 Cluster analysis refers to methods used to organise multivariate data into groups (clusters) based on a set of 
measurements such that the items in the same group are as similar as possible (Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008). The 
algorithms generated from the cluster analysis were used to group Eastern and Southern African countries into 
monetary clusters using a set of variables motivated by OCA theory and nominal convergence criteria (Buigut, 
2006: 302-303) 
" See Buigut (2006: 303) for each of the variables used and how they were derived. 
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Aziakpono (2006) investigated the degree of fmancial integration amongst the SACU countries 
by examining the extent of their interest rate parity. The research tested whether the monetary 
policy stance in South Africa is passed through to and reflected in the monetary policy of other 
countries (wlrich the author referred to as the South African Dominance Hypothesis, SADH). 
Thus the study was concerned with the extent of interest rate pass-through from South Africa to 
the other members of the union, and whether arbitrage opportunities existed between the 
countries. The study made use of monthly interest rate series for the period 1990-2004. The 
methodology employed used cointegration and error correction techniques, as well as impulse 
response analysis. 
The results of the study confirmed the dominant role of South Africa in the Union, and indicated 
a lrierarchy of integration of the financial systems of each member state with that of South 
Africa, with Namibia being at the top, followed by Swaziland, Lesotho and finally Botswana. 
The results also suggested that the prevailing integration between the fmancial systems was 
mainly due to policy convergence]] rather than market convergence (Aziakpono, 2006: II). The 
study also found that the central banks (excluding Namibia) were more rigid than commercial 
banks in responding to changes in the official rate in South Africa. The final results of the study 
suggested greater rigidity in deposit rates than lending rates, since deposit rates had a lower 
response in the other SACU countries than in South Africa. This suggested the existence of 
strong market power enjoyed by banks because of limited competition. 
In a closely related study, Sander and K1eimeier (2006a) investigated the pass-through in all four 
CMA countries]4 for the period 1991-2005. The study took into account Aziakpono's (2006) 
SAD hypothesis and investigated both how national bank rates react to national monetary policy 
rate changes and how they react to South African monetary policy rate changes. In order to do so 
Sander and K1eirnier (2006a) conducted structural break tests due to the changing fmancial 
structures over time in order to search for a breakpoint. After identifying break-free (sub-) 
~~ The author notes that the policy convergence had to do with the response of interest rates in the other SACU 
countries to changes in the South African official rate. 
34 The CMA countries are South Africa. Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. The authors made use of two bank 
interest rates (prime lending rates and deposit rates) and two proxies of the monetary policy rate (Treasury bill rates 
and discount rates), 
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periods, the pass-through was estimated by employing a uniform empirical pass-through model 
that allowed for thresholds, asymmetric adjustment and structural changes over time (Sander and 
Kleimier, 2006a). 
The findings of the study suggested that the banking markets of the CMA did exhibit some 
degree of integration. In terms of the lending markets, although the pass-through across all four 
countries was not perfectly homogenous, they did [md a full PT in the long run with fast 
adjustment over some six months to the major driving interest rates. In tenns of deposit markets, 
the PT was heterogeneous across the countries with South Africa exhibiting a full and fast PT 
while Namibia exhibited deposit rate stickiness and adjustment asymmetries pointing to some 
degree of market imperfection. 
In an attempt to study the monetary and banking market integration in SADC, Aziakpono et al. 
(2008) investigated the state, development and drivers of banking market integration in the IS 
member countries of the SADC. The authors employed interest rate data for the sample period 
1990-2005 to investigate the monetary and banking market integration using a principal 
component analysis (PCA) as well as a pass-through analysis. The method was applied to 
different time periods, i.e. rolling time windows, in order to document the progress and 
development of financial integration over time (Aziakpono et al., 2008: 4). The objective of the 
study was to identify those countries of the SADC that were converging to the CMA countries in 
order to determine whether an expanded CMA was viable. This would shed light on the prospect 
for a SADC-wide monetary union (Aziakpol1o et al., 2008 : 19). 
The results of the study indicated that the CMA banking markets were most integrated, followed 
by SACU countries, and that the level of integration increased over time for each region and 
interest rate. The SADC region was subjected to further analysis focusing on tlle period 2000-
2005 where there was evidence of growing integration, with the aim of sorting the countries into 
groups that are becoming integrated based on the similarities of their movements. The analysis 
showed that the CMA countries are highly integrated. From the evidence provided by the study, 
Aziakpono et al. (2008: 29) noted that a selective and cautionary expansion of the CMA would 
be possible, with Seychelles, Zambia and Botswana being the first potential candidates. 
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Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) examined the suitability of countries in the West African region 
to form the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOW AS). This was performed over three overlapping periods: 1990-2004, 
1995-2004 and 2000-2004. To assess the possibility of a currency union in West Africa, the 
economic structures of the countries were examined to identify whether they were similar 
enough to support a fixed exchange rate agreement. Thus the choice of variables was based on 
the OCA literature as well as the convergence criteria set for the West African region. In order to 
do this, the study used a cluster analysis applying crisp (hard) and fuzzy (soft) clustering 
algorithms to those variables35 The findings of the study revealed dissimilarities in the economic 
characteristics of member countries, particularly W AMZ countries. FurthelIDore, when west and 
central African countries were considered together, there were significant heterogeneities within 
the CFA franc zone, and some similarities between the central African and W AMZ countries 
(Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008). 
Judging from the analysis of the studies carried out above, two important observations can be 
made. First, the theory of OCA aided a number of authors in identifying relevant criteria and 
variables for their study. And second, of the differing methodologies, tJ,e interest rate pass-
through analysis came out again as being dominant (as with the international studies) amongst 
several of the authors identified above. With reference to the studies that incorporated the EAC, 
the general finding was that the EAC was in fact suitable for a monetary union. The next section 
pays specific attention to the East African case to determine what studies have been carried out 
to gauge the extent of integration in East Africa. 
2.5.3 The Case arEas! Aji-ica 
The earliest study on this region was from Mkenda (2001), who investigated whether the East 
African Community (EAC), comprising Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, constituted an optimum 
currency area. The study was carried out over the period 1981-1998. The paper employed the 
3S The clustering method is classified into two groups according to the types of clusters obtained: crisp (or hard) and 
fuzzy (or soft) clustering techniques. The crisp approach divides the data into clusters so that each object in the data 
set belongs to only one cluster. However, the fuzzy technique does not force objects to belong to one cluster, rather 
it allows objects to belong to different clusters to some degree, conveying more information about the data than crisp 
clustering. (Tsangarides and Qureshi. 2008: 1264-1265). A principal component analysis was used to check the 
robustness of results for groupings generated from the clustering analysis. 
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Generalised Purchasing Power Parity (GPpp)36 method and varions criteria suggested by the 
theory of OCA to investigate the optimality of tbe community as a currency area. The criteria 
used included the degree of product diversification which was measured by constructing a 
Herfmdahl Index37 for the three countries, degree of openness, which was evaluated using the 
share of intra-regional trade in each of the countries GDP, and the share of total trade in GDP. 
Cyclical covariation in economic activity was another criteria used to measure the behaviour of 
the countries' macroeconomic variables38 The similarity of the industry structure was analysed 
using the contribution of industries to value added. The last criteria used to assess whether the 
EAC constituted an optimum currency area was the similarity of inflation across the countries, 
which would also indicate the manner in which the countries conduct their economic policies 
(Mkenda, 200 I: 32). In terms of the G-PPP method, Mkenda (200 I: 33) notes that the method 
was relevant in a multi-country setting. The author notes that a currency area within such a 
setting would be one where the factors that drive the real exchange rates would share common 
trends. In other words, the real exchange rates would be co-integrated and thus the G-PPP was 
used to establish the extent of cointegration among the countries exchange rates. 
According to Mkenda (200 I: 41) the results of the various indices that were calculated based on 
the theory of optinlum currency areas gave mixed verdicts and thus were not conclusive. Mkenda 
(200 I) noted that the countries rely heavily on the export of agricultural goods, which constitutes 
the main source of export eamings, and thus it is likely that the countries tend to experience 
similar extemal shocks. This result was confirmed by the G-PPP approach that showed that the 
36 The approach can he described in the manner in which it works. Real exchange rates tend to be non-stationary and 
can be influenced by fundamental variables such as income, terms of trade and so on. These variables themselves 
have been found to be non-stationary. thus real rates will also be non-stationary_ If two countries qualify for creation 
of a cun-eoey union, then they must experience symmetrical shocks to their fundamental variables. These 
fundamentals in two countries must move together, thus GPPP postulates that the real exchange rates between the 
two countries comprising the domain ofa currency area should be cointegrated according to Mkenda (2001; 33) and 
Enders and Hum (I 994: 180). Enders and HW'I1 (1994) applied this theory to the Pacific Rim and India. 
37 Essentially the Herfindahl index is a measure for determining market concentration. The values obtained ITom the 
index would give an indication of how competitive the market is (Johansson and Svensson, 2006: 19). Mkenda 
(2001) adapted this model to identify the concentration of the industries in terms of diversification of industries, i.e. 
how diversified the industrial sO'ucture was in terms of production of goorls. A high value would indicate a small 
degree of product diversification. Furthermore, a more diversified industrial structure would allow countries in the 
currency union to absorb some shocks affecting a particular sector (M kenda, 2001: 22). 
38 The macroeconornlc variable included growth of output and money, the nominal and real interest rates. 
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real exchange rates of the countries were cointegrated for the period 1981-1998 as well as for the 
period 1990-1998, suggesting that the countries tend to be affected by similar shocks. Mkenda 
(200 I: 42) further notes that the fornlation of a monetary union relies on political will and 
cultural ties of the countries concerned and should political stability endure in them, the 
prospects for more integration are good. 
In a similar manner Buigut and Valev (2005b) also assessed the suitability of the East African 
countries for a regional monetary union. Tins was the first study to include Burundi and Rwanda 
as part of the analysis of the EAC. The authors identified and compared macroeconomic shocks 
to the East African countries and to those of the EMU countries, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The authors focused on shocks to aggregate output growth and inflation which 
were considered the two most important indicators across Africa. Buigut and Valev (2005b: 
2120) noted that the limitation of Mkenda's (2001) G-PPP approach was that movements in 
macroeconomic variables reflected the combined effects of shocks and responses, which meant 
that Mkenda's (2001) methodology did not distinguish the shocks from the responses . To correct 
for tills, Buigut and Valev (200Sb) used a methodology adapted from Bayounli and Eichengreen 
(1992) that identified structural shocks using a V AR technique39 in order to identify supply and 
demand shocks for the East African countries. Impulse response as well as variance 
decomposition techniques were also canied out in the analysis. The study made use of mmual 
data for the five East African countries, the UK, the US and the EMU countries 40 covering the 
period from 1970 to 2001. 
The results from the correlation did not show strong support for a currency union but did indicate 
that more integration may improve the symmetry of shocks. The results from the impulse 
response functions followed similar patterns, with the exception of Uganda. The adjustment to 
output and prices to a supply shock occurred within the first three to four years and the long run 
magnitudes were close. It was noted that while the magnitude of the response was larger in 
Uganda and the adjustment took a long time, the overall results supported a monetary union 
39 A V AR technique is a statistical method that is used to estimate how an unpredictable disturbance affects other 
variables in the economy (Buigut and Valev, 2005b: 2120). The method employed was similar to their 2005a study. 
40 The EMU countries included were Germany, France and Italy. and in addition the GDP-weighted aggregate of all 
EMU countries was used. 
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among the East African countries. Furthennore, the evidence oflinking an East African currency 
to an external anchor was found to be weak, however, evidence from the lagged supply shock 
correlations was in favour of the euro as an anchor currency over the US$ and pound sterling. 
The most recent study done on East Africa was carried out by Buigut and Valev (2009). The 
methodology employed was a theoretical model developed by the authors to show that a 
multilateral monetary union can enhance monetary stability for its member states even if none of 
them has a history of independent and prudent monetary policy as in the case of the five-member 
EAC. The authors focused on credibility effects of monetary integration in addition to estimating 
the welfare loss from losing independent monetary policy in the EAC (Buigut and Valev, 2009: 
586). In order to study the welfare effects of an East African monetary union the authors adopted 
the approach used by Swank (I997)41 in their welfare framework using data on real and nominal 
GDP covering the period from 1990 to 200442 In carrying out their regressions, a rolling 
regression method was used, and then the same data series was used to identify the output shocks 
faced by the EAC countries by regressing the growth of real output on its two lags to identify the 
variance and covariance of the shocks for each country. 
The results of the model suggested that a monetary union may dampen the negative effects of 
policy shocks under the condition that the shocks are not highly correlated across member 
countries. Furthennore, the welfare effect of a monetary union differed across all five countries. 
Uganda and Tanzania did benefit from a union whereas Kenya, Burundi, and Rwanda did not. 
By decomposing the net welfare into three effects - those of loss from output shocks asymmetry 
due to lack of monetary policy independence, imported monetary policy credibility, and mutual 
restraint on monetary policy interference - the authors noted that the most important factor 
detennining net welfare were the strong preferences for output stimulation. They found that 
Uganda would benefit from a monetary union with countries that display stronger aversion to 
high inflation. Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi, however, would lose from a monetary union with 
the two countries (Uganda and Tanzania). According to Buigut and Valev (2009: 590), the 
41 In Swank's model, the policy maker chooses nominal output to balanct! the objectives of 1m:\' inflation and high 
output subject to a constraint based on the short run Phillips curve (Buigut and Valev. 2009: 588). 
42 The data set was deliberately kept short so as to capture relatively more recent developments in the five countries 
(Buigut and Valev, 2009: 588). 
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results indicate that none of the EAC countries would be able to fill the role of being the anchor, 
but the welfare of the countries would improve when the EAC currency is linked to the euro as 
anchor, causing the net welfare for Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania to increase, but not 
for Burundi. 
From the review of the studies above, with only three studies assessing the possibility of a 
monetary union, it is evident that the empirical work on East Africa is severely limited. 
Furthermore, the results as to whether the East African countries should form a monetary union 
remain to an extent inconclusive. For example, Mkenda (2001) argued for the possibility of 
monetary integration after finding that the exchange rates for the countries were co integrated. 
However, Buigut and Valev (2005b; 2009) remained sceptical stating that Kenya, Rwanda and 
Burundi would lose out if they formed a monetary union with Uganda and Tanzania. 
2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The chapter reviewed the issues surrounding the aspect of monetary unions and monetary 
integration. The different spectrums of monetary unions were reviewed in the forms of monetary 
integration. The focus of the study remained in the final stage, being a full monetary union where 
countries adopt a common currency and a single central bank to manage monetary policy. 
The review of empirical literature reveals that a large amount of research has been done in the 
Euro area and in Africa. In both cases, the PT estimation was seen as popular amongst several of 
the studies reviewed, however, this was not the case in East Africa. The only three studies 
focusing specifically on the East African case apply the G-PPP, V AR and a theoretical model by 
Mkenda (2001), Buigut and Valev (2005b) and Buigut and Valev (2009) respectively. Thus with 
regard to East Africa, as noted above, there has been no stndy that employed the interest rate 
pass-through method to gauge the degree of financial integration among the countries. 
Furthemlore, no stndy has assessed the extent of integration over time amongst all five East 
African countries. The importance of this lies in the fact that there is a need to identify how far 
the countries have come in tenns of their convergence process if they are to form a monetary 
union by 2012. Thus this stndy will fill the gaps by employing the interest rate pass-through 
methodology to identify the extent of integration and detemline the possibility of all five EA 
countries forming a monetary union. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter provides an overview of the East African Community (EAC) and draws on any 
implications that may have an effect on the pass-through analysis. Essentially, the community 
collapsed in 1977, and after its revival, the Republics of Burundi and Rwanda were accepted to 
it, boosting its membership to five countries. The critical objective of the new EAC is to form a 
monetary union by 2012. In order to do so, it has set aside convergence criteria for member 
countries to comply with as they progress towards a monetary union. This chapter reviews the 
convergence criteria, and highlights the objectives and achievements to date of the new EAC. 
The fmal section provides an individual country analysis that aids in identifying the factors that 
may have an impact on the interest rate pass-through analysis in each country. The chapter 
hegins with a historical background of the EAC. 
3.2 THE EAC: A HISTORlCAL BACKGROUND 
Integration arrangements amongst the East African cowltries began as early as the colonial times 
where the economies were integrated in both monetary and customs union. The EAC community 
treaty was signed in June 1967 by the heads of stale of the then three partner countries, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Even though the EAC was formalised in 1967, the conditions for the 
establishment of the EAC was developed during the colonial era, where in 1917 a customs union 
was established between Kenya and Uganda with Tanganyika (now Tanzania) joining ten years 
later in 1927. According to Mkenda (2001: 12) within the customs union the three member states 
jointly administered a number of services, such as customs tax, excise and income tax, medical 
and industrial research, education, transport and communication and agriculture. Additionally, 
the factors of production such as labour were mobile across the member states and a monetary 
union existed amongst the three countries with a high degree of fiscal integration (Mkenda, 
2001: 13; Bigslen and Mkenda, 2002: 39). 
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Bigsten and Mkenda (2002: 39) note that before the community was fonnalised certain 
significant developments occurred. The first was the establisrunent of the East African High 
Commission (EAHC) in 1948. This commission was made up of governors of the three countries 
and acted as a legislative and administrative organ for East Afiica, with policy decisions effected 
through its secretariat in Nairobi. The second development was the establishment of the Central 
Legislative Assembly (CLA) which considered and enacted laws relating to aspects of the 
counnon services (Mkenda, 2001: 13 ; Bigsten and Mkenda, 2002: 39). 
However, after all three countries gained independence43, certain changes occurred that affected 
how the co-operation was run. Masson and Pattillo (2005: 130) note that after independence the 
member countries, which shared a common currency under Britain's colonial rule, issued 
separate currencies. In 1961 , the high commission was transfonned into the East African 
Common Services (EACSO), which consisted of the chief executives of the three governments. 
Some changes were also effected in the way the CLA was to operate services (Mkenda, 2001: 
13; Bigsten and Mkenda, 2002: 39). Mkenda (2002: 13) notes that the CLA was enlarged, and 
the authority operated through various committees which comprised the three mirusters from 
each country. In 1967, the treaty that officially established the EAC was signed with the main 
aim of forrrung a common market. The treaty specified free exchange of currencies at par, and 
the link to the sterling was broken following the 1967 sterling devaluation (Masson and Pattillo, 
2005: 130). The treaty also established the East African Council consisting of three presidents 
and five councils assigned to various areas such as common market, commurucations, economics 
and planning, amongst others (Mkenda, 2002: 14). The aim of the connnuruty was stated as 
follows: 
it shall be the a1lll of the Conmlunity to strengthen and regulate the industrial, 
conllllercial and other relations of the partner states to the end that there shall be 
accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic 
activities the benefits whereof shall be equitably shared (Hazelwood, 1979: 53). 
43 In 1961 Tanzania, which was also knov.rn as Tanganyika, attained independence, and Kenya and Uganda gained 
their independence in 1963 and 1962 respectively. 
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After the treaty was signed in 1967, problems started to emerge in the monetary UOion. 
According to Mkenda (200 I: 15) the first problem that occurred in 1967 had to do with the 
nationalisation of banks in Tanzania and the ensuing exchange controls that were imposed 
against Kenya and Uganda to restrict capital flight. These exchange controls caused a temporary 
break in the union. In 1970, the announcement of a nationalisation policy in Uganda caused a 
heavy outflow of capital from all three countries. Exchange controls against Kenya and Uganda 
were imposed, and the export and import of the Ugandan currency was banned. As a result, in 
retaliation to the exchange controls member countries started to pursue their own policies with 
regard to the pegging of their currencies, and all currencies were then pegged to the dollar. This 
continued until the EAC collapsed in 1977, and was officially dissolved in 1983 (Mkenda, 2001: 
15). The next section identifies what caused this collapse of the EAC. 
3.2.1 TheCollapseoftheEAC 
Hazelwood (1979: 43) argues that the failure of the treaty could not be attributed to a single 
cause. The author notes that in reality, there were a number of interacting influences and issues, 
some of which may have derived from the Treaty and some not, which may have resulted in the 
collapse, and thus no simple lesson can easily be drawn from the EAC experience. 
A review of the literature44 highlights two major factors that contributed to the collapse of the 
EAC: differences relating to the distribution of benefits, and ideological clashes. With regard to 
the distribution of benefits, there was a feeling that the benefits of a common market were 
accruing more to Kenya than to Tanzania and Uganda. Furthermore, the fact that Kenya's 
industrial sector was more developed than that of the other member states meant that the 
relatively less developed countries were buying more goods from Kenya than Kenya was buying 
from them, which resulted in a trade imbalance in favour of Kenya, with Tanzania and Uganda 
being in persistent deficit to Kenya (Musonda et al., 1997; Rothchild, 1974; Bigsten and 
Mkenda, 2002: 40). Furthermore, the latter two countries were disappointed that compensating 
mechanisms such as subsidies, concessions from Kenya, or redistribution through the East 
African Development Bank did not work (Goldstein and Ndung' u, 200 I: II). 
44 See Mkenda (2001), BigSlen and Mkenda (2002), Masson and Pattillo (2005), and Kamala (2006). 
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The other factor that contributed to the collapse of the EAC, which according to Mkenda (200 I: 
16) may have been the most important one, was the ideological differences between the tlu'ee 
countries. Mugomba (1978: 262) argued that the tensions that were already in existence in the 
EAC were worsened by the ideological distance between the partner states. Politically, Tanzania 
(under President Julius Nyerere) and Uganda (under President Milton Obote) pursued socialist-
oriented strategies of development, while Kenya was more capitalistic, and thus was becoming 
isolated in a region that was predominantly socialist. Furthermore, Tanzania did not recognise 
the Idi Arnin government that took power in a 1971 coup in Uganda, partly because of the brutal 
nature of Jdi Amin's dictatorship. This prevented summit meetings of the three leaders of East 
Africa and contributed to the eventual collapse of the conununity in 1977 (Mugomba, 1978: 262; 
Mkenda, 2001: 17; Bigsten and Mkenda, 2002: 40). 
3.2.2 The revival afthe EAC 
The current EAC is regarded by many as a revival of the old EAC. Considering that it was 
mainly ideological factors and lack of compensatory mechanisms for addressing the inequalities 
in the sharing of the costs and benefits of the integration that led to its collapse in 1977, tllis 
section begins by reviewing how the community was revived and identifying what made it 
different from the old one. Furthermore, tlle objectives and achievements to date will be 
highlighted. 
Following the dissolution of the community, according to Bigsten and Mkenda (2002: 40) a 
mediation agreement was signed by the heads of the state of the partner countries to divide the 
assets and liabilities and to identifY the possibility of the member countries co-operating in the 
future. The result of this was the establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East 
African Co-operation in November 1993, and in 1996 the EAC secretariat was established 
(Bigsten and Mkenda, 2002: 40). In the meantime, the agreement that revived the EAC came 
under debate by the heads of state in April 1997 regarding whether the Agreement could be 
revived and signed as a treaty. It was fmaUy upgraded to a treaty, and signed in November 1999 
(Institute for Security Studies, 2006: 1-2). 
In addition to the decision to re-establish the EAC by the end of 1999, one of the vital issues 
raised was the admittance of Rwanda and Burundi to the EAC. The question of whether Rwanda 
should be admitted to the community raised a heated debate during a meeting attended by three 
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of the foreign ministers ill January 1999. The Ugandan delegation wanted Rwanda to be 
admitted, however, Tanzania disagreed, arguing that it was not possible to admit new members 
at that stage, as the procedure for doing so was still being debated . The proposal by Uganda was 
defeated when the Tanzanian and Kenyan delegates voted against it (Institute for Security 
Studies, 2006: 1-2). However, according to Ncube (2009: 1) the Republic of Rwanda and the 
Republic of Burundi joined the EAC in June 2007 and became full members of the community 
from July 2007. 
After the revival of the EAC, several institutions were set up to ensure that the objectives set out 
by member countries were achieved. These institutions included the summit, the council, the Co-
ordination Committee, the Sectoral Committees, the EAC Court, the EAC Assembly, and the 
Secretariat:s as stated in Article 9 in chapter 3 of the EAC Treaty (East African Community, 
1999: 20). In terms of the objectives, this was stated in Article 5 of the Treaty. Essentially, it 
sought to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation 
among the partner states so as to promote the development of the partner states economically, 
politically, socially and culturally on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit of the three 
partner states (EAC 1999: 15). In order to acltieve these objectives", the partner states undertook 
to establish a customs union by 2005 (which has already been acltieved as discussed below), a 
common market by 2010, a monetary union by 2012, and ultimately a political federation of the 
East African states (Sarotto, 2008: 2). Mkenda (200 I: 19) further notes that the EAC sought co-
operation in various other areas, such as fiscal and monetary policies, transport and 
C01Tl111unication, immigration, security, energy, promotion of investment in the region, political, 
health, labour, education and training amongst others. 
45 See Mkenda (2001 : 18) and the Institute for Security Studies (2006: 5-6) for more detail on what each of these 
organs of the EAC consisted of. 
46 When the EAC was revived, it launched its first Development Strategy (1997-2000) as a vehicle for achieving its 
objectives. However, constraints and limitations in implementation such as Wlrealistic time frames, lack of public 
education and campaigns, wrong sequencing of activities, and lack of donor funding for progranunes as well as 
reliance on donor funding are among the factors that led to the second Development Strategy. which covered the 
period 2001 to 2005. This Strategy took into account the aims of the treaty and accordingly set up actions consistent 
with those aims (Bigsten and Mkenda, 2002: 39-44). The third Development Strategy" (2006-2010) was launched 
in November 2006 and set out an ambitious programme and target for the realisation of a vastly transformed and fast 
modernising East African region (Sarotto, 2008: 2). 
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Because this study is particularly concerned with the establishment of a monetary union in East 
Africa, emphasis is placed on the objective of forming a monetary union with the goal of 
introducing a single currency by 2012. For monetary union to be realised, the members of the 
EAC have pledged to meet a series of economic convergence cliteria. Maruping (2005: 131) 
notes that for this to be successful, it requires strong commitment in implementing the agreed 
arrangements, fair mechanisms to solve disputes and equitable distlibution of the gains and costs 
of integration. Furthermore, not only will this allow countlies to better contemplate the 
feasibility of entry into the monetary union, it will also allow them to reap the benefits of joining 
the monetary union once they have adhered to the convergence criteria. The following sections 
identifY and examine these convergence critelia. 
3.3 MACROECONOMIC CONVERGENCE AND THE CRITERIA FOR FORMING 
A MONETARY UNION 
Typically, countlies forming a monetary union set criteria which members must meet before 
being able to join the monetary union. The most notable and widely cited criteria that has set the 
precedent for others being established in different parts of the world are the Maastlicht criteria. 
The Maastlicht treaty represented the first step toward the creation of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe (Soukiazis and Castro, 2005: 386). According to Bayoumi 
and Mauro (1999: 9), the Maastlicht treaty provided a detailed timetable and set of preconditions 
for the final stages of the process of monetary integration and convergence. These criteria were 
established so as to achieve nominal convergence, which would result in a reduction in the 
economic disparities that existed between the European Union (EU) countries before the creation 
of the EMU in 1999 (Soukiazis and Castro, 2005: 386). 
AfXentiou (2000: 249), Haug et al. (2000: 420), and Soukiazis and Castro (2003: 6) identify 
these criteria as 47 : 
4 7 See Polasek and Amplatz (2003) for further discussion on the criteria. 
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1. An inflation rate of no more thRn 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three 
countries with the lowest inflation rates; 
2. Nominal long-term interest rates not exceeding by more than 2 percentage points, 
those for the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; 
3. No exchange rate realignment for at least two years; and 
4. A government budget deficit and debts not exceeding 3 percent and 60 percent of 
GDP, respectively. 
According to Afxentiou (2000: 249), the first three convergence criteria were designed to ensure 
monetary stability by supporting a fixed exchange rate regime among member countries. The last 
two criteria were set out to reinforce the stability of the euro. This was aimed at protecting the 
European Union from threats of inflation which could have arisen from budget deficits. 
Following the pattern of the euro, African countries have begun to set criteria for themselves 
with slight variations due to the different economic environments. structural characteristics and 
macroeconomic conditions faced by these African economies. As a result, the majority of sub-
Saharan African countries are members of one or more regional or sub-regional arrangements. 
For example,48 regional arrangements in Southern Africa include the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and the South African Customs Union (SACU) which also 
has a Common Monetary Area (CMA), in central Africa, the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community (CEMAC) and in West Africa the Economic Community of West African 
States49 (ECOWAS) and its monetary union (UEMOA). 
The EAC has also set convergence criteria of its own. According to the Central Bank of Kenya's 
annual report (2008: 58), the Governors of the EAC partner states adopted a new set of 
convergence criteria in May 2007 which were classified into primary and secondary criteria. The 
primary criteria were the primary preconditions for convergence, which needed to be met, while 
the secondary criteria reinforced the primary criteria. 
48 See Maruping (2005: 133) for more examples of the different unions in Central Africa, East Africa, Southern 
Africa, North Africa and West Africa as well as other groupings. 
49 See for example Rossouw (2006: 384) for convergence criteria for SADC, Rogers (2004: 32) and Harvey et al. 
(2001) for convergence criteria for CEMAC, and Bawumia (2002: 2) for convergence criteria for ECOW AS. 
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The primary criteria are: 
I. Overall budget deficit/GDP ratio (excluding grants), of not more than 3 percent; 
2. Annual average inflation rate not exceeding 5 percent; 
3. Minimization of central bank financing to 0 percent target; and 
4. Foreign exchange reserves equivalent to six months of imports of goods and non-
factor services. 
The secondary criteria are: 
I. Achievement and maintenance of stable real exchange rates; 
2. Achievement and maintenance of market based interest rates; 
3. Achievement of sustainable real GDP growth rate of not less than 7.0 percent; 
4. Sustained pursuit of debt reduction initiative on domestic and foreign debt I.e. 
reduction of total debt as a ratio of GDP to sustainable level; 
5. National savings to GDP ratio of not less than 20 percent; 
6. Reduction of current account deficit (excluding grants) as a percentage of GDP to 
sustainable level consistent with debt sustainability; 
7. Implementation of the 25 core principles of bank supervision and regulation based on 
agreed action plan for harmonisation of bank supervision; and 
8. Adherence to the core principles for payment systems by modernising payment and 
settlement systems. 
The macroeconomic criteria provided above5o highlight that the success of any monetary 
integration process will largely depend on the extent to which member countries are able to meet 
their convergence criteria. It can be observed that the East African criteria bear some 
resemblance to those of the Maastricht Treaty but are more elaborate and detailed. Naturally one 
would expect the criteria to be more elaborate considering that the East African countries are 
developing, thus greater attention would be required in such countries to prepare them for 
monetary integration. The critical question raised at this point is, to what extent have the East 
African countries managed to achieve these criteria? 
50 The criteria presented above may lead one to question the possibility of them being attained, especially in less 
developed countries such as the EAC. Thus the relevance of this study is vital to determine the extent to which these 
member countries have met the convergence criteria. 
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Since its inception, the new EAC has achieved a number of its objectives. The most significant 
accomplishment, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2007: 50), has been the creation 
of the EAC customs union, which came into force on 1st January 2005. The customs unions 
provided for free trade between the member states, with the proviso that Uganda and Tanzania 
could still impose tariffs on selected Kenyan manufacturers for an interim five-year period. It 
also set a common external tariff (CET) for trade with the outside world of 25 percent for final 
goods, 10 percent for internlediate goods and 0 percent for raw materials. 
Following the implementation of the customs union, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have tried to 
harmonise their fiscal and monetary policies. For example, there is full convertibility of the three 
currencies in each of the countries, and an agreement has been reached to liberalise capital 
accounts (Mkenda, 2001: 19). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2007: 50) a 
Monetary Affairs Committee has also been established. Other notable achievements include 
holding of pre-budget and post-budget consultations by fmance ministers, synchronisation of the 
budget day, and development of a macroeconomic framework for the region in order to guide the 
three states towards economic convergence, establishment of the East African passport and 
reductions in border delays, harmonisation of customs documentation, and execution of a 
tripartite agreement on avoidance of double taxation. These are all aimed at achieving a single 
market (Mkenda, 2001: 19; Bigsten and Mkenda, 2002i'. 
The following section provides a historical context of each of the five EAC member cotmtries, 
by looking at their financial developments and monetary policy frameworks with a view to 
identifying any factors that could affect the pass-through of interest rates in the countries. 
51 See the East Afiican Community Portal (2009) which highlights a number of achievements to date ranging from 
policy matters to aspects such as gender issues. 
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3.4 OVERVIEW OF EAST AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
3.4.1. Kenya 's Financial System 
According to Ngugi and Kabnbo (1998: 6) at independence, Kenya inherited a financial system 
which comprised the Currency Board of East Africa, a conunercial bank sector dominated by 
foreign banks, and a small number of specialised financial institutions. 111is inherited financial 
system expanded and increased in terms of diversity in the 1970s and 1980s due to an increase in 
local participation in the fmancial system made possible by government policies. Fnrthennore, 
specialised institutions were set up to collect savings and fmance investment through the issuing 
of new bank and Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI) licences. During the 1980s the growth 
of locally owned Financial Institutions (FIs) increased and began to include commercial banks 
(Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998: 93). Ngugi and Kabubo (1998: 6) note that the number of 
commercial banks increased from 9 to 15 in 1980, and by 1985 there were a total of 23 
commercial banks. 
However, in the mid-1980s the financial system suffered its first major episode of fmancial 
fragility when several locally owned FIs were closed down after encountering severe liquidity 
problems due to mismanagement and fraud. The first cycle of bank failures occurred during 
1984-6 and in 1989-90 several small NBFIs and building societies collapsed and were taken over 
by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) (Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998: 93). Ngugi (2001: 7) 
notes that the reason for the collapse may be attributed to low entry capital requirements and 
inadequate supervision and the fact that most NBFIs were undercapitalised and poorly managed. 
FurthemlOre the NBFIs mismatched asset and liability maturities invested in riskier assets and 
offered higher rates than commercial banks, thus squeezing their margins and ultimately facing 
problems of illiquidity and insolvency. The problems did not stop there, Browubridge and 
Harvey (1998: 93) add that during the 1990s the scale of bank failures escalated when six banks 
and II NBFIs were put into liquidation or placed under statutory management of the CBK for 
serious breach of banking regulations during 1993_452 
S2 Brownbridge and Harvey (1998: 93) note that the major causes of bank faihrres in Kenya have been the 
accumulation of bad debts because of fraudulent or imprudent lending, including lending to companies connected to 
politicians. Adverse selection problems in terms of lending to prospective borrowers, the poor quality of 
management and inadequate capitalization all contributed to the financial fragility affecting locally owned Fls. 
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According to Ngugi (200 I: 7), in response to the fmancial crisis the Banking Act was reviewed 
and approved in 1989 with the objective of enhancing the regulatory and supervisory functions 
of the central bank. Brownbridge and Harvey (1998: 95-97) note that the bank failures in the 
1980s and 1990s served as an indication of the deficiencies that existed in the system of 
prudential supervision and regulation of the conmlercial banks and NBFIs. As a result the 
govenunent introduced a number of refonns in the 1980s and early 1990s which were aimed at 
strengthening the institutional structure and regulatory framework of the financial system, such 
as revision of banking laws and improvements in supervision. 
With the introduction of the policy refonns since the early 1980s there was an increase in 
controlled interest rates from 1982 which ensured that pre-tax interest rates were positive in real 
tenns. Furthennore, the gap between the Treasury bill and lending rates was narrowed. The 
interest rate differentials between commercial banks and NBFIs were reduced in the mid-1980s 
and the spreads between the deposit and lending rates were widened in the second half of the 
decade. In 1990 the controls over the lending-related fees and charges were removed and in 
1991 , the interest rates were deregulated (Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998: 97). 
Despite the trend in liberalization, Kenya failed to meet the basic prerequisites for successful 
financial refonns because of increasing inflationary pressures and deteriorating economic 
conditions, thus Kenya was thus not able to reap the fruits of its liberalization process (Ngugi, 
200 I). For example the fiscal deficit in 1992 led to a large borrowing equivalent to 8 percent of 
GDP, further leading to an increase in money supply and inflation rates of 30 percent in 1992 
and 46 percent in 1993. At the time the TB rates were raised to absorb liquidity through open 
market operations (Ngugi, 200 I ; Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998: 97). According to 
Brownbridge and Harvey (1998: 97) the system still remained largely oligopolistic, with large 
banks operating an infonnal cartel in setting interest rates and charges. Even though interest rates 
had been deregulated, commercial banks were reluctant to raise their lending rates to match those 
of the high TB rates or the rise in inflation as it would have threatened the solvency of some of 
the banks ' borrowers. 
According to the Central Bank of Kenya (2008a: 32), as of June 2007 and June 2008 the number 
of financial institutions remained at 45. The Banking Supervision report (Central Bank of Kenya 
,2008b: I) notes that 43 of these financial institutions were commercial banks, and the other two 
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were mortgage finance companies. The banking sector experienced rapid expansion with branch 
networks increasing by 44.6 percent from 534 branches in June 2007 to 772 branches in June 
2008. Currently the banking sector is dominated by 6 large banks which account for 
approximately 58 percent of the market share. This serves as an indication of opportunities in the 
economy to expand banking services to parts of the population that do not hold bank accounts, 
for example in the rural areas. This would provide a larger pool of saving to fund productive 
investments. 
In light of the above, the possible factors that could affect the pass-through stem from 
oligopolistic behaviour and bank size. Since 1992 the banking sector has been dominated by 
large players, which indicates that these banks are able to liaise with one another and set rates 
according to what suits them best. Although Table 3.1 in Section 3.5.6 below indicates that the 
level of banking concentration has been low since 1995, the fact that it is dominated by 6 large 
banks controlling half (almost 60 percent) of the market share indicates that there is a possibility 
that these banks may be able to dictate their own rates and thus oligopolistic practices amongst 
the banks in Kenya may affect the pass-through of interest rates 
3.4.2. Tanzania 's Financial System 
According to Mwega (2003) the fmancial system was entirely owned and controlled by the 
government between the periods 1967 until 1991. The system was considered narrow since it 
was made up of tlle central bank, three commercial banks, five Designated Financial Institutions 
(DFls), two insurance companies, two contractual savings institutions and one hire purchase 
company, and these institutions were not subject to any foml of competition or banking 
regulation. The state owned most of these institutions, including all commercial banks and 
insurance companies. In addition the only social security institution and three of the five DFls 
were owned by the state. The only commercial bank of any significance was the National Bank 
of Commerce (NBC) which was a monopoly, and dominated the financial system, accounting for 
85 percent of bank deposits. According to Brownbridge and Harvey (1998: 189-197) until the 
1990s, no new entry by the private sector into the fmancial markets was allowed, however this 
changed with the Banking Act in 1991 that made provision for the entry of the private sector for 
the first time since the 1960s. 
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From the 1990s Tanzania began to implement financial sector reforms. Major components of the 
reforms were programmes aimed at restructuring the financially distressed public sector banks, 
encouraging private banking, the deregulation of the capital market, and strengthening of 
prudential regulation and supervision (Mwega, 2003). Furthermore, according to Brownbridge 
and Harvey (1998: 193) the reforms entailed interest rate liberalisation and the introduction of 
indirect instruments of monetary control, as well as policy measures to encourage new entrants 
from the private sector and to remove any obstacles to new entry. The authors further note that 
the impact of liberalization on competition was limited. Four new private sector banks, all with 
foreign participation, had been set up by 1996, however, their operations were confined to urban 
areas and lending was mainly focused on corporate customers. 
A recent article by Tirabassi (2009: I) noted that the banking market is characterised by a few 
big players and several small banks. There were a total of 27 banks and a few NBFls. 
Furthermore, 90 percent of deposits were in the hands of eight banking institutions 53 , three of 
which were local banks and five foreign banks. According to Machira (2008: I) these eight 
banks dominate the industry and represent about 70 percent of total banking sector assets. 
Until 1991 when the private sector banks started to emerge, the banking sector was characterised 
by the monopoly behaviour of the NBC. Thus with the lack of competition, the NBC was able to 
influence rates in any manner it wanted, regardless of changes in the official rates. Since the 
reforms of the 1990s there has been a considerable amount of foreign participation, but 
competition still remained weak. Currently, oligopolistic and collusive behaviour by the eight 
dominant banks is possible and may impact on the pass-through of interest rates. 
3.4.3. Uganda's Financial System 
The Ugandan banking system until the 1980s was considered to be highly oligopolistic and 
inefficient in tem1S of performing many basic banking functions, the largest bank and the several 
smaller ones being insolvent. The problems of the banking system were attributed to the 
financial policies pursued by the governments between the mid- 1960s and the later 1980s, 
combined with the severe economic crises, civil conflicts and acute political instability which 
5?o The eight banks were National Microfinance Bank (NMB), National Bank of Commerce (NBC). Cooperative and 
Rural Development Bank (CRDB), Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), Citibank, Stanbic, Barclays, and Exim Bank 
(Machira, 2008: 1). 
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affected Uganda during this period (Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998: 127). Cihak and Podpiera 
(2005: 6) note that the government began to implement financial sector reforms in the early 
1990s, the first being in 1992, with the objective of enhancing the efficiency of the fmancial 
sector and promote growth, thus redressing the crises. The refonns included liberalization of 
interest rates, restructuring distressed banks and strengthening prudential regulation 
(Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998: 127). Table 3.1 indicates that during the early 1990s the level 
of competition within the banking sector remained poor, confirming the possibility of 
oligopolistic behaviour on the part of the banks. 
According to Cihak and Podpiera (2005: 7) the reforms did improve the performance and depth 
of the financial system in Uganda, however it is still regarded as small even by regional 
standards. Factors such as the weak infrastructure and a problematic legal and institutional 
environment continue to deter the financial sector development. Judging from Table 3.1, from 
1996 onwards the concentration levels seemed to be decreasing to more steady levels, which 
may indicate that the reforms may have caused an increase in the level of competition in the 
banking sector, forcing institutions to provide better financial services for their clients. 
A recent article by Oketch (2009: I) noted that the Uganda's financial sector has been 
progressively growing in size and coverage, as well as in tenns of expansion and product 
development. This is as a result of the lifting of a moratorium on licensing of more banks in 
2005, which has led to an increase in the number of commercial banks from 14 to 21 54 with one 
yet to begin operations. This makes the current number of banks in Uganda 22, with four credit 
institutions and three microfinance deposit-taking institutions. 
3.4.4. Burundi's Financial System 
Since independence in 1962, before the adoption of financial reforms, Burundi ' s financial system 
was considered shallow. The sector was dominated by two commercial banks, a savings bank, a 
development bank and three NBF!s. The state was a major shareholder of these institutions. 
According to Nkurunziza (2009: 6) it was this strong state intervention as well as other rigidities 
54 See also the Bank of Uganda Annual Supervision Report (2008: 2) confirming the number of commercial banks in 
Uganda at 21. 
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that explained why Burundi ' s financial system was inefficient, far from dynamic and 
uncompetitive55 . 
With financial liberalization taking place in the 1980s and 1990s, the country' s financial sector 
has been described as being more diversified56 (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002: 34; Nkurunziza, 
2009: 6). Moreover, the refonns set in place in the 1980s with the objective of liberalizing the 
fmancial sector57 was in fact the second phase of an already ongoing structural adjustment 
progrannne since 1986 with the focus on liberalising the real sector of the economy in the first 
place (Nkurunziza, 2009: 6). Table B I in Appendix B indicates that from the 1990s the financial 
sector began to steady contribute towards growth in the economy. 
In tenns of the effects of the financial liberalisation process, the financial sector has been 
considered to be more competitive than it was before the refomls 20 years ago. According to 
Nkurunziza (2009: 8), currently Burundi has eight connnercial banks, one development bank, 
one housing bank, three insurance companies and several micro finance institutions. It is 
important to note that Burundi has no stock market, therefore financial intennediation is 
perfonned by the banks. However, the author notes that despite liberalisation efforts, the 
availability of banking has been limited to a small group of people, indicating that the effects of 
liberalisation have not gone far enough. 
Despite the fact that the financial sector had become more competitive than in the J 980s, 
Nkurunziza (2009: 12) highlights that the financial sector remains oligopolistic in nature, with 
three banks accounting for 60 per cent of the credit allocated and 78 per cent of the total 
deposits. In combination, the three banks share approximately 84 per cent of the total net profits 
5!i See Nkurunzazi (2009: 6-7) for ways in wh ich the state intervention caused ineniciencies in Burundi's financial 
system. 
56 According to Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2002: 35), as at 2002 the financial system comprised eight commercial 
banks, one development bank, two leasing companies, two investment banks, one mortgage bank, a rural 
development fund and a rural credit and savings cooperative. Additionally two speciali sed funds were established to 
assist investors to rai!;e the necessary guarantees to access lending. The post office network also provided some 
financial services. Lastly, the country had five insurance companies of which four were privately owned. 
57 Nkurunziza (2009: 7) notes that the objective of the financial Iiberalisation focused on allowing market 
fundamental s to determine lending and deposit interest rates. creating a bond market that would be accessible by 
financial operators and commercial banks, prudential regulation for risk management by ensuring that banks comply 
with reserve ratios and finally encouraging competition in the financial sector. 
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in the credit market. The concentration figures provided confirm that throughout the period from 
1996 to 2005 competition amongst the banks remained poor, confirming the oligopolistic nature 
of the banks in Burundi. Furthermore, the constant presence of the state in the fmancial sector 
makes it prone to political influences. 
Considering that Burundi has been characterised by ethnic based civil war, it is understandable 
that its fmancial system is still at an early stage of development and the regulatory and 
supervisory structures are still at their infant stages. The cyclical nature of the civil wars and 
political risk has increased the level of uncertainty over the future, and thus financial institutions 
may become cautious, causing interest rate rigidities. For example banks may keep lending rates 
at high levels to prevent lending to those with risky projects, causing rigidities in lending rates 
downwards. Furthermore, the levels of concentration remained significantly high, especially in 
2004 and 2005 where I was the highest concentration figure. This could seriously inlpede the 
pass-through of interest rates. 
3.4.5. Rwanda's Financial System 
Rwanda's financial sector faces a poor environment with economic activity concentrated in a 
few sectors as well as a weak credit culture, accounting and auditing systems and poor 
institutional, legal, and judicial franleworks . The programme of recapitalization and privatization 
started after 1994 and has strengt11ened tile short-term resilience of banks, however structural 
weaknesses remain (IMF Country Report, 2005: I). 
According to the IMF Country Report (IMF, 2005 : 8) Rwanda's financial system is considered 
to be "shallow" and dominated by a small number of banks. Table 3.1 shows the significantly 
high concentration figures from 1996 to 2007. At the time the report was prepared, there were six 
commercial banks. Of the six, the three largest banks controlled about two-thirds of total system 
assets. 
However, Rwanda's financial sector has been growing at unprecedented levels. According to 
Rwanda' s finance minister, Mr James Musoni, the country's financial sector has been growing at 
20 per cent annually for the last five years. This increase in growth was attributed to the 
Financial Sector Development Program. In the first 12 months of inlplementation of tile 
program, between April 2007 and March 2008, there was an increase in the minimum capital 
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requirements for banks from $2 million to $8 million, the objective of which was to increase the 
robustness and resilience of banks in Rwanda (Kezio-Musoke, 2008: 1). Table BI in Appendix B 
indicates the slow pace of growth in the contribution of the fmancial sector to the economy from 
1999 onwards. 
Judging from the ethnic based civil wars in both Burundi and Rwanda, including the Rwandan 
genocide, one can conjecture that during these periods there would naturally be no banking 
developments. In both countries the stages of financial development, oligopolistic behaviour and 
weak regulatory and supervision frameworks may affect the pass-through of interest rates. 
3.5 OVERVIEW OF THE EAST AFRICAN MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
3.5.1. Kenya 's Monetary Policy Framework 
According to Kinyua (200 I: 9) the effectiveness of monetary policy from the 1970s to the 1980s 
was constrained by the fixed exchange rate policy Kenya pursued at that time. The central banks 
were not able to carry out independent monetary policy as the expansionary fiscal policy that it 
acconunodated was in conflict with the fixed exchange rate regime of the 1970s and 1980s. As a 
result credit targets were rarely met. Furthermore credit guidelines used as a way of containing 
monetary policy expansion suffered a number of drawbacks58 Therefore monetary policy could 
not be considered to have been effective in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Ngugi and Kabubo (1998: 9) note that the period before liberalisation was also characterised by a 
weak monetary policy. In the early 1990s, emphasis was placed on direct monetary controls such 
as credit controls by the govermnent. For example, credit ceilings were put in place to limit 
private sector lending by the commercial banks. With the ceilings in place, the authors note that 
the central banks tried to offset the effect of large fiscal deficits on monetary expansion. The 
ceilings however did not apply to NBFIs (which may be a possible explanation for their failures 
in the early 1990s), varied across commercial banks and had minimal compliance from state-
owned banks. Furthermore, the ceilings were based on weak and selective enforcement which 
lead to the segmentation of the financial market. As a result the goverrm1ent was not able to 
58 See Kinyua (2001: 9) for these drawbacks. 
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control inflationary pressures due to expansionary fiscal policy, lending by NBFls and state-
owned banks. Furthermore, those banks with tight ceilings sent their riskier clients to other banks 
and NBFls (Ngugi and Kabubo, 1998: 9). 
After the period of Iiberalisation in the early 1990s, there was a shift away from direct to indirect 
instruments of monetary control and in 1996 a new framework for conducting monetary policy 
was set in place with the primary objective of achieving and maintaining price stability. For most 
of the 1990s, the conduct of monetary policy focused on the behaviour of the broad money 
aggregate M2 which comprises currency in circulation and term and non-term domestic currency 
deposits with banks and NBFls. With an increase in the openness of the economy, the stability of 
the relation between M2 and nominal GDP thus came into question. Thus by 1998, the central 
bank shifted its focus to a much broader monetary aggregate, M3, which comprises M2 plus 
foreign currency deposits held by residents (Rotich et ai., 2007: 4-5). 
In order to ensure the realisation of its objectives, the primary one being price stability, the 
central bank makes use of three major instruments to implement its monetary policy. According 
to the Central Bank of Kenya (2008c) these include: Open Market Operations (OMO), Reserve 
Requirements and Discount Window Operations. Cheng (2006: 5) highlights that OMOs are 
regarded as the main active monetary instruments most frequently used by the central bank to 
manage liquidity. Through OMOs the central bank buys and sells securities in order to achieve a 
certain level of reserves. Alternatively the central bank injects money into the economy by 
buying securities in exchange for money stock (Central Bank of Kenya, 2008c) . 
The second instrument of monetary policy is the reserve requirement. Under this instrument the 
bank is required to retain a certain proportion of commercial bank deposits to be held as reserves 
at the central bank (Central Bank of Kenya, 2008c). As at December 2008 the reserve ratio 
currently stood at 5 percent (Central Bank of Kenya, 2009: 17). Table B 1 in Appendix B shows 
that the ratio of reserves to total assets in Kenya was relatively high fi'om 1990 to 2007, 
indicating that the banks were somewhat over liquid. This suggests that the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in draining liquidity out of the banking system may have been weak, potentially 
affecting the pass-through of interest rates. 
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Finally, according to Cheng (2006: 5) rediscount facilities and lender of last resort facility are 
also used as instruments of monetary policy. However, the author notes that these instruments 
have not been recently used as key tools for implementing monetary policy in Kenya . 
3.5.2. Tanzania's Mane/my Policy Framework 
In 1995 a new Bank of Tanzania Bill was enacted by parliament. Under this act, there was a sltift 
away from the multiple policy objectives of the former Bank of Tanzania (BoT) act, to a single 
policy objective of price stability. Moreover, the implementation of monetary policy shifted from 
one that focused on the use of direct instnunents to one that used indirect instruments to 
influence the money supply (Masawe, 2001: 6). Thus from the period 1995 to date, the BoT has 
implemented monetary policy via a combination of indirect instruments in order to keep liquidity 
in the financial sector within desired levels59 The instruments include OMOs, foreign exchange 
market operations, reserve requirements, discount rate, moral suasion and gentlemen 's 
agreements. The main instrument for monetary policy in Tanzania is OMOs, and Masawe (200 I: 
6) notes that two approaches are used with regard to OMOs, namely the active and passive 
approaches. The active approach aims at attaining a certain level of base money, and at the same 
time allowing the price of reserves wltich are the interest rates to fluctuate. In contrast to this, the 
passive approach aims at a particular price of reserves while allowing the amount of reserves to 
fluctuate. 
Foreign exchange market operations is another instrument of monetary policy whereby the 
central bank engages in buying and selling foreign exchange to commercial banks. However, 
since the shilling is determined by market forces of demand and supply, the central bank only 
intervenes to smooth out any fluctuations and build external reserves without affecting the 
primary objective of price stability (Masawe 200 I: 6) . 
S9 Masawe (200 1: 6) highlights that the implementation of monetary policy in Tanzania involves setting three levels 
of targets followed by the choice of instruments. The first target, known as the operating target, can be easily 
controlled by the central bank, and is measurable and predictable. The choice of target depends on factors such as 
the level of sophistication of the markets or the type of system being used by the central bank, for example money-
based versus exchange rate-based stabilisation. The author notes that the Bank of Tanzania uses reserve (base) 
money as the operating variable/target. The second target is a quantifiable target known as the intennediate target. 
This target is influenced by the operating target and linked to the ultimate target (being the third target level). In 
Tanzania the money supply (M2) is the intermediate target since it is a money-based stabilisation system. 
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Reserve requirements are also used to affect tbe proportion of assets that the banks are required 
to bold. According to tbe Central Bank of Tanzania (2009b: 4) tbe bank increased the reserve 
requirements on central govermnent deposit held by the banks from 10 percent to 20 percent 
effective from January 2009. However according to Masawe (2001: 6) tbe BoT does not use this 
instrument frequently as it is considered to be more direct than indirect. Table B I in Appendix B 
sbows tbat from 1993 onwards tbe ratio of reserves to total assets has been increasing, suggesting 
that the banks still remain higbly liquid. This may also be explained by the fact that the central 
bank does not pay much attention to this form of monetary policy instrument. 
The discount rate used by the central banks serves two functions. Firstly, the central bank buys 
Treasury Bills and other securities from those banks that are in need of liquidity before the 
securities mature. Secondly, via the discount window the central bank provides loans to those 
banks that are in need as well as to the govermnent (Central Bank of Tanzania, 2009a: I) . 
Masawe (200 I: 7) notes that considering that the OMO is the main instrument for monetary 
policy, the discount rate is highly restrictive in order to discourage borrowers from resorting to 
this form of monetary policy instrument. The reason for doing so, according to the Central Bank 
of Tanzania (2009a: I), is that borrowing from the central bank injects liquidity into the system 
which may ultimately result in inflationary pressures. 
Additional instruments used by the central bank include moral suasion and gentlemen's 
agreements. Moral suasion is a situation wbere the bank tries to influence the behaviour of 
certain market players. This instrument is used in conjunction witb other policy instruments. 
Gentlemen' s agreements are essentially voluntary agreements between the central bank and 
commercial banks with the aim of improving monetary conditions in the economy. Gentlemen's 
agreements were used in Tanzania between the central bank and the largest cormnercial bank 
witb the ainl of lowering the spread on interest rates (Masawe, 200 I: 7). 
3.5.3 Uganda's Mane/my Policy Framework 
During the period 1971-72 to 1992-93, the effectiveness of monetary policy was weak and 
subordinate to fiscal considerations. Monetary policy was exercised via direct means sucb as 
interest rate controls and credit controls, and ultimately monetary policy was considered 
dormant. Between 1972 and 1992, the reserve requirement remained at 10 percent even when 
liquidity conditions called for a cbange. Laws on limits were hardly enforced and a number of 
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commercial banks had open access to credit from the Bank of Uganda (BoU). Moreover, interest 
rates remained unchanged for long periods of time despite developments in inflation, and when 
rates were changed, the magnitude of the change was not sufficient to offset the inflation. This 
resulted in negative real interest rates for most of the period and led to excessive demand for 
bank credit which slowed down the mobilisation of financial resources. Thus in the 1980s 
monetary policy remaioed practically inactive. However in 1993, indirect monetary policy 
instrunlents were introduced as part of the financial sector reforms·o. Furthermore the reserve 
money programme was introduced in 1993 as the monetary policy-operating framework after the 
BoU was given the power to operate monetary policy (Musinguzi and Katarikawe, 2001: 7). 
Since the ioitiation of the reforms Uganda has succeeded in stabilising inflation to single digit 
levels from its high levels in the 1980s and early 1990s due to prudent macroeconomic 
management, and since 2002 the BoU has targeted reserve money with the aim of achieving 
inflation rates below 5 percent (Saxegaard, 2006: 19). Moreover, Ingves (2004: 74) and 
Saxegaard (2006: 19) note that after the reform period the BoU shifted to a combination of rule-
based monetary policy instruments and money market operations to conduct monetary policy. 
According to Saxegaard (2006: 19) the rule-based instruments include reserve requirements and 
standiog facilities. The reserve requirements were introduced in 1977 at 10 percent of total 
deposits and by 2006 they were set at 9.5 percent for deposits of all maturities and are also 
applied to foreign currency and local currency deposits. Table B I in Appendix B indicates that 
the ratio of reserves to total assets remained relatively high from the period 1990 to 2007, 
providing an indication that the banks remain highly liqnid. Therefore the effectiveness of this 
monetary policy instrnment in draining liquidity out of the banking system may have been weak, 
ultimately affecting the pass-through of interest rates . 
The standing facilities take two forms. The first is the rediscount window which exists for 
treasury bills with a remaining maturity of 91 days or less. The rediscount rate is considered to 
be the policy rate set by the BoU to signal its monetary policy stance, and is based on the moving 
average on the 91 day Treasury bill plus a policy margin. The second facility is known as the 
60 The introduction of the indirect monetary policy instruments was part of a broader set of reforms which also 
included macroeconomic stability and liheralisation of the whole economy (Musinguzi and Katarikawe, 200 I: 7). 
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automatic borrowing window, where the banks are allowed at their own discretion to borrow up 
to 5 percent of required reserves for a period of 5 days. The interest rate is equal to the rediscount 
rate plus a 1 percent margin (lngves, 2004: 74; Saxegaard, 2006: 19). 
The BoU makes extensive use of OMOs to manage the amount of liquidity in the economy. 
According to Saxegaard (2006: 19) about one-third of the BoU 's money market operations are 
carried out by issuing government secUlities in the primary market and the use of repurchase 
agreements. The remaining two-thirds of the money market operations are effected through the 
sale and purchase of foreign currency from the private sector. 
3.5.4. Burundi's Mone/my Policy Framework 
From 1988 to the present the Bank of Burundi (BoB) undertook a significant reform of its 
monetary and credit policies. The components of the reform focused on discarding the system of 
prior agreements, creating a market for Treasury certificates, adopting a single rate of 
refinancing after the removal of historical rates, the introduction of the system of reserve 
requirements and refinancing ceilings (Central Bank of Burundi, 2009). 
Currently the BoB conducts its monetary policy using instruments that affect certain monetary 
aggregates. After having exercised monetary policy via direct control over money creation by the 
management of credit and regulation of interest rates, the bank has now introduced indirect 
instruments based on market mechanisms in the allocation of credit by financial institutions. 
The instruments of monetary policy include refmancing policies, a minimum reserve system and 
a market for Treasury bonds (Central Bank of Burundi, 2009). The refinancing policy is 
considered the main mechanism used for the conduct of monetary policy, and is concerned with 
volume refinancing. Under volume refinancing with the liberalisation of the distribution of 
private sector credit, banks and financial institutions are allowed to classify themselves as 
eligible for refinancing loans . The minimum reserve system as an instrument of monetary policy 
was established in 1991 and requires the financial institutions to keep a portion of their cash or 
deposits with the central bank. According to the Central Bank of Burundi (2008: 4) during 2008 
the bank continued to use the ratio of reserves requirements as an instrument for regulating 
liquidity and maintained the rate in Burundi Francs at 3 percent. Judging from Table B I in 
Appendix B, the reserve ratio began to increase from 2004 to 11 percent in 2006, indicating that 
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during tbese periods the effectiveness of the reserve ratio as a tool of monetary policy may have 
been weakening. The final tool of monetary policy is the market for Treasury bonds. Essentially, 
the impact of this market on monetary policy and credit lies in that the market, amongst other 
things, aimed to emphasize the value of money via the market mechanism of demand and supply. 
The resultant market prices would serve as a bencbmark for setting other interest rates, m 
particular the rate of refinancing (Central Bank of Burundi, 2009). 
3.6.5 Rwanda 's MonetmJ' Policy Framework 
Following the pattern of the East African countries Rwanda also shifted from a direct to an 
indirect monetary policy in November 1990. Tbis was as a result of the structural adjustment 
policy imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. The direct control of money supply and prices 
was abandoned to allow market forces to detennine prices. However, the effOlts of the reform 
process in order to reduce the government's participation in the economy were halted due to the 
war that escalated into genocide in April 1994. In 1995 the reform process began again and 
monetary policy came to rely more on indirect instruments and in 1998 the central bank was 
advised by the IMF and World Bank to consider inflation targeting as its main objective 
(Sayinzoga and Simson, 2006: 67-68). 
In order to regulate the liquidity in the economy the central bank implements monetary policy 
using three instruments, namely OMOs, the discount rate and the reserve requirement. It is 
important to note that during the last decade, the central bank made use of weekly auctions for 
absorbing or injecting liquidity. However, from 2008 onwards, the central bank replaced the 
weekly auction and overnight deposit facility by repo operations. The central bank also makes 
use of foreib1Jl exchange sales as a supplementary monetary policy instrunlent, mainly to smooth 
out any unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market (National Bank of Rwanda, 2008: 1). 
With regard to the reserve requirements, in February 2009 the national bank of Rwanda reduced 
the reserve ratio from 8 to 5 percent in an attempt to address short-term liquidity. Table BI in 
Appendix B highlights that the Rwandan banking sector remained highly liquid from 1991 to 
2005, which suggests that once again the effectiveness of reserve requirement as a tool of 
monetary policy remained weak in controlling the liquidity in the banking system. 
Based on the above overviews of the monetary policy frameworks, it can be concluded that after 
liberalisation periods in each of the countries, the focus of central banks in East Africa was 
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geared towards achieving price stability as their primary objective of monetary policy. In order 
to do this, the central banks shifted away from direct to more indirect instruments of monetary 
policy. The use of reserve requirements was cornmon to all countries in the efforts of central 
banks to regulate the levels of liquidity in the banking sector. However, making any inferences 
with regard to the effectiveness of monetary policy was somewhat difficult, because despite the 
central banks efforts to manage liquidity in the banking system, Table B I suggests that for 
countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, the ratio of reserves to total assets is 
still high indicating a somewhat weak monetary policy. The consequence of this is that the 
commercial banks would not rely on the central banks for accommodation facilities due to their 
large reserves and thus any changes in the official rates would not have the desired impact on 
bank retail rates, ultimately causing rigidities in the pass-through of interest rates. 
After looking at the East Africa financial systems and monetary policy frameworks, the 
following section gives an overall summary of the banking concentration in the countries. 
Additionally the asset and liability ratios of the commercial banks are examined to identify any 
other factors that could possibly affect the pass-through of interest rates. 
3.5.6 Overview of Banking Concentration and Deposit Money Bank Asset and Liabilities in 
East Africa 
Table 3.1 below reports the banking market concentration for the five EAC countries. This 
provides some indications of the level of competition in the banking sector as this can have an 
impact on the pass-through of interest rates. 
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Table 3.1 . Banking Concentration 
YEAR KEN TZ UG BUR RW 
1992 0.87 * 1.00 * • 
1993 0.75 * 0.89 * • 
1994 0.66 • 0.81 • • 
1995 0.58 * 0.69 • • 
1996 0.53 • 0.47 1.00 1.00 
1997 0.51 • 0.49 0.90 1.00 
1998 0.56 * 0.61 0.88 0.93 
1999 0.57 • 0.67 0.93 1.00 
2000 0.60 * 0.65 0.92 0.94 
2001 0.61 • 0.61 0.89 0.94 
2002 0.59 • 0.69 0.86 0.91 
2003 0.58 • 0.68 0.93 0.76 
2004 0.54 0.64 0.67 1.00 0.72 
2005 0.50 0.59 0.62 1.00 0.63 
2006 0.49 0.50 0.65 • 0.71 
2007 0.79 0.49 0.63 * 0.S7 
Note: • represents years where no data was available 
Source: Dataset, Beck et al. (2009). 
The bank concentration provided in Table 3.1 is calculated as the ratio of the assets of the three 
largest banks to the total of the banking sector assets. As can be seen, the concentration index 
varies between 0 and I . A valne close to I indicates the country has a high bank concentration, 
thus competition within the banking sector is low. In the same way, a low concentration index 
(closer to 0) indicates a less concentrated banking sector, thus a higher degree of competition 
exists in the banking sector. From Table 3.1 it can be seen that the level of banking concentration 
is generally low, especially from 1995 onwards for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. However 
Burundi maintained relatively high concentration ratios from 1996 to 2007, whereas Rwanda 
was less concentrated from 2003 to 2006. Overall, banking concentration was highest in Burundi 
and Rwanda, averaging to 0.93 and 0.87 respectively in the periods where data was available. 
Banking concentration ratios in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda averaged 0.61 , 0.55 and 0.68 
respectively, suggesting that banking concentration would not be a major factor affecting the 
pass-through of interest rates in these countries. 
Table B I in Appendix B reports the assets and liabilities for the conunercial banks, providing 
additional information on the perfonnance of the banking system. Overall, the table shows that 
the banks in all five countries have continuously depended on demand deposits and time, savings 
and foreign currency deposits. As can be seen from Table B I the ratio of these two liabilities to 
total liabilities has remained significantly higher than any other ratio in each of the countries 
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over the entire period. Additionally, Burundi also relied on foreign liabilities more for the period 
2000 to 2006, ranging between 11.1 percent in 2000 and 23.7 percent in 2004. This could be an 
indication that Burundi relies less on borrowing from its central bank as a source of finance and 
more on funds from outside the country. TIlls may affect how the bank interest rates respond to 
changes in the official rate and possibly result in a slowdown of the pass-through of interest 
rates, rendering the transmission of monetary policy ineffective. However, with regard to the 
other four countries - Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda - funding from foreign sources has 
remained relatively low. Other sources of funds to the banks include credit from other fmancial 
institutions, liabilities to non-bank financial institutions and government deposits. 
Looking at the assets of the commercial banks, overall it is evident from Table Bl in Appendix B 
that claims on the private sector and government for all five countries throughout the period 
significantly dominate the assets of the banks. Furthermore, for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Rwanda, the ratio of reserves to total assets is quite high. In Kenya this ranged from 6.40 in 2003 
to 17.66 in 1994, in Tanzania from 3.84 in 1990 to 13 .01 in 2000, in Uganda from 7.49 in 2003 
to 17.56 in 1991 , and in Rwanda from 3.78 in 1990 to 21.06 in 1994. The ratios suggest that the 
liquidity in the fmancial systems was increasing over time. Burundi was the only exception 
however: from 2004 onwards the reserve ratio started to pick up slightly, from 7.03 percent in 
2004 to II percent in 2006. Other uses of funds include claims on non-financial public 
enterprises, claims on Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFls) and claims on local government. 
Additionally, the credit to the private sector was calculated as a share of GDP in each of the 
countries. This ratio was used to identify the extent to which the commercial banks finance the 
domestic economy. Overall, Table B 1 in Appendix B highlights that for all countries except 
Kenya the ratio remained significantly low. In Kenya the ratio grew over time to 25.62 percent in 
2000, however despite the growth the contribution of the banks to financing the domestic 
economy remained low. It can be deduced from tlus that the banks do not finance the domestic 
economy and thus the economy does not rely on the banking sector for credit. TIllS also suggests 
a low level of financial intermediation on the part of the banking sector. 
The high reserve ratios identified above indicate that in the event that the banks ever needed to 
source funds, they would first resort to running down on their own reserves before seeking other 
sources of finance. Considering that the banks now use their own reserves as a source of finance, 
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they may not rely on the accommodation facilities provided by the central bank, thus changes in 
the official rate may not have the desired impact on the bank interest rates thus affecting the 
pass-through process. 
It was also identified that the banking sector lends a large amount to the government. This could 
be due to a number of reasons which may ultimately affect the pass-through process. Firstly, 
political influences may force the banks to lend to the government, or government has a large 
influence on the banking sector for example in ternlS of ownership". In such cases naturally the 
banks would be forced to lend to the state WitllOut necessarily increasing their lending rates 
regardless of what happens to changes in ilie official rates. Another reason that may explain the 
large lending to ilie government is sinlply that ilie private sector may be underdeveloped and as a 
result the risk ofiending to tile private sector may be too high62 The government may pose less 
of a risk in tenns of default on their loans than lending to the private sector. The overall result 
would be tllat tllere would be no need for the banks to adjust their interest rates following 
changes in ilie official rates, causing rigidities and ultimately affecting ilie pass-through process. 
3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a historical overview of tile EAC and to identifY how the new EAC 
differed from ilie old after its collapse in 1977. Some of ilie vital developments in the new EAC 
included the introduction of the EAC treaty in 1999 which identified the objectives of the 
community. One of the objectives of ilie EAC is the fornlation of a monetary union and 
introduction of a single currency by 2012. A development was the long awaited acceptance of 
Burundi and Rwanda into the commuruty in 2007. 
All five countries now fonn part of the EAC and have pledged to meet a convergence criteria to 
be eligible to fonn a monetary uruon. This convergence criteria were reviewed and it is noticed 
iliat they bear some resemblance to the Maastricht criteria. This is not surprising, because the 
61 Recall that in section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2 it was highlighted that state-dominated banks can lead to monopolies 
which can result in interest rate rigidities. 
b2 In such cases infonnation asymmetries and the resultant moral hazard play a role in lending less to an 
undeveloped private sector. 
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Maastricht criteria set the precedent for other countries when setting their own. To date the most 
notable development has been the introduction of the customs union which was introduced in 
2005. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the study seeks to use the interest rate pass-through analysis to 
identify the extent of integration amongst these five EAC member countries. However, 
considering that there are a number of factors that may impact the pass-through of ioterest rates, 
an overview of the financial systems and monetary policy frameworks of each of the countries 
was carried out. The analysis of the fmancial systems indicated that hank concentration was 
more prevalent in Burundi and Rwanda than io the other countries. With regards to monetary 
policy, it may be that monetary policy may have not been as effective in draining liquidity out of 
the banking system in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, because the ratio of reserves to 
total assets in these countries remained high suggestiog that the banks were highly liquid. This 
results in a lack of reliance on accommodation facilities provided by tbe central bank and 
ultimately hinders the pass-through of interest rates. The large lendiog to the government in all 
countries suggests either that there were political influences in the banking system, or that the 
private sector was undeveloped. Lastly, the lack of contribution to the economy by the banks in 
all countries suggests that the financial system is inefficient io carryiog out its role of financial 
intermediation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether or not the pass-through from central bank to 
commercial bank retail rates has become more similar over time in the five countries that make 
up the EAC, i.e. whether there is convergence in monetary transmission. To do so the study 
examines this relationship using a rolling window analysis in an Error Correction Model (ECM). 
Focus is placed on the speed and magnitude of these changes and the possibility of asymmetry in 
the pass-through of interest rates. 
4.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.2.1. Data Definitions and Sources 
The studynses monthly data from 1999-2008 for all the series as described below. The choice of 
the period was based on the availability of data that was comparable across all five countries. 
Two sets of empirical analysis were carried out. Firstly the analysis was carried out for the entire 
sample period. The second set of analysis made use of a rolling sample period of 5 years (60 
observations) with the first period being 1999-2003. Subsequently the next windows are 2000-
2004, 2001-2005 and so on until the final rolling window period of 2004-2008. The rolling 
windows help capture the dynamic development of the interest rate pass-througb over time. The 
end of period discount rate for Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, and bank rate to commercial 
banks for Uganda, are used as variables representing central bank rates (CBRs). Note that in the 
case of Kenya, there was no sufficient data available for the discount rate, thus the Treasury bill 
rate has been used as a proxy and is also represented as a CBR. The lending rate and deposit 
rates for the five countries are used as variables representing the commercial banks' retail rates 
(RRs). Except for Kenya's Treasury-bill rate, which was obtained from tlle Central Bank of 
Kenya, all other interest rate series were obtained from Thompson DataStream and the IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). The next section begins with the estimation techniques. 
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4.3 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
4.3.1 Tests for Cointegration 
Co integration analysis was proposed by Engle and Granger (J 987). Brooks (2002: 388) notes 
that a set of variables can be classified as being co integrated if a linear combination of them is 
stationary. For example, if two or more variables that have stochastic trends are found to be 
co integrated, it would mean that although they may not be individually stationary, one or more 
linear combinations of them would be. Hence, cointel,>Tated variables can be thought of as having 
a long-run equilibrium relationship between them, and non-cointegrated variables would suggest 
the non-existence of a long-run association (Brooks, 2002: 388). The co integration analysis 
therefore seeks to identify whether such a relationship exists, and if so, the number and structure 
of cointegrating vectors. 
Generally, a study of this nature employing time series data begins with determining the order of 
integration of the relevant time series i.e. to test whether the series is stationary or non-stationary. 
According to Brooks (2002: 367) a stationary series can be described as one with "constant 
mean, constant variance and constant autocovariances for each given lag". The objective of such 
stationarity/unit root tests is to determine whether the interest rate series are integrated of order 
one, I( 1) so that a combination of these series will produce residuals that are integrated of order 
zero, 1(0). This would indicate the presence of a cointegrating relationship between the interest 
rates. In order to investigate the stationarity/unit roots of the time series, several methods have 
been developed, for instance visual plots of data, the autocorrelation function, unit root tests and 
those that directly test for stationarity, amongst others. In this study, we employ the conventional 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and the Kwiatkowski-PhiJIips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test to 
examine the stationary properties of the series63• The ADF tests the null hypothesis that the series 
is non-stationary (has a unit root) against the alternative of stationarity (no unit root). However, 
the KPSS tests the null hypothesis of stationarity, thus reversing the null and alternatives of the 
unit root tests (Brooks, 2002: 382). 
63 The KPSS test is used in addition to the ADF test because the ADF tests have been criticized for their poor size 
and pO"'ier properties. This means that they have the tendency to "over-reject the null-hypothesis of nonstationarity 
when it is true and under-reject it when it is false" (Aziakpono, 2008: 198). See Brooks (2002: 377-386) for a full 
discussion on the ADF and KPSS tests, and Harris (1995: 39) for a discussion of the problems relating to ADF unit 
root tests. 
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If the interest rate series are found to be stationary at level, then the relationship between the 
central bank rates (CBRs) and the commercial bank retail rates (RRs) will be estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, if the unit root test reveals that the series are not 
stationary at level, but stationary at first difference, then cointegration tests discussed below will 
be carried out to determine whether or not the CBRs and RRs of the respective country are 
cointegrated. If the non-stationary series of the CBRs and the RRs are found not to be 
cointegrated, then their relationship will be estimated with first difference series to avoid the 
problem of spurious regression. But if the rates are found to be cointegrated, then the ECM will 
be estimated to determine the extent of the pass-through as well as how long it will take for the 
RRs to adjust to changes in the CBRs (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2008: 26). Furthennore, for the 
co integrated series, the study employs an asymmetric error correction model used by Scholnick 
(1996). Essentially, the model allows one to determine whether the adjustment in interest rates is 
faster back down to equilibrium if the residuals were above their mean, or whether the 
adjustment is faster back up to equilibrium if the residuals were below their mean. The 
asynunetric error correction model is discussed below under the empirical PT analysis in Section 
4.3.2 of this chapter. 
After establishing the order of integration of the series, co integration techniques can then be used 
to reveal useful long run relationships amongst the variables. In this study a number of different 
tests for cointegration will be carried out. Firstly, the study makes use of four types of tests to 
provide robust evidence on the nature of cointegration among ti,e interest rates. These are: (I) the 
Johansen maximum likelihood approach, (2) the cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson 
(CRDW) test, (3) the Engle-Granger (EG) approach, and (4) the error-correction based testb'. 
According to Kremers el af. (1992: 1) the ECM statistic can also be viewed as a cointegration 
test and is considered more powerful than cointegration tests based upon the Dickey-Fnller (DF) 
statistic that is applied to the residuals of a static cointegrating regression"'. Based on this, 
cointegration is considered to exist if the coefficient of the ECT,_! is significant at the 5 percent 
" See Seddighi et al. (2000: 281). Brooks (2002: 387), Aziakpono ard Wilson (2008: 27) and Gujarati and Porter 
(2009: 763) for further discussion of these tests. 
65 According to Kremers e/ al. (1992: 1) the possible reason for this is that the error correction based test uses 
available information more efficiently than the OF test. 
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level even if other tests indicate that cointegration does not exist. This decision is based purely 
on the premise that the error correction based test is considered to be more powerful than the 
Dickey-Fuller test (Kremers et al., 1992: 1-3). The method will test whether the coefficient of the 
ECT'.l = 0, i,e, RR, and CBR, are not co integrated (Kremers et ai" 1992: 3), If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, then it will be concluded that there is cointegration between the interest 
rates. If co integration has been established, the study employs an error correction model to 
examine the relationship further, 
4.3.2 Empirical Pass-71l1'ollgh Analysis 
According to Sander and Kleimeier (2006a: 216) a widely used methodology in order to 
investigate the effectiveness of the monetary transmission process is the interest rate pass-
through (PT) estimation due to its ability to reveal how fast and how completely changes in 
monetary policy rates are passed on to bank lending and deposit rates, 
The study follows the pioneering work by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) which influenced a 
number of authors to use the PT approach in their studies (cf, De Bondt et ai"~ 2002; Toolsema et 
ai" 2002; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Aziakpono, 2008 and Aziakpono et al., 
2008). TIle PT is modelled based on cointegration methodologies: 
k' II ' 
RR, = flo + LflRR.,RR, .. , + fl,CBR, + LflcBR"CBRH + 8, (I) 
i=1 i=1 
where CBR, is the central bank rate and AA represents the commercial banks' retail rate which 
can be a lending rate (LR) or a deposit rate (DR)66 The lag length is indicated by k' and n' 
respectively. Note that the above equation (1) represents a PT model in level terms and is used 
for a set of interest rates that are stationary i.e, exhibit an 1(0) property, 
From equation (I) above the responsiveness of RRs to the CBRs can be measured with reference 
to two sets of multipliers, namely the impact multiplier and the long-term multiplier. The impact 
multiplier ~, measures the immediate adjustment within the current month. Hence, a value of 
~ 1 < I would indicate a sluggish adjustment, known as interest rate stickiness (Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2004: 465), 
66 The variables RR and CBR have been adapted from the study by Aziakpono et al. (2008) . 
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However, when turning to the long-run case, obtaining estimates for the long-run pass-through 
depends entirely on whether co integration is present amongst the interest rates in question . If the 
co integration tests reveal a stable long-run relationship between the interest rates, then the long-
run parameters Cal1 be obtained via ordinary OLS estimation. This long-run relationship can be 
represented as: 
RR, = 80 +8,CBR, +u, (2) 
where eo and 8, represent the long-run intercept and slope coefficients respectively. 
As already been noted, Equation (I) above, is used for a set of interest rates that are stationary, 
however, if the interest rate time series used in this study exhibit an 1(1) property, i.e. they are 
non-stationary and thus do not have a constant merul or variance, then the PT model as in 
equation (1) is estimated using first differences: 
k n" 
11RR, = Po + I.Pu".,I1RR' -i + P,IlCBR, + I.PcRRJIlCBRH + 5, (3) 
;=1 ;,., 1 
where 11 represents the first difference of the respective interest rate, and t, is the white noise 
error term. According to Srulder ruld Kleimier (2004, 2006a) equation (3) specification avoids the 
problems associated with spurious regression, however, it would lead to a loss of information 
about long-run relationships. This loss of information can be recovered if the central bank and 
commercial bank retail rates are fOWld to be cointegrated. If the co integration tests reveal that the 
CBRs and RRs are co integrated, then their relationship will be estimated further using a rolling 
regression technique in an error correction frrunework67• 
However, if the tests reveal no clear signs of cointegration, in order to obtain the long-run 
parameters we follow the method employed by Kwapil and Scharler (2009). To do this we use 
the first difference of the series in the model and calculate the long-run pass-through as: 
61 The idea behind the rolling regression approach is to take a fixed number of observations and to redo the 
regressions, every time adding one observation at the end of the sample, while dropping one at the beginning. The 
resuJts should provide an indication of whether monetary policy transmission has been stable over time in the 
country under consideration (TooIsema et al., 2002: 9). 
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e = ("" J3 ) /(1 - "m J3 .) ~i=O I L.Jj=J Rf(., (4) 
where nand m indicate the number of lags chosen, J3, is the coefficient of the central bank rate 
and fJ RHJ represents the coefficient of the retail rates which could either be a deposit or a lending 
rate. If 8= I, one can speak of a full PT in the long run . As noted in Chapter 2, interest rate 
rigidities which lead to an incomplete PT can be caused by a number of factors such as financial 
structure, information asymmetries, credit demand functions that are not fully elastic, imperfect 
competition and other market imperfections. Such factors would result in 8<1 (Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2004: 465). However, if 8> I, this may indicate times when banks were not rationing 
credit supply but increasing lending rates to compensate for higher risks stemming from credit 
risk factors due to infonnation asymmetries between banks and their borrowers (Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2004: 465). 
When the series are cointegrated, Aziakpono et ai. (2008: 14) note that a proper PT measurement 
should be based on an error correction model (ECM). This is shown below: 
k" n" 
6.RR, = J30 + LfJRR.,6.RRH + fJ,c,CBR, + LfJCBR.,c,CBR>-j + J3ECT ECTH + e, (5) 
i- I 
where C, represents the first difference of the respective interest rate, and £, is the white noise 
error tenn. Of special interest is PECT, the coefficient of the error correction tenn, which 
measures the degree of adjustment to equilibrium. This coefficient is expected to be negative and 
a larger value would indicate a faster adjustment to the long run equilibrium. According to 
Aziakpono and Wilson (2008: 29) a coefficient of the ECT'_l that is statistically significant 
suggests that market forces are in operation to restore long-run equilibrium following a short-run 
disturbance. P, is the short-run PT and PRR.; is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. It 
is inlportant to note that the error correction tenns in equation (5) above can only be obtained if a 
stable co integrating relationship is found between the interest rates in question. The logical 
reasoning behind this is the fact that there would be no adjustment back to long-run equilibrium 
(represented by the error correction tenn) following any disturbances in the short run if no long-
run relationship between the interest rates was present in the first place. 
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From equation (5) above a symmetric mean adjustment lag can be calculated to determine the 
speed of adjustment back to equilibrium. A high mean lag would indicate that it takes longer for 
the interest rates to respond to changes in the official rates and vice versa for a low mean lag 
(Scholnick, 1996). Following Schohlick (1996) the study computes the symmetric mean 
adjustment lag as: 
ML = (1 - 13,)1 13Ecr (6) 
A major drawback to using such a specification to calculate the mean lag is that it assumes that 
the adjustments are the same whether the retail rates are above or below equilibrium (Scholnick, 
1996: 489). As a result the adjustment is said to be symmetric and not asymmetric (when the 
adjustment is different). Therefore, in order to exanline the asymmetric adjustment, the author 
proposes a procedure by dividing the series of residuals which can be denoted by BCT' and ECT 
(error correction terms when the residuals are below and above equilibrium respectively) from 
the cointegrating regressions as follows: 
ECT =ECT if ECT> 11 
ECT· =0 if ECT < 11 (7) 
and 
ECT = ECT if ECT < 11 
ECT=O if ECT> 11 (8) 
where 11 is the mean of the BCT. Once introduced into the model, the asynunetric short-run 
equation takes the following foml: 
(9) 
where ¢, and ¢, are the coefficients of the asymmetric error correction term, and from this the 
asymmetric mean lags for when the interest rates are above or below equilibrium can be 
calculated as follows : 
ML+ = (1- fl,) 1 tP, (10) 
and 
ML- = (1 - fl,)1 tP, (11 ) 
Equation (10) represents a situation in which the residuals are greater than the mean and thus 
represents the adjustment back down to equilibrium, while equation (II) is when the residuals 
are below the mean, thus representing adjustment upward to equilibrium. The importance of 
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asymmetric mean adjustment allows one to identify whether the speed of adjustment is faster 
upwards or downwards, which may provide some indication of the direction of the rigidities in 
the interest rates being analysed. Once equation (9) above has been estimated, the study applies 
the Wald test to determine whether asymmetry is present. The Wald test tests whether tP, = tP, in 
equation (9). If the test confirms that the parameters are in fact equal, it means no asymmetry is 
present in the adjustment. 
Once the estinlations have been carried out, the short-run and long-run PT parameters will be 
graphically plotted in order to examine whether or not the PT from policy-induced changes in the 
CBR to the RRs has become more similar over time, i.e. whether there is convergence in 
monetary transmission. The symmetric and asymmetric mean lags will also be plotted to analyse 
the direction of adjustment back to equilibrium. If it is evident that convergence has occurred 
judging from the graphical analysis, then the formation of a monetary union becomes more 
feasible. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The chapter provides the empirical framework that is used in this study. After determining the 
order of integration, the study makes use of four cointegration tests to test for the existence of 
any long-run relationships amongst the relevant interest rates. The analysis makes use of an 
interest rate PT estimation using rolling windows in a symmetric and asymmetric error 
correction framework to identify whether the PT of monetary policy measures has become 
similar over time in each of the five countries, and fmally the study uses the Wald test to conflffil 
the presence of asymmetry. Having set out the analytical framework, next the study applies them 
to the five East African countries with a view to achieving the objectives set out in Chapter 1. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTERS 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the interest rate pass-through analysis as described in Chapter 
4 . The results of the stationarity tests are presented in Section 5.2 while Section 5.3 presents the 
findings from the cointegration analysis. Section 5.4 gives a I,'faphical analysis and provides a 
discussion of the findings of the pass-through model for the EAC. Section 5.5 concludes the 
chapter. A summary of the interest rate pass-though analysis is provided in Appendix I. 
5.2 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
The empirical analysis commenced with testing for unit root using the ADF and KPSS tests. The 
detailed results for the unit root tests are provided in Appendix C and D respectively. The tests 
were condncted for both the CBRs and RRs for each of the rolling windows. With regard to the 
ADF test, in majority of the cases, the results for the series in levels suggested that the null 
hypothesis (Ho) of unit root (and thus non-stationarity) could not be rejected, implying that the 
series were non-stationary at levels. These results were confmned by the KPSS test, where the 
null of stationarity was rejected in levels, however at first difference, the null of stationarity 
could not be rejected68 For example, Table Cl in Appendix C shows that the null hypothesis for 
the ADF test for the Treasury bill rate for Kenya in all 6 rolling window periods could not be 
rejected in levels implying a non-stationary series. However, at first difference the null of non-
stationarity was rejected, implying that the series was stationary at first difference. These results 
were confirmed by the KPSS tests shown in Table D 1 in Appendix D where in all 6 rolling 
window periods, the null hypothesis of stationarity could not be rejected at first difference, 
implying that the Treasury bill rates for Kenya were stationary at first difference. Overall, based 
on both tests, the results suggested that the interest rates were 1(1) series. 
68 As noted in Section 4.3.1 the ADF tests the null hypothesis that the series is non-stationary (has a unit root) 
against the alternative of stationarity (no unit root). However, the KPSS tests the null hypothesis of stationarity, thus 
reversing the null and alternatives of the unit root tests (Brooks, 2002: 382). 
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5.3 COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
As noted in the previous chapters, the study made use of four different methods to determine 
whether cointegration was present amongst the pairs of interest rates. Since the findings from the 
unit root tests suggested that tile interest rates (CBRs and RRs) were stationary at first difference, 
i.e. integrated of order 1(1), cointegration tests were then used to detemline if there was a stable 
long-run relationship between the pairs of interest rates over tile various rolling windows. The 
tests used were the Johansen maximwll likelihood method, the Engle-Granger method, the 
CRDW test and fmally the error correction-based test. The results of these tests are reported ill 
Appendix E. The analysis of the results showed some degree of discrepancy in terms of whether 
to accept or reject the null of cointegration from the different tests carried out. Thus the error 
correction-based test was used to determine whether or not cointegration was present. The results 
showed that cointegration was strongest between the official rate and deposit and lending rate in 
Uganda. Cointegration was also strong between the official rate and the Burundi and Rwanda 
lending rate. The weakest evidence of cointegration came fTom the Tanzanian lending rate where 
the null of no co integration could not be rejected in six out of the seven rolling windows, 
sintilarly with the Burundi and Rwanda deposit rates where in four out of the seven rolling 
windows there was no cointegration. Once cointegration and thus the existence of a long-run 
relationship has been established between the CBR and RRs, an error correction model can be 
used to establish the short-run dynamics of the interest rate pass-though. It is inlportant to note 
that in cases where no cointegration was present, it was not possible to estimate an error 
correction model. The following sections present the results from the interest rate pass-through 
analysis. 
5.4 RESULTS FROM THE INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH ANALYSIS 
The regressions carried out in the study were estimated for a sample period of 10 years, based on 
the availability of data, from January 1999 to December 2008. Within this tinle frame, rolling 
sample periods of five years (60 observations) were estimated in order to capture the dynamic 
development of the pass-through over tinle, and thus to identifY the extent of nominal 
convergence in the East African Community over time. TIle swmnary of the long- and short-run 
regression analysis are provided in Appendices F and G respectively. As noted earlier, the 
overall result indicates that the series are 1(1). Figures 5.1 to 5.6 below represent the results from 
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the regressions carried out under the various rolling windows for the short-run pass-through, the 
long-run pass-through and the mean adjustment lag (ML) for both the deposit and lending rates 
for the EAC. 
5.4.1. Short-Run Pass-Through Analysis 
As noted in the previous chapter, the responsiveness of the RRs to changes in the CBRs could be 
measured over two time horizons, namely the short term and the long term. The short-run pass-
through or impact multiplier measures the immediate adjustment of the RRs to changes in the 
CBRs. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below show the short-run pass-through in the deposit and lending 
rates respectively. 
Figure 5.1: Short-Run Pass-Through: Deposit Rate. 
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Figure 5.2: Short-Run Pass-Through: Lending Rate 
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Figure 5.1 above shows that there are some discrepancies in the pass-through in the earlier time 
periods from 1999-2003 to 2001-2005 for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. However, for the period 
2004 and 2005, the pass-through for Kenya and Tanzania respectively fell to levels similar to 
those of Burundi and Rwanda. 10 terms of convergence, evidence from Figure 5.1 suggests that, 
with the exception of Uganda, the countries began to converge from the period 2002-2006 
rolling window. 
As can be seen from the figures above, the short-run pass-through remained extremely low, 
being less than 10 percent from the 2002-2006 rolling window onwards. Despite the convergence 
amongst some of the countries, there are still serious rigidities in the deposit market over time_ 
With regard to the entire estimation period 1999-2008, the results show that the pass-through in 
Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda is similar. Kenya and Uganda appear to be converging, with 
Kenya having a higher pass-through than Uganda. Once again the magnitude of the pass-through 
in both cases remained extremely low, with the first group being less than 10 percent and the 
second being approximately 23 percent. 
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With regard to the short-run pass-through in the lending rates, Figure 5.2 clearly indicates that, 
with the exception of Burundi, the pass-through of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda remained 
consistently similar to one another from 1999-2003 to 2004-2008 rolling windows. Rwanda 
follows the same trend althongh with lower short-run pass-throngh from 2001-2005 rolling 
window onwards and then begins to rise to levels again similar to the three countries in 2004-
2008. With regard to the lending rates in the East African countries, Figure 5.2 shows that 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda were converging from 1999-2003 to 2001 -2005 rolling 
window. The same countries began to converge again in the rolling windows 2003-2007 to 2004-
2008. As with the deposit rates highlighted above, the magnitude of the short-run pass-tllrough of 
the lending rates remained excessively low, hovering around 10 percent, thus implying serious 
rigidities in the lending rates. The results from the entire period 1999-2008 indicated that all five 
countries had a low similar short-run pass-through. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, if the value of the short-run pass-throngh is less than I, it 
is an indication of a sluggish adjustment in the short-run, hence the interest rates are sticky. From 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 it is evident that interest rate adjustment in all five countries remains 
sluggish. Figure 5.1 indicates that the interest rate adjustment was highest in Uganda from 2000-
2004 rolling window onwards rising to a level of approximately 60 percent in 2004-2008 rolling 
window. With regard to the lending rates, Figure 5.2 shows that Burundi was the only COWltry 
with a relatively quick interest rate adjustment, the highest being at 80 percent in 2001-2005 
rolling window, however the magnitude began to decrease from this period onwards to a low of 
38 percent in the 2003-2007 rolling window. 
5.4.2. Long-Run Pass-Through Analysis 
Having looked at the short run pass-through analysis, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 below show the pass-
through of interest rates in the long run, and whether the countries are converging towards one 
another. 
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Figure 5.3: Long-Run Pass-Through: Deposit Rate 
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Figure 5.4: Long-Run Pass-Through: Lending Rate 
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Figure 5.3 above shows that there is no evidence of a strong pass-through in the long-run for all 
five countries for most of the estimation period. Generally, for all countries there are great 
disparities across interest rates over time. For conntries such as Tanzania and Rwanda, there is a 
considerable level of fluctuation in the long-run pass-through parameters over the entire period. 
While the pass-through between these two countries tends to fluctuate in similar directions, the 
pass-through for Tanzania rises to levels greater tban Rwanda and falls to levels below Rwanda. 
The pass-through in Bwundi, however, seems to be fairly consistent over time, yet significantly 
different from and lower than all tile other countries. After the 2001-2005 rolling window 
onwards, the pass-through in Burundi remains the lowest of the other countries. With regard to 
Kenya and Uganda, there is some evidence of consistent long-run pass-through over the entire 
period, especially from 2001-2005 and 2002-2006 rolling periods, when tile rates are almost 
equal. Despite the discrepencies in the pass-through for all countries, Figure 5.3 provides some 
indication of convergence for all countries in rolling window 2003-2007, and Witll tile exception 
of Burundi some convergence in 2004-2008. Even though the countries may not necessarily be 
converging towards one another, the direction of the pass-through in these countries is similar. 
For example in rolling window 2003-2007 all countries are converging in the direction of a 
slower pass-through, whereas in rolling window 2004-2008, the countries are converging 
towards a slightly higher pass-through. However, the magnitude differed for all countries in 
these two rolling windows. For example in the 2003-2007 rolling window Kenya had the fastest 
pass-through of 34 percent, while Tanzania had ilie lowest of negative 5 percent. Similarly, in 
2004-2008 Rwanda had the lowest pass-through of23 percent while Kenya had ilie highest of 47 
percent. Overall, the magnitude of tile pass-through remained low, highlighting the existence of 
rigidities in ilie pass-through of deposit rates in the long-run. With regard to the entire estimation 
period, 1999-2008, no evidence of convergence was found. 
Turning to ilie lending rates, Figure 5.4 indicates some level of consistency in the pass-tlrrough 
over time. Over the period 1999-2003 to 2004-2008, the pass-through in Uganda and Rwanda 
remained consistent over time. From rolling window 2002-2006 onwards, the pass-through in 
Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi begin to move towards the levels of Uganda and Rwanda, and as a 
result some evidence of convergence was identified in the 2002-2006 rolling window. The 
countries continued to converge until 2004-2008. It should be noted that from 2002-2006 
onwards, the countries were converging towards a slower pass-through. In 2004-2008 the pass-
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through in Burundi was the highest at 31 percent while Rwanda had the lowest pass-through of 
negative 6 percent. The results fron the entire estimation period 1999-2008 showed some slight 
convergence between Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. Based on the findings, it can be concluded 
that from 2002-2006 onwards, there is slight evidence of convergence in the long-run pass-
through parameters in all five countries. However, the slow rate of pass-through implies the 
existence of rigidities in the lending rates. 
In order to supplemement the discussion of the long-run pass through analysis, the coefficient of 
variation was calculated to provide further insight about the dispersion in the deposit and lending 
rates. Figure 5.5 and 5.6 below provide a graphical plot of the variability of the interest rates over 
time in the EAC. 
Figure 5.5: Coefficient of Variation of Long-Run Multipliers: Deposit Rates 
Coefficient of Variation of long-Run Multipliers 
6.00 I 
5.00 -+------ ---..----------------------
4.00 +------+ - -"<:--------------------
3.00 
2.00 +-----7'--------"<- --- ---~-...::_---- . . 
1.00 +---.,<---
0,00 1- - --,------- -- --- --- --,- ----, ---_ . , 
" "' '" 
r- oo 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
N ~ ~ N N 6 ~ 
'" 
,;, 
'" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N N N N N 
_ EAC 
79 
Figure 5.6: Coefficient of Variation of Long-Run Multipliers: Lending Rates 
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The coefficient of variation is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of all the countries ' 
interest rates by their mean. Figure 5.5 above shows that there was great dispersion in the deposit 
rate in the 2000-2004 rolling window as well as in the lending rate in the 2001-2005 rolling 
window indicated in Figure 5.6. Despite the decrease in the dispersion in both the deposit and 
lending rates, as noted from the long-run results the speed and magnitude of the pass-through 
remained significantly low. Possible reasons for the low speed and magnitude and their 
implications on the pass-through are discussed further down in this chapter. 
From the discussion of the results above, with regard to the deposit rates, the pass-through in the 
short-run indicated some slight evidence of convergence amongst Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and 
Rwanda over time, however in the long run there was still evidence of somewhat heterogenous 
pass-through for the countries under analysis . With regard to the lending rates, there was some 
slight evidence of convergence in the short-run amongst all the countries except Burundi. 
However, in the long run, the rates remained heterogenous and after the 2001-2005 rolling 
window, the rates for all the countries seemed to be converging at a slow rate but still varying 
over time. 
Moreover, the estimation results show that there was no situation where there was a complete 
pass-through of interest rates i.e. the pass-through parameters in the deposit and lending rates in 
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the long run remained significantly below 1. It is important to mention that in the event that the 
coefficient of the long-run pass-through was equal to 1, this would imply a full or perfect pass-
through of changes in the central bank rates to the retail rates. The results of the long run pass-
through indicate no evidence of a movement towards a full and complete one-for-one pass-
through for either deposit rates or lending rates. 
The reason for the incomplete pass-through in some cases are country-specific. Section 3.5 of 
Chapter 3 looked at tbe possible factors that could affect the pass-through of interest rates and 
thus provide an explanation for the decreasing pass-through. Banking concentration was seen as 
one of the major causes of interest rate ligidities and thus the slow-down of the pass-through. 
The East African countries fmancial systems are dominated by a few commercial banks, and thus 
they may have the ability to set their own interest rates despite changes in the official rates. As a 
result this could lead to rigidities in the lending and deposit rates in both the long and short telID. 
Banking concentration was particulary relevant in the cases of Burundi and Rwanda. Table 3.1 in 
Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 highlights that tbe level of banking concentration in these two countries 
remained significantly high, averaging 0.93 and 0.87 respectively based on the concentration 
index provided in the table for periods where data was available. Another possible factor 
identified was the effectiveness of monetary policy in these countries. The ratio of reserves to 
total assets provided in Table B I in Appendix B was relatively high for Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Rwanda, suggesting that ilie banks were very liquid. This could be an indication 
that the countries rely on reserve requirement rather than the discount rate as a tool of monetary 
policy. The high liquidity would mean iliat the countries would first run down their own reserves 
before resorting to the central bank as a source of fmance, resulting in banks not changing their 
retail rates in reponse to changes in official rates. 
Moreover, ilie large credit provided by the banks to ilie government was common to all 
countries. This suggests that either the banks were subjected to large political influences which 
may have forced them to lend to government organisations, or that the private sectors are 
undeveloped, and so lending to the state poses less of a risk in telIDs of defaulting on their loans 
than lending to ilie private sector. Lastly, the poor contribution of ilie banking sector to financing 
the domestic economy in East Africa suggests iliat ilie financial system was generally inefficient 
as well as inefficient in carrying out its role of intelIDediation. These factors may significantly 
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contribute to the rigidities in the lending and deposit rates identified from the estimation results 
which was slowing down the pass-through. 
5.4.3. Symmetric Mean Adjustment in the ECM Model 
Figure 5.7: Mean Adjustment Lag (ML): Deposit Rate 
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Figure 5.8: Mean Adjustment Lag (ML): Lending Rates 
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The mean adjustment lag essentially indicates how long it would take for the long run-interest 
pass-through to be fully realised. Naturally the longer it takes for the full adjustment to be 
realised, the slower the process and vice versa. Figure 5.7 above illustrates the speed of the 
transmission process in the deposit rates given by the ML following changes in the official rates . 
It is important to recall that the calculation of the ML as described in Chapter 3 can only be done 
when a cointegrating relationship between the interest rates under consideration is found. In the 
event that there is no cointegrating relationship, an error correction model (ECM) cannot be 
estimated and thus no MLs can be calculated. This explains the reasons for the possible breaks in 
the line graphs in the above figures such as for Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda in Figure 5.7 and 
Kenya Tanzania and Burundi in Figure 5.8. 
From Figure 5.7, it is apparent that the only country that seems to have a low and stable ML is 
Uganda, thus the speed of the transmission process is fastest in Uganda throughout the 
estimation period. However, the speed of adjustment in Kenya began to slow down after 2000-
2004 until the 2003-2007 rolling window. With regard to the three remaining countries, no 
concrete inferences can be drawn because a stable long-run relationship between the CBRs and 
the DRs was not found, thus the significant number of gaps in the lines. Hence, overall Uganda 
recorded the fastest speed of adjustment in the long run, with the transmission process being 
completed in just over a month of a change in the CBR. With regard to the entire estimation 
period 1999-2008, for the countries where co integration was present, Uganda reported the fasted 
speed of adjustment with the transnllssion being completed in about two months, followed by 
Kenya and Tanzania with the transmission being completed in about 4 and 7 months 
respectively. 
With regard to the lending rates, Figure 5.8 indicates tbat there tends to be a relatively low and 
stable ML from the 2001-2005 rolling window onwards for Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Thus 
these three countries reported the fastest speed of adjustment with the transmission process being 
completed in about two months. However, the speed of adjustment in Kenya remained relatively 
inconsistent from the 2003-2007 rolling window. After the 2003-2007 rolling window there was 
no evidence of cointegration amongst the rates under question. The oddest case comes from 
Tanzania, with no cointegration identified in 6 out of the 7 rolling windows and thus no strong 
inferences can be made about how the lending rates in Tanzania respond to changes in the 
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official CBRs, However, in the instance where co integration was found, i,e, in rolling window 
2001-2005, the transmission process was completed in just about 8 months indicating a slow 
adjustment process, The results from the entire estimation period indicate that the adjustment 
process was fastest in Rwanda with the transmission process being completed in a month, 
whereas Kenya reported the slowest adjustment, with the process taking approximately IS 
months to complete"·, 
5.4,4, Asymmetric Meal! A4iustment in the ECM model 
Figure 5,9: Asymmetric Adjustment: Deposit Rates 
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69 The possible reasons for the slow speed of adjustment in the transmission process was country specific. These 
fac tors as well as the implications for policy are discussed in more deta il in Section 6.1.1 in Chapter 6. 
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Rwanda 
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The Wald test was used to establish whether or not there was asymmetry in the adjustment of 
commercial bank rates. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Wald test involves testing whether the 
coefficients of the positive and negative residuals in the asymmetric error correction model are 
equal. The Wald test was not significaut, suggesting that there was no statistically significant 
asymmetry of deposit rate in Kenya. However, Figure 5.9 shows that the adjustment was faster 
downwards than upwards. The results are similar in the case of Uganda, where the adjustment 
was faster downwards than upwards, but out of the 7 rolling windows the Wald test was only 
significaut in the 2003-2007 rolling window. With regard to Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda, the 
Wald test was not significant in any of the rolling windows except for Tanzania in the 2002-2006 
rolling window, indicating the absence of asymmetry in adjustment. Overall, despite the lack of 
significant asymmetry, there seems to be greater rigidity in deposit rate upwards than downwards 
in response to changes in the official rates. This may be an indication of collusion amongst banks 
in the deposit market. This is consistent with the framework proposed by Hannan and Berger 
(1991) discussed in Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2. As noted in the chapter the authors showed that 
in a market characterized by a few banks, breaking price agreements set amongst them would be 
costly if there was an increase in the deposit rate, aud as a result banks would be reluctant to 
increase their deposit rates causing rigidities in the deposit rate increases. 
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Figure 5.10: Asymmetric Adjustment: Lending Rate 
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With regard to the lending rate, Figure 5.1 0 above indicates that in Kenya and Rwanda, there are 
some indications of asymmetric response to changes in the official rate. In both countries the 
adjustment was faster when there was an increase than a decrease. For Kenya this result was 
more pronounced, confirmed by the Wald test which was significant in 2 out of the 6 rolling 
windows for a faster adjustment where there was an increase in the official rate. This behaviour 
in interest rates is suggests the presence of collusion amongst the banks in the lending market 
and supports the collusion framework (see Scholnick, 1996) as discussed in Section 2.4.1 in 
Chapter 2. However, with regard to Rwanda, the Wald test was not significant, suggesting no 
significant asymmetry in any of the rolling windows. With regard to Burundi the Wald test 
showed no significant presence of asynunetry, however Figure 5.1 0 indicates that from the 2001-
2005 rolling window onwards it took longer for the lending rate to increase than to decrease, 
suggesting a faster adjustment downwards. This result leans more towards the customer reaction 
hypothesis proposed by Neumark and Sharpe (1992) as discussed in Section 2.4.1 in Chapter 2. 
With regard to Uganda, the evidence from Figure 5.10 shows that from the 2001-2005 rolling 
window onwards there was no presence of asymmetry. This is because from this period onwards 
the positive and negative residuals from the asymmetric error correction model are equal. This 
was confirmed by the Wald test which remained insignificant for all the rolling windows 
including the entre estimation period 1999-2008. Finally, no concrete inferences can be made 
about the asymmetric adjustment for Tanzania because in 6 out of the 7 rOiling windows, there 
was no co integration present between the lending rates and the CBRs. Where cointegration was 
present in 2001-2005 rolling windows, even though the Wald test was not significant, Figure 5.8 
indicates some evidence of asymmetry showing that the lending rates take a longer time to 
decrease than increase. This suggests that the adjustment was faster upwards than downwards. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The results of the short- and long-run pass-through show that the countries that showed some 
evidence of convergence differed over time horizons in both their deposit and lending rates. The 
results however indicated the presence of convergence amongst the countries. In the short-run 
deposit rates, all countries except Uganda converged, whereas in the lending rates the only 
exception was Burundi. Thus the countries that were consistent in converging in both rates were 
Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, especially from the 2003-2007 rolling window onwards. The 
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results from the long-run pass-through suggest that in some cases all five countries seemed to 
follow some pattern of convergence. In the deposit rates, this was identified in the 2003-2007 
rolling window and in the lending rates all countries converged in the 2002-2006 rolling 
window. From this tone may conclude that in the 2003-2007 rolling window, for both interest 
rates all five countries followed a similar pattern of convergence. For example, in the deposit rate 
the countries converged towards a slower pass-through, whereas in the lending rate, the 
magnitude of the pass-through differed for all countries except for Uganda and Rwanda where 
the pass-through remained consistent for both countries. 
Despite the level of convergence identified among the countries, the results clearly suggest that 
the deposit and lending rates remained largely sticky. In the short run the magnitude of the pass-
through in both the deposit and lendiug rates hovered around 10 percent. In the long run, the 
magnitude of the pass-through varied amongst the countries in the deposit rates where the 
countries were converging towards a lower pass-through in the 2003-2007 rolling window and 
then towards a higher pass-through in the 2004-2008 rolling window with the exception of 
Burundi. In the 2003-2007 rolling window the average of the magnitude of the pass-through of 
all countries was 9 percent, and in the 2004-2008 rolling window the magnitude of the pass-
through averaged 33 percent for the four converging countries. With regard to the lending rates, 
where the countries were seen to be converging, the magnitude of the pass-through was less than 
30 percent in 2003-2007 rolling window. 
Regarding the speed of adjustment (i.e. ML) the general fmding is that the speed of adjustment 
remained low for most countries. The evidence suggests that the highest speed of adjustment 
occurred for the lending rates, followed by the deposit rates. With regard to the direction of the 
speed of adjustment i.e. the asymmetric adjustment, the results varied amongst the countries. For 
example in Kenya and Uganda the result suggests that conmlercial banks are becoming more 
rigid in adjusting their deposit rate upwards. With regard to the lending rates, the fmdings 
suggest that in Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda the adjustment was faster upwards, indicating 
greater rigidities in lending rate decreases than increases. However, the opposite was found in 
Burundi, where the results show that the adjustment was faster downwards, suggesting greater 
rigidities in lending rate increases than decreases. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
At the heart of this study was to identify whether the pass-through of monetary policy had 
become similar over time, giving an indication of the extent to which the East African countries 
had met their nominal convergence criteria and thus the possibility of forming an East Afiican 
monetary union and ultimately the establisluuent of a single East Afiican central banle The 
analysis made use of cointegration and asymmetric error correction models to examine how RRs 
responded to changes in the CBRs. The study further explored whether there was asymmetry in 
the responses. The study used three monthly interest rate series, the central bank rate (in the case 
of Kenya the Treasury-Bill rate was used as a proxy), commercial bank lending rate and deposit 
rate. To identify the extent of integration over time, the analysis was canied out for the period 
1999 to 2008, as this was the period for which the data was available for all five countries. To 
capture the dynamic development of the pass-through over time, the study uses rolling windows. 
A summary of the results from the estimation follows. 
From the empirical results provided in Chapter 5, it was most evident that the magnitude of the 
pass-through in the short and long run for both interest rates remained very low. In the short run 
the magnitude for both rates hovered around 10 percent. In the case of the long-run pass-through 
to deposit rates, where convergence was identified in the 2003-2007 and 2004-2008 rolling 
windows, the magnitude of the pass-through averaged 9 and 33 percent respectively. The 
magnitude of the pass-through in the lending rates also remained low, hovering around 30 
percent in rolling window 2003-2007 where convergence was identified. The low magnitude of 
the pass-through further indicates that there were significant rigidities in the interest rates over 
the long and short term. With regard to which countries were seen to be converging, the results 
show that in the deposit rates all five countries were converging in the 2003-2007 rolling 
window. Additionally, in the 2004-2008 rolling window, with the exception of Burundi, some 
convergence was also identified between the other four countries. In the lending rates, the results 
suggested a greater level of consistency in the pass-through when compared to the deposit rates. 
The results show that in rolling window 2003-2007 there was some evidence of convergence 
amongst all the countries. FurthemlOre, compared to the deposit rates, where convergence for all 
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cOlUltries was identified, the magnitude of the pass-through remained slightly higher in the 
lending rates. This finding was similar to that of De Bondt (2005) discussed in Section 2.5.1 of 
Chapter 2 which showed that the pass-through for lending rates was higher than for deposit rates 
in the long term. A general observation about the lending rates is that, despite the low speed and 
magnitude of the pass-through and with the exception of one or two countries, the pass-through 
in the lending rates seemed to have improved over time. This result was similar to the findings of 
the study canied out by Sander and Kleimeier (2004) discussed in Section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2: 
they noted that the pass-through of monetary policy had improved with respect to the lending but 
not the deposit rate. However, as noted above, despite convergence identified in the above 
rolling windows, the magnitude and speed of adjustment of the pass-through remained low. 
The results of the asymmetric adjustment suggest that there seemed to be greater rigidities in 
deposit rate increases than decreases in response to changes in the official rates. This result was 
similar to the findings of Scholnick (1996) where the author found that the adjustment in deposit 
rates in Malaysia and Singapore was faster downwards than upward. This result suggested that 
the banks in the East African countries were colluding and thus supported the collusion 
hypothesis proposed by Hannan and Berger (1991). From the banking concentration ratios 
provided in Chapter 3 and the overview of the financial systems in East Africa, it was concluded 
that the financial sectors specifically in Burundi and Rwanda were dominated by a few 
commercial banks. Thus it is possible that the results suggested that collusion amongst the banks 
was a possible factor that caused rigidities in the interest rates in these two countries. With 
regards to the lending rates, the results were more country specific. As noted in Chapter 5 the 
results suggested a tendency towards greater rigidity in lending rate decreases than increases in 
response to changes in the official rates in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This may suggest the 
possibility of collusion amongst the banks in these countries. However, the results in Burundi 
showed greater rigidities in lending rate increases than decreases leaning more towards the 
customer reaction hypothesis proposed by Neumark and Sharpe (1992) . 
Chapter 3 highlighted additional factors that may inlpede the pass-through of interest rates. From 
the asset and liability ratios calculated, two more factors could have contributed to the low level 
of pass-through of interest rates. Judging from the ratio of reserves to total assets it could be that 
the banks in East Africa were somewhat liquid. As a result there may be no need for the 
90 
commercial banks to rely on the accommodation facilities provided by the central banks. In 
times of need, the banks would run down on their own reserves before resorting to the central 
banks as a source of finance. Furthennore, the increasing ratio of credit to the government may 
suggest a strong influence of the government over the banks or an underdevelopment of the 
private sector. Lastly, the weak contribution of the banking sector in financing the domestic 
economy shows inefficiency on the part of the banks in the financial intennediation process. 
Previous studies carried out in East Africa with the exception of Buigut and Valev (2009) 
generally supported the monetary union initiative amongst the countries that were included as 
part of the EAC in their studies7o• However, the results of this study do not indicate any evidence 
of strong convergence amongst all five countries over time, although there were periods where 
some countries were seen to be converging in certain rolling windows. The results suggest that 
the pass-through in lending rates had become more similar over time. Judging from the results of 
this study one may conclude that the extent of monetary policy transmission has been weak over 
time considering the slow speed, magnitude and large rigidities in the interest rates. In order to 
prepare the countries for a monetary integration initiative, certain policy actions may be needed. 
This is discussed next. 
6.1.1 Policy Implications 
From the analysis of the results, it was identified that the speed and magnitude of the pass-
through to deposit and lending rates remained low in all countries. Furthennore, there were 
significant rigidities in the interest rates over time. This finding could be the result of several 
factors identified in this study that affected the countries either individually or collectively. 
These and their implications for policy are discussed next. 
In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda it was identified that the weak contribution of the financial 
sector to the domestic economies, the high liquidity nature of the banks and the large lending 
provided to the government were the three major factors that may be responsible for the low 
70 As discussed in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 the only three known studies carried in East Afiica were those of 
Mkenda (2001), Buigut and Valev (200Sh) and Buigut and Valev (2009). Additionally, Buigut and Valev (2005a) 
and Buigut (2006) incorporated the EAC in their studies. The results ITom Mkenda (2001) support a monetary union 
between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Buigut and Valev (2005a; 2005b) support the formation of a monetary union 
including all five countries. Buigut (2006) shared simi lar results. Supp011ing the EAC monetary union initiative. 
Buigut and Valev (2009) suggest that not all countries would benefit in a monetary union. 
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pass-through of interest rates. The first factor implies that the banking system in each country 
was generally inefficient in perfonning its role of intermediation. In this regard policy concerns 
should be geared towards fmancial refonns that may improve the manner in which the banks 
perfonn their role of intennediation. The second factor identified relates to the excess reserves 
and thus the high liquidity nature of the banks. This may be an indication of an ineffective 
monetary policy. As noted under the overview of policy frameworks in Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, 
the main instrument of monetary policy in these countries is aMOs. This suggests that monetary 
policy does not rely much on the discount rate, in fact the discount rate in some of these 
countries is highly restrictive so as to prevent banks from borrowing from the central bank. As a 
result the banks are not indebted to the central banks and thus there would be no response of 
bank interest rates to changes in the official rate and ultimately no transmission of monetary 
policy. Therefore making the discount rate the primary tool of monetary policy would greatly 
improve the transmission of monetary policy, because banks would adjust their retail rates in 
response to changes in the official rates. 
Finally the large lending to the government raises two important points regarding the possible 
cause of the low pass-through. The first point is that the banks in these countries may have been 
subjected to a high degree of political influences or government intervention. In such a case 
policy reforms should be concerned with freeing the fmancial system of government control. 
Secondly, the large credit provided to the government may have also been due to the fact that the 
private sector may be undeveloped and so lending to the private sector was risky. In such a case 
institutional factors, such as a strong regulatory and supervision framework, may playa major 
role in overcoming the challenges of an undeveloped private sector. According to Ndung'u and 
Ngugi (2000: 17) a strong regulatory framework would improve lending practices, especially 
when infornlation asymmetries exist. Adequate supervision would lead to credit being provided 
to trustworthy parties and thus reduce incidents of default. Furthermore, the authors note that a 
proper legal and regulatory framework would put in place necessary rules of law and improve 
the internlediation process, which, as was noted above, is needed for all five countries. 
The factors that affected the pass-through in Burundi and Rwanda were the poor contribution of 
the financial sector to the domestic economy and the lack of competition in the banking sector 
due to high concentration and oligopolistic behaviour by the cOllunercial banks. Thus in addition 
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to the financial refonns as explained above to improve the financial intennediation process, 
policy should also focus on liberalising the banking system, thereby introducing more 
competition. Moreover, by allowing the entry of foreign financial institutions this would further 
reduce the level of banking concentration in Burundi. It is important to note that Rwanda was 
also characterised by excess liquidity which may imply that monetary policy may have also been 
ineffective. In such a case policy may be concerned with using the discount rate as the primary 
tool to manage liquidity in the economy or the possible revision of the reserve ratio so as the 
maintain certain amount of liquidity in the banking system. 
6.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As noted earlier, this study did not directly model the factors that may have affected the pass-
through of interest rates over time. Future studies may explore the effect of variables such as 
bank concentration, ownership of banks, the development and openness of the financial system 
amongst others to detennine the extent to which each have an effect on the pass-through of 
interest rates and thus the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Of the several factors identified in this study that may have affected the pass-through of interest 
rates, it was identified that the large credit provided to the govenunent was common to most 
countries. This suggests that the government may have a large influence in the banking system or 
that the private sector in the countries remain underdeveloped, suggesting that lending to the 
private sector may be too risky. Thus, a possible area for future studies may be to explore these 
factors further so as to detennine the extent to which they affect the pass-through of interest 
rates. 
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APPENDIX A: 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Table AI: Summary of Empirical Literature 
AUTHOR AND YEAR COUNTRIES STUDIED SAMPLE PERIOD METHOD SUMMARY OF FfNDINGS 
Toolsema ef al. (2002) 6 EMU countries 1980-2000 The FM-OLS estimator and test The authors concluded that even 
(Belgium, France, for parameter instability was used though there were major differences 
Germany, Italy, the to examine the long run in pass-through in their sample, both 
Netherlands, Spain) relationship between money for the initial and long-run responses 
market and lending rates. The to policy-induced interest rate 
relationship was further examined changes, there was evidence for 
in more detail using rolling convergence of monetary policy 
regression techniques in an error transmission. 
correction framework. 
Aziakpono el al. (2008) SADC Region (IS 1990-2005 Principal Component (PCA) and The results from the study indicated 
countries) an Interest Rate Pass through that CMA banking markets are most 
analysis was applied to central integrated followed by the SACU 
bank interest rates as well as to countries. The authors suggest that a 
deposit and loan interest rates. selecti ve expansion of the CMA is 
possible with Seychelles, Zambia and 
Botswana being potential candidates. 
Aziakpono (2006) SACU countries 1990-2004 Cointegration and error correction The study confirmed the dominant 
techniques as well as impulse role of South Africa in the Union and 
response analysis. showed that there was a hierarchy of 
integration of financial systems of 
each member state with South Africa, 
with Namibia being at the top and 
Botswana at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. The findings also 
suggested that integration between 
the financial systems was as a result 
of pol icy convergence rather than 
market convergence, which implied 
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AUTHOR AND YEAR COUNTRlES STUDIED SAMPLE PERIOD METHOD SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
limited arbitrage opportunities 
between countries. 
De Bondt (2005) Euro area as opposed to 1996-2001 Three different empirical The study found that the pass-
cOlmtry specific frameworks were used to test the through of official interest to market 
experlences robustness of empirical results. interest rates is complete for money 
The VECM was applied to model market interest rates up to three 
the two stages of interest rate months, but not for market interest 
pass-through process. Impulse rates with longer maturities. 
response analysis based on the Furthermore only 50% the immediate 
V AR model was used to examine pass-through of market interest rates 
the two stages of interest rate PT, to retail bank interest rates was 
and finally a univariate ECM was found, whereas the final pass-through 
used to examine the pass-through was 100% for lending rates in 
of interest rates. particular. The authors accounted for 
the difference between the 
adjustment speed of bank deposit and 
lending rates to be explained by 
credit risk considerations. 
Sander and Kleimeier 10 Euro zone countries 1995-2002 The study made use of the The authors' overall findings suggest 
(2006c) mortgage and corporate loan rates that euro-zone convergence has been 
to investigate the integration of a result of integrating wholesale 
the euro zone retail banking markets, and that further integration 
markets by comparing may only be possible by further 
convergence and cointegration integration of wholesale markets. 
measures. The convergence The authors further suggest since 
measures were exposed to a retail-banking activities tend to be 
difference-in-difference localized, competition policy in these 
methodology which allowed the markets will remain a major concern 
identification of the impact of a for policy makers in the future. 
single currency. 
Sander and Kleimeier 8 Central and Eastern 1993-2003 The study applied the V AR and The results indicated that on average 
(2006b) European countries co integration methods which the PT in the CEECs IS more 
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allow for asymmetric and complete and faster than in the 
threshold adjustment and follow aggregate euro zone. Furthermore, 
an automatic model selection convergence across CEECs can be 
procedure. The data used to carry predicted with market concentration, 
out the study included retail bank health, foreign bank 
interest rates on mortgages, participation and monetary policy 
consumer loans, short and long regime as conditioning factors. The 
term corporate loans, current authors did not find evidence for 
account and, time deposits and convergence towards the euro zone. 
savings accounts. 
Sander and Kleimeier 4 CMA countries of the 1991-2005 The study made use of two bank The results of the study stated that 
(2006a) South African Customs interest rates and two proxies of the banking markets of the CMA 
Union (SACU) the monetary policy rate: Prime exhibit a degree of integration as the 
lending rates, Treasury bill rates, pass-through is often fast and 
and discount rates. The data was complete. Deposit markets were 
used to model the PT based on a found to be more heterogeneous by 
unifying empirical approach that showing different degrees of interest 
also allowed for long-run rate stickiness and 
co integration relationships as well asymmetric adjustment III some 
as asymmetric and threshold countries, thus pointing to some 
adjustment. degree of market imperfection. 
Buigut and Valev (2005) East African Countries 1970-2001 The authors focused on shocks to The results of the study indicated that 
(EAC) which was aggregate output growth and supply and demand shocks were 
compared with the UK inflation using a V AR model. The asymmetric, which did not support 
and the USA. study also compared the response the formation of a currency union in 
of the economies to the shocks in EA at the moment. However, the 
terms of the magnitude and speed speed and magnitude of adj ustment 
of adjustment. This was done by to the shocks were similar across the 
looking at the impulse response countries which meant that further 
functions. Variance integration of the economies might 
decomposition was used to lead to more favourable conditions 
identify the contribution of each for a monetary UnIon. Evidence 
shock to the movements in the suggested that linking an EA 
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two variables. currency to an external anchor would 
be weak. Evidence however did 
favour the Euro as the anchor 
currency over the US$ and the UK 
pound. 
Tsangarides and Qureshi Countries that form the 3 overlapping The study employed both crisp The authors found considerable 
(2008) WAMZand the periods: 1990- and fuzzy clustering analyses to dissimilarities in the economic 
ECOWAS 2004, 1995-2004 examine the similarity between characteristics of West African 
and 2000-2004 countries within and across the countries. The W AMZ countries did 
proposed monetary regions. They not group with the W AEMU member 
further tested the accuracy of countries. When West and central 
their results using a principal Africa were examined as one group, I 
component analysis. the authors found heterogeneities 
within the CF AF zone, and some 
similarities between the central 
African and W AMZ countries. 
Aziakpono (2008a) South Africa and other 1990-2005 The study made use of The results of the study identified 
SACU countries cointegration and error correction South Africa as playing the dominant 
(Botswana, Lesotho, modelling techniques as well as role in the union. There was a high 
Namibia, Swaziland) weak exogeneity tests to examine level of dependence of other SACU 
the degree of financial and countries fmancial systems on South 
monetary autonomy and Africa's financial system, suggesting 
interdependence between South that a monetary lInion with a single 
Africa and other SACU countries. central bank (SARB) and monetary 
policy for the union is possible. 
Nielsen et al. (2005) CMA Countries 1994-2004 The study made use of the The results indicated that Lesotho, 
concept of the uncovered interest Namibia and Swaziland were well 
rate parity. To test for financial financially integrated with the South 
integration, the authors analyzed African market, while for Botswana, 
the impact of foreign interest Zambia, and Zimbabwe the opposite 
rates on domestic interest rates, was true. 
and for comparative purposes, 
other neighbouring countries sllch 
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as Botswana, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe were brought into the 
analysis. 
Grandes (2003) CMA countries and 1990-2001 The author made use of a two- Evidence from the study showed that 
Botswana step econometric model based on CMA and Botswana form an OCA 
the theory of generalized given the existence of common long-
purchasing power parity (G-PPP). run trends in their bilateral real 
The authors used the bilateral real exchange rates. 
exchange rates in their tests for 
cointegration using the rand as 
the base currency for the CMA 
countries and Botswana. 
Fielding and Shields Members of the UEMOA 1963-1997 The study modified the method of The results showed a high degree of 
(1999) and BEAC that make up Blanchard and Quah (1989) in correlation between inflation shocks 
the African CFA Franc order to estimate a structural to different CFA members but not to 
Zone plus Kenya V AR representation of the macro- Kenya. Furthermore, the costs of 
economy of each member of the monetary integration depend on the 
CF A zone plus Kenya. extent to which price and output 
shocks are correlated across 
countries, and how similar the long-
run effects of the shocks are on the 
macro-economy. 
Egert ef at. (2007) 5 Central and Eastern 1991-2005 The study made lise of a The results indicated that the pass-
European cOlmtries: the multivariate Vector through is generally very low for 
Czech Republic, Autoregression (V AR) analysis to overnight deposit rates, but becomes 
Hungary, Poland, study the transmission from the higher for short- to long-term deposit 
Slovakia and Slovenia, policy rate via market rates to rates. In addition, the pass-through 
the CEE-5. European bank retail rates. In estimating the has been declining over time in the 
countries- Austria. long run pass-through, the study CEE-5. and the authors argue it will 
Germany and Spain. made use the use of Dynamic decrease further in the future. 
Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) Evidence suggested that the pass-
and a standard ARDL model. through was similar in the CEE-5 
Co integration tests between the than in Spain and was higher than in 
ItO 
AUTHOR AND YEAR COUNTRIES STUDIED SAMPLE PERIOD METHOD SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
monetary policy rate and retail core euro area countries. Thus the 
rates were carried out to adoption of the euro by the CEE-5 
determine the size of, and will not increase heterogeneity within 
mechanism underlying, the the euro area with regard to interest 
interest rate pass-thro~gh. rate pass-through. 
Marotta (2008) 9 EMU countries 1993-2003 The paper ultimately allowed for With reference to the structural 
multiple unknown structural breaks, the study found two in four 
breaks to investigate whether the EMU countries and in the UK, and a 
size and speed of the pass- single one in five other countries. 
through of market rates into The pattern of dates indicates 
short-term lending rates have national banking systems adj usting 
increased since the introduction slowly to the new monetary regime 
of the euro. Single breaks were and emphasizes caution In 
searched for using a supermum F associating structural changes to the 
testing procedure. The algorithm introduction of the euro. It was found 
was then rerun from the earliest that the pass-through 111 the last 
break-point to detect the break-free period was incomplete, 
successive one and so on. suggesting that a single monetary 
policy would not be very effecti ve. 
Mkenda (200 I) EAC (Kenya, Uganda and 1981-1998 The paper employed the The results from the G-PPP method 
Tanzania) Generalised Purchasing Power supported the formation of a 
Parity (G-PPP) method and currency union in the region. The 
various criteria suggested by the method assisted 111 establishing 
theory of Optimum Currency cointegration between real exchange 
Areas to investigate whether the rates in East Africa, which indicated 
EAC would be an optimum that the three countries tend to be 
currency area. affected by similar shocks. 
Haug ef al. (2000) 12 European countries 1979-1995 The study employed a The results of the study indicated that 
multivariate cointegration an EMU would not be successful for 
framework. The study looked at all 12 original EU countries unless 
whether the EU countries were monetary and fiscal policies are ' 
cointegrated with each of the four al i gned further. 
i Maastricht criteria by using the 
III 
AUTHOR AND YEAR COUNTRIES STUDIED SAMPLE PERIOD METHOD SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Johansen's Likelihood based 
technique for cointegrated V AR 
models. 
Zhang el al. (2003) 10 East Asian economies 1983-2000 (study The study made use of a three- The overall findings of the study did 
and the USA included sub- variable V AR model to identify not display strong support for 
periods) and examine the correlation of the forming an optimum currency area in 
shocks for specific sub- periods the East Asian region. The results 
with the entire sample period. however implied that some sub-
Furthermore, variance regions were better candidates for a 
decomposition and impulse currency arrangement as their 
response analysis were used in disturbances were con'elated and 
the study. Considering that small, and those countries adj usted 
foreign shocks have an influence rapidly to shocks. 
on the EA economies, the authors 
used transformed variables 
representing the ratio of EA 
levels to US levels to remove the 
effects of US shocks. 
Phylaktis (1999) 6 Pacific Basin countries 1973-1993 (study Cointegration tests were used to The study found evidence for real 
(Singapore, Malaysia, included sub- identify long-run relationships interest rate parit)' and capital market 
Hong Kong, Korea, periods) amongst interest rates and the integration. More interestingly, the 
Taiwan and Japan) speed of adjustment was results showed greater capital market 
measured using the impulse integration with Japan than with the 
response analysis. Multivariate US, thus emphasising Japan's 
Granger causality tests were influence in dominating the region. 
utilized to identify whether it was Results from the causality tests 
real interest rates of the US or of indicated that some of the countries 
Japan that drove the interest rates in the Pacific Basin had developed 
in the Pacific Basin countries. close links with Japan, and in some 
of them such as Taiwan, shocks 
originating from the US were 
transmitted via Japan. 
Ahn ef af. (2005) 12 East Asian economies 1960-2002 The study used a structural V AR The results show that the East Asian 
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approach as well as a G-PPP to economies, the ASEAN 4 (Indonesia. 
study monetary union ship in East Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) 
Asia. and three Northeast Asian economies 
(Hong Kong SAR, Korea, and 
Taiwan) satisty the macroeconomic 
conditions for forming an OCA. 
Maskay (200 I) The South Asian 1980-1997 Asian monetary integration in The results of the study suggest that 
Association for Regional light of the OCA criterion of SAARC member countries are not 
Cooperation (SAARC ), patterns of shocks. The model suitable for a currency area, as they 
consisting of Bangladesh, was estimated using a VAR did not face symmetric patterns of 
Bhutan, India, the method and impulse response shocks. Thus implementation of a 
Maldi ves, Nepal, functions were used to identify single currency would result in 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka) the response of prices to significant economic costs. 
aggregate supply and demand 
shocks. 
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APP ENDlX B: 
ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Table 8 1: Deposit Money Bank Assets and Liabiliries 1990 102007 
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CLAIMS ON CE~'TRAL GOVER.'.\1tNT 16 OS IHI II JO 15.61 21.]6 11 .99 15.44 
"" 
19.62 17.65 17.22 2121 217 1 27 87 1956 20.85 219) 23.00 
CLAIMS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 0.10 000 0.15 016 014 0.14 0. 13 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.28 016 0.15 0. 13 0.06 010 015 011 
LIABILITIES 
TOTAL UABILITlES 52164 65013.J 865438 1064291 153619 ]8318!.96 228013 48 2722805 28!966.5 301922.9 314780.7 3225U 41 347514.2 391717.:'12 450178 go 498831.91 590022.04 727382.63; 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 16773 19J5U 26620.9 }3664.4 )40018 36185.6 40H6.6 4470B.} 466713 56--HO.Q 649 10.5 75~5U 86069.S 128297 136729 157460 206S83 276%'1 
TIME, SAVI~GS &. FGN CCY DEPOSITS 30570 5 178.., 50002.5 6433 1.6 89007.3 129%1 170009 206488 211161 21~148 22 166S 224211 241727 244327 288011) ) 1627b H)8J4 }Q)1S6 
FOREIGN UABILmES 1697.7 1.181.4 1921.7 3392.4 1314U 5806.96 S61UR 10)55.9 12122 . .\ 159]),8 J3~00. 9 127$6 S 10953.5 SJ756S 11747,5 802~ IS 93S2.1 S 26110.3: 
CREDIT FROM MONETARY .o\UTHOIUTIES 
" 
13423 4920.9 2~ 1 . 6 . . . 447.7 4335.2 1613.6 3635.2 291414 2672.53 740.19 H.04 . . 61 55091 
CREDIT FROM OTHER FIN INSTITuTIONS 10696.8 640) Sl6S.1 600~.4 S082.2 387' 2682.57 leo7S 73 182674 202~ 92 3098.3 148283 ::124 ]Q '::28513 
(JAB TO NON HANK ,"1NANCIAL INSTS . 
· · 
12.3 t. . 48.9 l .l l.' 1.97 2,87 '87 230.0') 195,82 280.9J 2lS 416.21 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS 3097,8 5n33 3077 8 4789.7 4'W'.8 5530.5 382U 422() 1 9192 4 87~3 7 83 84 . ~6 S309.S7 4312.76 792167 1034L2 15307 ]nu] S 22260.9 
I'ERCENTOFTOTAL L. IABILITIES 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 32.15 29.46 30.76 31.6] 22,12 1968 17,69 1642 16.15 }S 68 2062 23.43 2476 32.75 30.37 JI ~7 B .01 'I.os 
TIME. SAVINGS & FGN CCY DEPOSITS 58.60 58. 15 57.78 60.45 58.53 70.67 74.56 75.84 73.07 71.33 70.42 69.S3 69,~4 62.37 63.98 63.40 ~9.97 .~4 . 03 
FOREIGN UABILlDES 3.25 2.14 2.22 3.19 1.56 3.16 2.49 3.80 4.20 5.27 4.29 3.96 3.15 2.09 2.61 1.6 ] 1.59 J S9 
CREDn FROM Mo:-.n ARY AtmlORlTIES 00' 2.06 ,,, 0.24 0]6 150 o ~3 
'" 
0" 077 019 0.01 . 0.8S 
CREDIT FROM OTHER FIN INSTITUTIONS . 
· · 
6.96 3.48 llA 2.21 1.76 L28 0.85 0.S2 0.53 0.S2 0.69 0.30 0.46 0.)1 
LlAB TO NONBANK ANANC"lAL INSTS . . 
· · 
0.01 . 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.06 0," 006 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS ~ .'I 4 B.19 3.56 00 ,.U 3.0 1 ' 68 I.S5 H2 HO 2.66 1.63 L25 2.02 2.30 l07 2.93 l06 
CDP (Mil SbiUiA~) 19S536 22.\ZJ2 264475 3336 16 400700 465654 687'191 770312 850808 
... ". Q678J1 1020020 ]OH170 11 33060 1286460 144~80 1642400 . 
PERCEI\T OF CDP 
CLAIMS ON PRI VATE SECTOR IS 74 19.96 22 IS 1850 19.83 25.61 21S1 24.22 23.8\ 26.42 2562 23.46 24.00 22.96 25.23 24.11 2480 . 
ASSETS: TM'Z.AN IA 
TOTAL ASSETS (J..1tl Shillin&J 179319) 23S04U 260102.3 421S71.2 S31220 665130 650\86 723634 '136130 1062422 1123090.31 1416604 63 1702032 20'1190 2392317 1369176 4600913 6054210 
RESERVES 6889.7 10289 14377 J0 111 .2 J9911 6<012 72797 ~97 10 113202 12J199 172096 171329 1951SJ 226870 310420 395425 594062 7513$3 
FOREIGN ASSETS 11995.2 12389.5 3438~. 7 69782 76741 170163 111m 233556 26n57 301079 410990 5J'106l 571573 685488 683666 8l5b.\O 1079~80 879827 
114 
YEAR 1990 1991 1992 1993 199' 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2OQ.l 2005 2006 2007 
CLAIMS ON NONFIN PUB ENTERPRISES 41422.6 ~6471.2 44711 49261 ~7tS2 468)1 17)40 1622: 
'''' 
4719 29&0.31 1015.6) . . 
· · 
. 
· 
CLAIMS ON PRl \ 'ATE SEliOR 115483 152405 133490 186307 222978 2010 1 ~ 116556 166754 219861 )0216~ HJ264 403494 H0661 &17125 105%90 1425060 1946170 2&&lNO 
CLAIMS ON GOVERNMENT 35n .8 348b 8 3113&b 93190 124401 111089 2(:,1942 247392 312746 H1260 403760 29HO) 3646)8 122407 n&~41 7 130~1 981161 I H3240 
PERCE1\TOFTOTA.L ASSlTS 
RESERVES '14 4.38 S . ~3 7.0} ' .40 99l 11 .20 &.2S 12.1)Q 1160 Il 0 1 12 52 II 41 11 .06 129& 11.74 12.91 12..5 ] 
fOREIGN .... SSETS (:,.69 5.21 13.22 10.27 14.45 2B8 2192 32.28 2855 28.l4 ll.06 38.0' HU 33AI 28.5& 24.80 23.46 14.S} 
CLAIMS ON l\ONfl~ PUB ENTERPRISES 2309 24 OJ 17. 19 II 49 10.1(:. 7.04 2.67 2.2" 033 0 ..... 0.23 007 . . 
· · 
CLAIMS ON PRlVA.TE SECTOR 6438 64.84 s l.n 43.44 41 .97 lO.22 17.9} 23.04 2562 28.44 2S. 19 n.4S 33 53 )9 &2 4430 42.30 4UO 47.63 
CL\lMS ON GOVERNMENT 2.00 1.48 12.74 21.78 2342 27.2) 4029 14.19 33.41 31.111 30.52 20.87 2142 lUI 14. 15 21.16 2l.H 2~ )) 
LIABILITIES 
TOTAL UA/3ILmES 116402. J 22224 U 38&645.6 495943.5 428214 ~71091 589778 68S260 746972 861430 10155J494 1270S81.7 1618336" 1924032 . .'i~ 2138346. 1 BJ426H 9 4023984 II ~2b2440 i 
DEMAND DEPOSITS S~0&3 3 7519&.2 90661. 1 12S161 n1317 18197t 1 9J5~1 20~992 237718 24m3 302602 35438 1 463341 ~603H 65 1451 9 1 ~6~3 %1104 1397<J6tJ 
TIME. SAVINGS. & FGN CCY D[I'05ITS ~2312 2 1b26U 116243 173624 2 .. 0119 329~2 1 372282 4B200 481467 ~84948 1026&2 81(11 11 1088900 1274" 40 1332390 217(,1&0 27(13090 12b~~70 
FOREIGN LIABILITIES 4071.4 6610.9 102749 44939.3 10923 2&261 4827 4878 2460 1169 4163.24 16169.1 35193 687<>.5~ 19Q42.1 ~5214 . 9 914748 281856 
CREDIT FROM CENTRAL BANK 62677 3 6068S.6 7398&.9 147397 Ins 7~85 16: 12763 . 5430 1.2 . 82.95 lO 
· · · 
GOVERNJl.lENT DEPOSITS 2238. 1 34U3 5001 .5b 4822 22S17 217SJ 21J9~6 28427 25327 21560 20086.5 29320 308198 8Ull 115463 18720 1 262316 ll7054 
PERCE.""'lT OF TOTAL LlASILInES 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 31.23 33 84 2333 2~ 24 33.80 32.21 32.48 ~0.06 31.82 2&.16 29.22 27.89 2861 2912 2786 27.46 23&8 26Sb 
TIME. SAVINGS. &: FGN CCY DEPOSITS 29.61 34.31 29.91 15.01 56.07 H .70 63.12 6322 64.46 67.90 67.86 68.53 67.29 66.26 b.'i .S3 65.27 61. 17 62.0S 
fOREIGN LLIillILfllES 2.31 2.97 26.44 906 2.SS 4.95 OB2 071 0.33 0.21 0.40 1.21 2.17 
'" 
OBI 166 
'" 
5 Je, 
CREDIT FROM CENTRAL BA."lK 3S.5~ 27.3\ 19.04 29.72 0.31 1.)) 0.03 1.16 0.00 0.6) 0.00 . 0.01 0.00 
· · 
GOVERNMEI'(J' DEPOSITS 1.27 1.57 1.29 0.97 5.26 3.81 US 4.15 1.19 2.50 2.52 2.31 \.9(> 4.2S ' .79 ~.61 "2 6.02 
GOP (Mil ShillinlJ &10690 1086270 1369870 1725540 2298870 3020500 3167640 4703460 U7 12S0 6432910 7;!68J80 82746 10 9431960 1"77900 1236SS00 142QQ100 . 
PERCli:fIoT OF GOP 
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 1390 14 0l 9.74 IUO 9.70 6.66 l .09 
'" 
4.31 ' .70 4.59 4.SS 605 
'" 
&.57 10.0] 
· 
ASSETS: UCA."IOA 
TOTAL ASSETS (B!lJ 90.95 155.99 261 36 3.'i4. 11 4&63\ SS7.S7 711 .12 n~.99 1016.29 1270.65 1709. 12 1194.92 2301.55 2768.44 3130.37 330S.2 39112.56 
· 
RESERVES II.CJ9 2739 34.64 37.06 7.'i12 796 109 62 104.22 1294 1 12 1.02 111l.9l 233.79 2058 20726 37563 4 18.28 4 1424 
· 
FOREIGN ASSETS 1474 39.)) 87.88 1033 134 3~ 133.77 146 & 183.34 2~9 23 300 9~ 4692J 42943 44477 701.0S 71491 6J~.04 829.01 
· 
CLAIMS ON NONFIN PUB ENTERPRISES 12. 12 n.71 21.9 1 32.53 SUI S6.63 6S 85 6H3 63.59 70.66 lint> 14141 192.47 212.31 264.86 3M. I..\ ..\~H6 
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 49 36 6417 IOS.08 166 95 190.69 2..\$.12 321.1R 319.96 424.82 4919 BUS 503.51 ~96 S 757 27 836.45 921 . 7~ 127S 89 
· 
CLATh-IS ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 2.74 0.99 US 1427 3".74 4175 6Sf>7 182.64 199.24 286. 12 4()<1.2~ S8b 78 86&.0 1 890 35 93852 962.99 1007 56 
PERCENT OFTOTAL ASSETS 
RESERVES ll. IS 17.S6 ll .25 10.47 I ~A5 14.28 15.42 12.\8 J2.02 9.S2 II . O~ 12.34 8.92 7.49 12.00 12.66 10. ~ 0 
· 
FOREIGN ASSe"TS 162 1 2~. 21 3362 29. 17 ~7.07 "99 20" 2142 24.09 2368 2745 2266 1927 2S.32 2284 19.21 ~O. 82 
CLAiMS ON NONflN PUB ENTERP.RlSES 1333 1~.20 1068 9.19 JO. ~3 10. 16 926 '69 ~ . 9 1 ~ . ~b 6. 7~ ' .46 8.34 7.68 8.46 JJ ()~ 11 .37 
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 54.27 41.39 40.21 47.15 39.21 ".Il'> 4H5 37.J8 39.47 38.1 1 31.09 26.51 25.85 21.35 26.72 27.Q~ 32. 1 J 
CLAIMS ON CENTRAl.. GOVERNMENT 3.01 0.63 2.24 4 0J 1 .14 1.49 9.23 21.34 1&.5 1 22.52 23 .65 30.97 17.62 32.16 29.98 29.14 25.30 
LIABILITIES 
TOTAL UABILITIES &146 13lH 207.56 304.66 429.06 484 69 61827 13304 9 11.59 1112.07 ll9201 1490 14 1862.31) 2197.71 239762 2S'I2. 17 2977 J& 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 4766 78.63 107.68 126.76 177) 204. 11 22974 212.08 326.S6 358.6 443 24 SIS 30 632 83 6SS.68 7H.63 .... 22 1020.01 
TIME. SAVINGS, &. FGN CCY DEPOSITS 19.4 JO.I\J 51.18 155.4<) 20'lAI 2H1 115.37 402.46 512.42 SSS.OI 701.62 739.4 96I.1J 1193.75 1356.47 153789 17U.) 
· 
fOREIGN UABILITIES '13 12 II 26.21 075 ,« 0.08 2.2l 2.92 38.43 7).69 ,,,, 7168 4<1.9 4&.9Q 1'1.(17 5921 
CREDIT FROM MONETARY AlITHORJTIES 4.&1 9.62 1.SI1 1047 6.7 1 8.4S 0.15 724 23.4 27.22 22.22 20.) 21.48 20.3 60. 12 35.76 31.77 
· CEr..'TRAL GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS 1.76 W 8. 15 11.I9 28 lU8 1l.01 49.01 46.29 99.81 149.24 159.62 I7S.29 245.08 119.41 104 6J 71.42 
· 
PERCENT OJi'TOTAL LlABILITlfS 
DEMAND DEPOSITS ~8 51 58,97 51.88 4161 4 1.37 42. 13 37. 16 37.12 3582 32.25 31.84 3458 33.93 31.34 3139 34 SO J4.28 
· 
"ID.-tE. SAVINGS. 8.: FGN cey DEPOSITS 2382 2313 21.89 no.. 4SS1 4S.1l 51.0 1 54.90 56.21 52.88 SO. ~5 ~9.62 Sleil ~4l2 S6.5& 59.33 
"" · 
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YEAR [990 199[ 1992 19<)3 1994 1995 [996 1997 1998 [999 2000 200 1 2002 2003 200-1 2005 2006 2007 
FOREIGN UABILmES 9.61 'l.[l8 12.66 0.25 1.73 0.02 . 0.30 0.32 3.46 5.29 3.72 3.85 2.27 2.04 0.76 1.99 
· 
CREDlT FROM MONETARY AUTHORITIES 
'''' 
721 3.65 
'" 
U6 1.74 O.O:! 0.99 2.57 2 . 4~ 1.6<) 1.36 Ii' on 2>1 us L27 
CENTRAL GOVcRNMI:.'IT DEPOSITS 2.16 1.61 3.93 367 
'" 
7.98 II 81 6.69 S.OS 8,98 10.72 10.71 9.41 IUS 
'" '" 
2.40 
GDP (Bil Shillinj!;j 154~ . 89 21 52.91 3S76. 16 3875.6 5059.45 5855.55 6406.08 7143.43 7856.82 8748.73 9442.5 10167.3 10847,8 12756.5 )4081 .b 16268.3 18608.4 
PERCENT OF GDP 
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 3.19 3.00 2.94 4.31 3.77 4.20 5.04 4.48 5.41 5.62 5,6) 4.95 5.50 5.94 5.94 ~.68 6.87 
· 
ASSETS: BURliNDI 
TOTAL ASSETS (Mil Franc) 27317,2 33S787 34249,8 400161 49167.8 43616 57752.8 60106.5 72917.3 97096.3 123048.5 138309 1lI01ll3.1 2214089 252080.9 281440.4 3325'l1 
· 
RESERVES 7J7 2524 8 2468.8 1760.9 2170.6 1289.7 171M 28~ 1 . 7 28392 4753.1> 3625.1 6289.1 6720 I 9307.7 17711 (, 30922.8 3&6195 
· 
FOREIGN ASSETS 879.4 1268,7 1539.3 2m.2 <n3 4760,2 7'Xl6.6 4897.6 2649.6 8427.1 14352.4 12334.1 16877.5 42990.2 55017.9 59039.2 74464,8 
CLAIMS ON NONFlN PUB ENTERPRISES 7122.3 63J8.2 H92.8 1590 5 27489 I32U 16n.6 2213.3 3515.1 4538, I 32304 '1634 52%8 69303 6849.3 ~1745 9143,1 
· 
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 16437. I 22500.3 23362 31556.5 .14021.7 2916U 35885.6 3951~ .6 52948.4 5'H84,S 101356 110418 143552 158978 161387 1 597~2 192627 
· 
CLAIMS ON OTHE R fiNANCIAL lNSf 1124 2 345.g 127.2 Jl41 14VI 2839 17483 104) 106.3 105.4 264.5 271.2 1350.2 961 91.1 
." 9891 
CLAIMS ON CENTRAL GOVERN;"1ENT 10167 900.9 4~9. 7 2440.9 5311 .2 6799.2 8824.1 1 0~24 10878.~ 9887,6 220.1 43606 6386 :; 3106.6 11024 26476.3 18747. ~ 
PERCENT Of' TOTAL ASSETS 
RESERVES 270 7.45 1.21 4.40 4.41 2.% 2.'l7 47' 389 4.90 2. 9~ 455 3.73 4.20 7.03 10 9Q II 01 
· 
FOREIGN ASSITS 3.22 3.7~ 4.49 6.38 971 10.91 13.61) S.IS .1.63 5.68 11.66 5,92 9.37 19.42 2i.S3 20.98 2239 
· 
CLAIMS ON NONFIN Pl"B ENTERPRISES 26.07 IS 71 11).91 3,97 5,59 3.£13 2.90 3.68 4.82 4.67 2.63 3.}5 294 lI3 272 1.84 
'" · CLAI/I.'IS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 60. 17 66.41 6967 78.86 69.20 6686 62.14 65.74 72.5Q 71.46 82.37 1983 79.67 71.80 64 02 56.76 nn 
CLAIMS ON OTi-iER FINANCIAL INST 4.12 1.02 0.37 0.29 0.29 0.65 3.03 0.17 0. 15 O. ll 0.21 0.20 o.n O.IM 0.1>4 0.03 0.30 
CLAI MS ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 3.72 2." 1.34 6.10 10.80 IS 5'1 15.28 17. ~1 14.91 1018 018 3. 15 354 lAO 4.J7 9.41 ,." · 
LIABILITIES 
TOTAL LlABILmES 24625.60 28088.80 272:'01.10 1 \395.20 3987840 33456.20 44892.40 43418.40 56628.&0 78637.10 100062.10 11 1088.60 152623,20 182292.50 212881.90 232733.00 28288040 
· 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 10398.80 12461.60 13525.30 14720.50 19094.70 18729,80 18038.00 22234.70 22180.10 342%.00 34860,20 44Ul.90 55838.10 72106.50 1)1078 60 104871,00 J45068.00 
· 
SAvlNG DEPOSITS 8066,50 11146..;l0 10695,10 101J5.20 14950.80 10680 SO 16373.40 17037.50 t5955.00 26144 00 3097600 35126.20 486~1.20 530~0.30 52364.00 65208.10 83973.50 
FOREIGN UABlLlTIES 1891.00 1635.50 1871.70 1%9.40 3154.90 3048.00 244710 3018,60 37%00 4848.40 IIlIS.30 16579.20 22887.00 33431.00 50~43 . 20 n~40 . 10 41367.60 
CREDIT FROM MONETARY AlrrHORlTIES 4269,30 2844.80 1134 .20 4044.00 260J .80 805.90 8019.90 1121.60 14511,70 \J 198. 70 22337.50 146&3.10 24866,90 9743.30 3774.70 . 
· · GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS 0.00 0.00 24.80 526.10 76.20 192.00 14,00 0.00 180.00 150,01) 773. 10 <176.20 34000 1392 1 40 15127.40 l51D 80 1247UO 
PERC i NT OIiTOTA L LIABILITIES 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 42.23 44.37 4963 46.89 47.88 55.98 40.18 51.21 3917 43.61 3484 39.83 36.5Q 39.56 4278 45.06 5l.28 
SAVING DEPOSITS 32.76 39.68 39.25 32.28 37.49 31.92 36.47 39.24 28.17 3U5 30.96 31,62 31.1)0 29.12 24.60 28,02 29.69 
· 
fOREIGN U ABlLITIES 7.68 582 6.87 6.27 7.91 9.11 5.45 6.95 ' .70 6.17 lUI 14.92 15.00 IS 34 2374 16. 13 1462 
· CREDIT FROM MONETARY AL fHORITlES 17.34 10,13 4. 16 12.88 (>.S2 2.41 17.86 2.60 25.64 16.78 22.32 1320 1629 n4 177 
· · GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS . 0.09 1.68 0.19 0,57 0.03 . 0.32 0.11) 0.77 0.4) 0.22 7." 7.11 10.79 4.41 
· 
GDP (Mil Fnlnc) 1966~6 204951 2258~7 236676 210051 249865 263075 342786 400166 455443 5110l') 54998 1 584605 644680 748486 862100 Q86600 
· PERCENT Of' GDP 
CLAiMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 8.36 10.98 10.57 13.3) \2.60 11.67 1l.64 11.53 \3 .23 15.23 19.83 2008 24.56 24.66 2156 18.53 19.52 
· 
RWANDA: ASSETS 
TOTAL ASSETS (Mil Franc) 27552.2 28899 (, 314SJ <I 33463 ') 31427.41 57418.3 67761 88864 97425 103517.29 121004 133396.5 153J46.9 I 772Q44 243190.06 212521.4 
· 
RESERVES 1040.4 5097.2 JIJ6.8 5778.3 6617.7 8589.7 138J6 16035 I 183~ 1SS44.9 10823 15496.2 13510.6 130547 28901 36753.4 
· · FOREIGN ASSETS 392S.7 5422.6 6093.1 4637 4 3633.22 15565.6 201S7 22293 24095 1965H 32'149 34281.3 3898'1.9 49768.8 60758.7 525844 
· 
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 14&29.2 12 12l.8 15308.4 17874.8 162341 28381 .3 28615 44948 54079 59681).4 69289 75264.2 82906 <l.l6n.~ 127568 1~8J28 
· · 
CLAn.1S ON GOVEJt~MENT 5421 5448.1 6667.4 4494.8 4)11.06 4527.8 4968 557.1 60)95 7146.0)1 726S 7344.8 14407.5 14861 .8 21015 22474.6 
· · CLAIMS ON OFFICIAL I'STITIES 2532.9 SIJ9.9 291.7 678.6 58i.J3 3H9 205 
" 
421 586.68 ". 1010 3532.9 49516 494U6 2381 · · 
PERCENT Of' TOTAL ASSETS 
RESERVES 3.78 17" 9.90 17.27 2100 1496 20.39 1804 12 . 1~ 1~ 3J 8.94 Jl 62 881 736 11.89 13.49 
FOREIGN ASSETS 14.26 18.76 19.35 13.86 11.72 27,11 2U5 25.0Q 24.73 18,98 27.23 25.70 25.43 28.07 24.98 J'I.30 
· · CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 53.10 41.94 48.62 53.42 51 {;6 49.43 42.23 50.58 5Ul 5766 57.26 56.42 54.06 53 39 52.46 58.10 
· · 
116 
YEAR 1990 1991 1992 1993 '99' 1995 1996 1997 1998 1099 2000 2001 2002 2003 1004 200S 2006 2007 
CLALII.1S ON GOVERNMENT 19.68 18.85 21 . 18 13.43 13.72 7.'9 7.31 6.27 7.18 7.48 6.00 5.51 9.40 S.38 '.64 8.2S 
· · CLAIMS ON OFFIOAL ENTITIES 9.19 2.80 0.95 20' 1.85 .62 0.30 0.02 0.43 .>7 0. ~6 '76 2.10 2.79 20' 0.87 
UABILrrlfS 
TOTAL UABILITIES 26671 ') 21S')62 30523 I 306')} 9 28611085 HOW l 60215 "',,, 83759 88727 U 101509 1116469 131mB7 1540052 1~319 84 229607.91 · 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 73462 8586 I> 1I S70 7 128759 16165 22S15 8 2497<) 34~22 9 J1509 369364 37575 38U2 4~346 3 522197 62604.3 82523 6 
TIM!! &:. SAVINGS DEPOSITS 13804.4 14878.9 14249 1nss.a 80n.8 221 11.4 22151 32445.3 36051 38680.4 SOS88 61621.9 70')73.8 813522 113026 112063 
H>REIG~ UAIHUTIES 902.1 10)0.3 1280.9 888.9 77l S 12264 1378 lSJU 3816 1855.95 3>4, 47494 788t11 12919 12724.4 11805.5 
· · 
CREDIT FROM MONETARY AU11-IORIllES 1398.7 600.3 469.1 719.4 286.SS \ti13.9 6l 63 61 1550.22 2331 1352.3 : 07').67 1216.3 1623.77 20SU I 
CEl\'TRAL GOVERN.iI.fE/'IT DEPOSITS 3219.8 2800.1 2953.2 2853.9 ))70 5481.1 ,.,.., "1724 12322 9704.86 9442 5401.3 5235.3 6298 9341.37 1 1 1~ 7 
· · 
PERCENT 0 ,... TOTAL LIABIUl' IES 
DEMAND DEPOSITS 27>, )0.78 37.91 41 .95 56.36 4254 4148 43 18 3H2 4163 36 JO 34 SO 3448 33.91 Jl. 41 3~ 94 
TIME &:. SAVINGS DEPOSITS 5176 53.34 46.68 4351 28.19 41.77 37.95 40 S8 43.04 43.59 4B.87 55.19 53.96 52.82 56. 71 53 16 
· fOREIGN UADIUTIES 3.18 3.69 4.20 2.90 ':.70 2.) 1 2.29 HI 06 2.09 3.43 4.25 6.00 ,,, 6.38 5.14 
· · CREDIT FROM MONETARY AUTHORITIES 
'" 
2.H U4 2.14 1.00 306 0.10 QQ, 0.07 I 7~ '28 1.21 
'" 
' .79 08' 
.'" CENTRAL GOVERN.'-1ENT DEPOSITS 12.07 10.04 9.68 9030 11 75 1032 18.1 7 IUS 14.71 10.94 'U2 48' '98 
'" '" 
486 
· 
GOP (Mil Fr:mt) 2\J~30 239310 276490 284370 165800 339140 4241 30 ~5S280 621340 6441190 1{)~680 741870 781470 <)~5 1 60 1137910 1131600 1631590 
· 
PERCENT OF COP 
CLAIMS ON PRlVAlE SECTOR ", 5.07 ", 6.29 '.39 837 
'" 
8.05 8.70 
'" '" 
10 15 10.61 9.91 1 UI 11 89 
Source: Oala compuled based on the lntcmatioDai Monetary FLind iFS CD ROM 
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APPENDlXC: 
ADF UNIT ROOT TEST SUMMARY 
TableCl: Unit Root Tests 
Rolling Period from Janu ary 10 December of the ~cars 
COWl!2: Series 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 1999-2008 
Panel A: Treasury Bill & 
Central Bank Rate 
Kenya (TB Rate) Level -1.26 -1.50 -2.1 8 -1.91 -1.80 -2.47 -2.28 
15t Difference -3.92a -5.74a -5.42a -5.lOa -4.60a -5.26a -7.46a 
Tanzania Level -1.34 -3.33b 1.41 -0.60 -2.10 -3.06b -2 .65c 
1st Difference -6.2Ia -5.71a -6.86. 4.8411 -2.78c -2.78c -4.48a 
Uganda. Level -1.50 -1.93 -3.37b -2.7Ic -2.92b -5.49. -3.06b 
I st Difference -6.37a -5.92a -4.40a -4.52a -4.49a -4.50a -8.53. 
Bunmdi Level -1 .40 -2.46 -1.74 -0.84 -0.25 -0.90 -0.58 
1st DifTerence -7.05a -7.60a -7.49a -5.26a -5.83a -5.60a -9.ooa 
Rwanda Level -1.69 -1.72 -2.20 -1.36 -0.87 -2 .20 -2 .14 
1st Difference -6.87. -7.02a -6.81. -6.35a -7.49a 8.35a -10.8a 
Panel B: D~sil Rate 
Kenya Level -2.08 -4 .20a -1.36 -1.45 -1.34 -0.94 -3 .33b 
1st Difference -6.22a -7 .17a -6.44a -6.06a -4.28a -7.99. -8.77a 
Tanzania Level -1.26 -2.24 -2 .36 -0.90 -0.57 -1.34 - 1.67 
1st Difference -9.82a -9.37a -8.05a -8.50a -7.51a -8.74a -12.9. 
Uganda Level 2.50 -2.72 -3.46b -3.09b -4.47a -3.75. -4.16a 
1st Difference -9.99. -9.38. -9.24a -9.6Oa -10.2. -7.83. -14.4a 
Burundi Level -1.8 1 -1.45 -2.50 - 1.8 1 0.46 1.88 2.86c 
1 sl Diff(,..Ttmce -7.653 -8.47a -7.19a -9.28a -7.89a 3.23b 2.59c 
Rwanda Level -2.50 -2.0 1 - 1.1 4 -1.68 0.39 -0.81 -0.96 
1 Sl Difference -7.69a -8.93. -9.65a -IO.Oa -11.0a -9.38. -12.4a 
Panel C: Lending Rate 
Kenya Level 0.0 1 -1.30 -1.06 -1.75 -3 .44b -0.33 -1.85 
lSi Difference -5.70a -7.2 1a -7 .13a -6.98a -6.76a -7 .30a -8.2Ia 
Tanzania Level -0.22 -0.95 -3 .5Ib -2.06 -1.86 -2.28 -1.69 
1st Difference -7.76a -7.57a -7.47a -8 .09a -9.47a -8.78. -IUa 
Uganda Level -1.48 -2.76c -3.9Ia -4.49a 4 .lla -3.98. -4.15a 
1st Difference -8.84a -10.1a -9.98a -7.98a -8.96a -7.42a -11.4a 
Burundi Level 1.59 -1.73 -5 .27a -5.38a -5 .84a -5 .44a -2 .92b 
I 51 Di IT erence -1O.0a -9.39. -8.58.0. -8.90. -8.99a -9.05a -12.0a 
Rwanda Level -8.19a -8 .34. -8.15a -8.24a -8 .48a -5 .94. -1O.3a 
1st Difference -10.9a -8.44a -8.54a -9.07a -7.67a -11.8. -11.3a 
Note: Signifi cance levels with regard to the rejection of the null hypothesis are indicated with a, band c for 1%,5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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APPENDIXD: 
KPSS UNIT ROOT TEST SUMMARY 
Table 0 I: Unit Root Tests 
Rolling Period from Ja nuary to December of the years 
Country Series 1999-200l 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 200l-2007 2004-2008 1999-2008 
Panel A: Treasury Bill & 
Central Bank Rate 
Kenya (TB Rate) Level 0.65b 0.83a 0.46e 0. 16 O.39c 0.36< 0.56b 
1 s t Difference 0.16 0.28 0.l8c 0.2 1 0.17 0.20 0.07 
Tanzania Level 0.52b 0.27 0.86. 0.90. 0.85a 0.26 0.l8e 
I SI Difference 0.12 0.83a 0.46e 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.06 
Uganda Level O. l l 0. 16 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.11 0.06 
I s t Difference 0. 14 0.08 0.22 0.13 0.08 O.36c 0.06 
Burundi Level 0.85a 0.62b 0.24 0.46b 0.7l b 0 .79a O.46c 
1st Difference 0.11 0.23 0.13 O.37c 0.17 0.14 0.35e 
Rwanda Level 0.92. 0.89. 0.58b 0.25 0.6lb 0.87. 0.3ge 
1 st Difference 0.50b 0.50b 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.36e 0.30 
Panel B: Deposit Rate 
Kenya Level 0.88. 0.9la 0.50b 0. 19 0.46e 0.56b 0.67b 
I sl Difference 0.09 0.43 0.42e O.ll 0.23 0.10 0.28 
Tanzania Level 0.86. 0.6 1b 0.25 0.79. 0.89a 0.79a 0.l5e 
151 Difference 0.17 O.42c O.l l 0.33 O.lO 0. 15 0.25 
Uganda Level 0.17 0.15 0. 14 0.32 0.11 0.68b 0.22 
151 Difference 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.30 
Burundi Level O.72b 0.26 0.65b 0.86a 0.78. 0.94a 0.82. 
1st Difference 0.12 DAle 0.22 0.1 9 0.42e 0.440 0.57b 
Rwanda Level 0.l4 0.34 0.69b 0.7 1b 0.82. 0.8la 0.82a 
I st Difference 0.26 0. 12 0.11 0.09 0.26 0.13 O.ll 
Panel C: Lending Rute 
Kenya Level 0.82a 0.898 0.87. 0.68b O.3Sc 0.69b 1.08. 
1st Difference 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.36e 0.59b 0.24 0.22 
Tanzania Level 0.86. 0.85a 0.69b 0.21 0.67b 0.3ge 0.87a 
1st Difference 0. 14 0.13 0.68b 0.32 0.08 0.08 0.22 
Uganda Level 0.5 1b 0.52b 0.32 0.16 0.26 0.25 0.59b 
1st Difference 0.11 0.08 0.24 0.21 0.16 0. 19 0. 11 
Burundi Level 0.73b 0.5 1b 0. 18 0.51b 0.60b O.79a O.l l 
1 Sl Difference 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.25 
Rwanda Level 0.29 0.51b O.45c O.ll 0.09 DAlc 0.52b 
I st Difference 0. 10 0.17 0.12 0.l3 0.29 0.10 0.05 
Note: Significance levels with regard to the rejection of the null hypothesis are indicated with a, band c for 1%,5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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APPENDIXE: 
COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Table EI: Co integration Analysis 
Johansen Method 
Rolling Sample 
Country Interest Rates From I To Obs K r<O 
Trace 
r<1 
I Max 
r<O r<1 
Kenya Deposit Rates 1999 2003 60 7 
Deposit Rates 2000 2004 60 2 
8.S[0.3SJ 
21.9[0.01] 
0.S[0.39] 
I.8[O.IS] 
8.1[0.37] 
20. 1[0.01] 
0.S[0.39] 
1.8[0.IS] 
Deposit Rates 200 1 
Deposit Rates 2002 
Deposit Rates 2003 
Deposit Rates 2004 
Deposit Rates 1999 
Lending Rates 1999 
Lending Rotes 2000 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Tanzania Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2005 60 9 21. 7[0.0 I] 2.9[0.09] IS.S[O.01] 2.9[0.09] 
2006 60 12 21.0[0.0 I] 1.6[0.21] 19.4[0.01 J 1.6[0.21] 
2007 60 2 20.S[O.01] 3.2[0.07] 17.7[O.0IJ 3.2[0.07] 
200S 60 
200S 120 7 11.4[O.19J 4.6[0.03] 6.S[0.51] 4.6[0.03] 
2003 60 
2004 60 IO.S[0.23J 2.7[0. !OJ S.0[0.38] 2.7[0. IOJ 
2005 60 
2006 60 
2007 60 
200S 60 1 
200S 120 2 
2003 60 2 
2004 60 
2005 60 6 
2006 60 5 
2007 60 S 
200S 60 4 
2008 120 I 
2003 60 5 
2004 60 I 
2005 60 2 
2006 60 9 
15.7[0.05] 
22.S[O.00] 
11.9[O.l6J 
15.6[0.05J 
20.6[0.0IJ 
8.1 [0.46J 
23.9[O.00J 
20.3[0.01] 
16.6[O.03J 
19.1[O.0IJ 
IS.8[0.02J 
20.4[0.01] 
2.9[0.09] 
2.2[0.14] 
1.9[O.16J 
0.2[0.63J 
1.7[0.19J 
0.O[O.8S] 
1.9[O.17J 
2.6[0.11 J 
0.4[0.54] 
3.6[O.06J 
0.0[0.96] 
0.3[0.60] 
12.7[0.09] 
20.6[0.00] 
10.0[0.21] 
15.4[0.03] 
IS.9[O.01] 
8.1[0.37] 
22.1[0.00J 
17.7[O.0IJ 
16.2[0.02] 
15.4[0.03] 
IS.S[O.O I J 
20.I[O.0IJ 
2.9[O.09J 
2.2[O.14J 
1.9[0.16] 
0.2[0.63] 
1.7[10.19] 
O.O[O.SS] 
1.9[0.17] 
2.6[0.11 J 
0.4[0.54J 
3.6[0.06J 
0.0[0.96J 
0.3[O.60J 
EG 
-4.10 
-2.17 
-2.14 
-1.75 
-1.63 
-2.53 
-5.29 
-2.47 
-0.66 
-0.50 
-1.29 
-3.43 
-0.96 
-2.24 
-2.07 
-2.09 
-2.82 
-2.49 
-2.44 
-1.67 
-2.79 
-0.34 
-0.63 
~3 .24 
-1.87 
Prob. 
0.00 
O.M 
om 
O~S 
0.10 
O~I 
0.00 
om 
0.43 
0.50 
O.IS 
0.00 
0.30 
0.02 
O.M 
OM 
0~1 
0~1 
om 
OM 
O~I 
0.56 
0.44 
0.00 
0.06 
CRDW 
0.17 
0.24 
0.3 1 
0.24 
0.19 
0.26 
O.IS 
0.25 
0.22 
0.06 
0.05 
0.08 
0.17 
0.09 
0.28 
0.28 
0.42 
0.39 
0.52 
0.19 
0.23 
0.08 
0.04 
0.08 
0.22 
ECM(s) 
Coeff 
-0.20[0.00J 
-0.29[O.00J 
-0.23[0.00] 
-0.20[0.00J 
-0.16[O.00J 
-0.20[O.00J 
-0.21[0.00] 
-0.12[O.02J 
-0.14[O.00J 
-0.06[0.04J 
-0.07[0.041 
-0.12[O.0IJ 
-0.06[0.33J 
-0.06[0.00J 
-0.19[0.00] 
-0.22[0.00J 
-0.2 1 [O.02J 
-0.16[0.05] 
-0.13[0.06J 
-0.10[0.03J 
-0.14[0.00J 
-0.02[0.52] 
-0.03[0.371 
-0.11 [0.00] 
-O.l1[O.IOJ 
t-stat 
-3.S0 
-4.93 
-4.26 
-3.S0 
-3.43 
-5.20 
-5.S2 
-2.32 
-3.40 
-2. 15 
-2.14 
-2.56 
-0.99 
-3.76 
-3.S0 
-3.40 
-2.32 
-2.05 
-1.93 
-2.19 
-4.01 
-0.65 
-0.91 
-3.21 
-1.66 
Coint? 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
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Johansen Method 
Roll ing Sample 
Country Interest Rates From I To Obs K r<O 
Trace I Max 
r< l r<O r<l 
Uganda 
Burundi 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 60 4 16.8(O.03J 1.2(0.26] 15 .6(0.03] 1.2(0.26] 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 60 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 120 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 120 
2 
4 
4 
2 
20.5(0.0 1] 
16.8[0.03] 
16.6(O.05J 
15.5[0.05] 
15.6(0.05] 
3. 1 [0.08] 
3.8(0.05] 
3.0(0.08] 
6.8(0.0 I] 
2.9[0.09] 
17.3 [0.02] 
13.0[0.08] 
13.5[0.06] 
8.7[0.31 ] 
12.7[0.09] 
3. 1 [0.08] 
3.8(0.05] 
3.0[0.08J 
6.8(0.0 1] 
2.9[0.09] 
Lending Rates 1999 2003 60 5 15.0[0.061 5.4[0.02J 9.5(O.24J 5.4[0.02J 
Lending Rates 2000 2004 60 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
60 
60 10 
60 
60 4 
120 9 
60 
60 
2005 60 
46.8[0.00] 
9.0[0.3 7] 
18. 1[0.02] 
8.2[0.44] 
3.2[0.07] 
0.0[0.9 1] 
3.4[0.06] 
1.0[0.3 1] 
43.6[0.00] 
9.0[0.29] 
14 .6[0.04] 
7.2[0.461 
8.3 [0.44] 3.5 [0.06] 4.8[0.77] 
3.2[0.07] 
0.0 1[0.9 1] 
3.4[0.06J 
1.0[0.31] 
3.5 (0.06] Depos it Rates 200 1 
Deposit Rates 2002 
Deposit Rates 2003 
Deposit Rates 2004 
2006 60 2 7. 1[0.57] 0. 1(0.75] 7.0[0.49] 0. 1[0.75] 
2007 60 2 12.7[0. 13] 0. 1 [0.80 J 12.6[0.09] 0.1 [0.80] 
2008 60 18.6[0.22] 1.0[0.3 1] 17.6[0.0 1] 1.0(O.31 J 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 120 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
1999 
2000 
200 1 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
60 
60 
60 
60 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 60 
2 
25.7[0.00] 2.1[0.15] 23.7(0.00] 2.0(0.15] 
36.4[0.00] 
38.9[0.00] 
18.1 [0.02] 
29.3[0.00] 
3.8[0.05J 
3.7[0.06] 
3.5[0.06] 
2.8[0.09J 
32.6[0.00] 
35 .2[0.00] 
14.6[0.04 J 
26.5[0.00] 
3.8(0.05] 
3.7[0.06J 
3.5[0.06J 
2.8[0.09] 
23.2[0.00] 0.8[0.39] 22.4[0.00] 0.8[0.39] 
EO 
-2.85 
-3.08 
-1.69 
-4.49 
-4.57 
-4.93 
-4.64 
-5.24 
- 1.92 
-5.89 
-1 .40 
-3.02 
-3.79 
-4.68 
-4.33 
-3.38 
-4.43 
-2.42 
- 1.37 
-2.56 
-2.50 
-2.90 
1.30 
2.74 
-2. 12 
-I. 95 
-5.90 
-5.47 
-6.99 
Prob. 
0.01 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.16 
0.0 1 
0.0 1 
0.00 
0.95 
1.00 
0.03 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
CROW 
0.48 
0.56 
0.04 
0.94 
1.06 
1.09 
1.07 
1.27 
0.84 
0.87 
0.66 
0.57 
0.64 
1.09 
0.96 
0.69 
0.58 
0.36 
0.32 
0.40 
0.33 
0.76 
0.33 
0.29 
0.28 
0.28 
1.48 
1.34 
1.79 
ECM(s) 
Coeff 
-0.11 [0.2 1] 
-0.1 7(0.08] 
-0.03 [0.09] 
-0.47[0.00] 
-0.48[0.00J 
-0.52(0.00] 
-0.48[0.00] 
-0.54[0.00] 
-0.33(0.0 I] 
-0.39(0.00] 
-0.22[0.05 1 
-0.29(0.0 I] 
-0.55[0.00] 
-0.74[0.00] 
-0.73 [0.00] 
-0.41 [0.00] 
-0.21 [O.OOJ 
-0.14[0.07J 
-0.07[0.431 
-0. 19[0.03 J 
-0.1 5[0.05] 
-0.29[0.01] 
0.35(0.0 I] 
0.26(O.00J 
-0.08[0.26] 
-0.08[0.24] 
-0.55[0.001 
-0.61 [O.OOJ 
-0.88 [0.00J 
t-stat 
-1.26 
- 1.77 
-1.69 
-3 .94 
-3.76 
-3.98 
-3.52 
-3.49 
-2.7 1 
-4.60 
-2.04 
-2.81 
-4.60 
-4.72 
-5.09 
-3.86 
-3.03 
-1.85 
-0.79 
-2.23 
-1.97 
-2.58 
0.0 1 
3.61 
- I. 13 
- 1.1 8 
-3.58 
-3.46 
-4.63 
Coint? 
DO 
DO 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
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Johansen Method 
Rolling Sample Trace I Max ECM(s) 
Country Interest Rates From To Obs K r<O r< l r<O r<l EG Prob. CROW Coeff t-stat Coint? 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 60 -7.34 0.00 1.92 -1.01(0.001 -4.94 yes 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 120 3 23.2(0.00] 3.0[0.08] 20.1 (0 .0 I] 3.0(0.08] -3 .63 0.00 0.82 -0.28(0.00] -3.53 yes 
Rwanda Deposit Rates 1999 2003 60 11.1 [0.20] 4.3[0.04] 6.9[0.51] 4.3[0.04] -2.47 0.01 0.18 -0. 15[0.01] -2.60 yes 
Deposit Rates 2000 2004 60 9.1 [0 .36] 2.3 [0.1 3] 6.8[0.51] 2.3[0.13] -2.50 0.0\ 0.34 -0.15[0.05] -1.98 yes 
Deposit Rates 2001 2005 60 12 12.4[0.14] 1.5[0.22] 10.9(0.16] 1.5[0.22] -1.05 0.26 0.23 0.00[0.99] 0.01 no 
Deposit Rates 2002 2006 60 5 21.3[0.01] 1.0[0.32] 20.3[0.01] 1.0[0.32] -2.15 0.03 0.22 -0.12[0.04] -2.06 yes 
Deposit Rates 2003 2007 60 I 5.4[0.76] 0.0[0.86] 5.4[0.69] 0.0(0.86] -2.79 0.0\ 0.64 -0.13[0.21] -1.26 no 
Deposit Rates 2004 2008 60 9 27.1[0.00] 3.6[0.06] 23.5[0.00J 3.6[0.06J -2.67 0.01 0.43 -0.04(O.40J -0.85 no 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 120 3 10.6[0.24] 3.2[0.08J 7.5[0.44] 3.2[0.08] -1.19 0.21 0.08 -0.01(0.60] -0.53 no 
Lending Rates 1999 2003 60 36.4[0.00J 3.8[0.05J 32.6[0 .00] 3.8(0.05] -8.36 0.00 2.18 -1.20(0.00] -5.84 yes 
Lending Rates 2000 2004 60 38.9[0.00] 3.7[0.06] 35.2[0.00] 3.7[0.06] -8.60 0.00 2.22 -1.26[0.00] -6.14 yes 
Lending Rates 2001 2005 60 2 18.1[0.02] 3.5[0.06] 14.6[0.04] 3.5[0.06] -8.23 0.00 2. 15 -1.11 [O .OOJ -5.58 yes 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 60 29.3[0.00] 2.8[0.09J 26.5[0.00] 2.8[0.09] -8.31 0.00 2.17 -1.13[0.00] -5.75 yes 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 60 23.2[0.00] 0.8[0.39] 22.4[0.00] 0.8[0.39] -8.62 0.00 2.20 -1.08[0.00J -5.47 yt!s 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 60 -6.12 0.00 1.56 -0.74[0.00] -4.25 yes 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 120 3 23.2[0.00] 3.0[0.08] 20.1[0.01] 3.0[0.08] -10.73 0.00 1.97 -0.97[0.00] -7.38 yes 
Notes: The Parentheses are used to indicate probability values. 
EG - Engle-Granger Method. 
CROW - Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson. 
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APPENDIXF: 
LONG-RUN ROLLING REGRESSION SUMMARY 
Table FI: Long-Run Model Analysis 
Country Interest Rates _,,:R:.:::Ol::l::in:lig:.:S;;:a::m:.::p:::l.:;e __ -:::_J::n::te;:r;.;c.:;epl;t~ ___ ~~::Sl::o.p;;;e~~ __ ~~~_-:~:-_ 
From To Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Adj. R2 DW 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Burundi 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending RaLes 
Lending Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Deposil Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit ~tes 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
200 1 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
200 1 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
200S 
200S 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
200S 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2.86 5.89 0.39 8.82 0.57 0.17 
1.96 6.97 0,42 13.94 0.77 0.24 
2.33 12.62 0.33 14.99 0.79 0.31 
2.41 
2.46 
1.56 
2.00 
14.88 
12.70 
12.41 
12.91 
·0.10 
12.59 
10.56 
-0.46 
·0.34 
2.50 
0.25 
·2.09 
2.13 
0.52 
14.04 
15.50 
20.57 
15.83 
12.54 
12.38 
17.07 
4.24 
3.22 
2.88 
3.10 
4.92 
3.55 
4.32 
\9.08 
18.11 
18,43 
18.30 
17.27 
15.53 
18.24 
4.17 
3.69 
2.62 
3.S2 
4.73 
5.86 
5.70 
3.78 
4.61 
9.44 
11.31 
10.66 
6.26 
7.87 
28.86 
25.1 1 
19.29 
17.90 
"1.64 
51.41 
18.70 
·0.79 
·0.54 
5.13 
0.42 
-2.61 
1.62 
0.94 
11.34 
9.55 
17.18 
29.73 
29.14 
23.95 
16.44 
7.54 
6.01 
5.13 
5.00 
5.7 1 
2.77 
8.88 
23.60 
22.89 
23,42 
29.99 
20.83 
14.49 
28.90 
24.35 
13.79 
5.81 
14.83 
48.60 
15.31 
22.65 
2.45 
2.08 
1.97 
0.33 
0.34 
0,47 
0.44 
0.49 
0.64 
OA9 
0.31 
0.03 
0.05 
0.72 
0.47 
0.41 
0.13 
0.31 
-0.05 
0.27 
0.38 
O.OS 
0.01 
·0.38 
·0.02 
-0.18 
·0.20 
-0.07 
0.28 
0.32 
0.35 
0.34 
0.25 
0.36 
0.29 
0.13 
0.1 7 
0.12 
0.D7 
0.13 
0.27 
0.14 
·0.\3 
·1.39 
0.02 
·0.06 
·0.11 
0.67 
058 
-0.34 
·0.26 
0.60 
10.61 
9.18 
12.88 
16.10 
10.59 
11.86 
6.38 
2.92 
0.27 
2.97 
11.78 
10.27 
7.96 
3.1 9 
7.27 
9.66 
3.35 
9.88 
4.08 
1.1 7 
·3.85 
-1.24 
6. 14 
5.58 
·0.02 
8.12 
10.\3 
9.83 
8.61 
4.76 
4.37 
9.57 
2.59 
3.69 
2.36 
1.88 
2.62 
3.93 
3.50 
-6.86 
·2 .69 
0.76 
-3. 15 
·16.06 
-6.30 
-9 .87 
8.68 
5.93 
1.84 
0.65 0.24 
0.59 0.19 
0.74 0.26 
0.68 0.18 
0.65 0.25 
0.70 0.22 
0.40 0.06 
0.11 0.05 
0.14 2.04 
0.12 0.17 
0.54 0.09 
0.64 0.28 
0.5 1 0.28 
0.13 0.42 
0.47 0.39 
0.61 0.52 
0.15 0. \9 
0.45 0.23 
0.21 0.08 
0.01 0.04 
0.19 0.08 
0.0 1 0.22 
0.38 0.48 
0.34 0.56 
-0.01 0.04 
0.52 0.94 
0.63 !.06 
0.62 1.09 
0.55 1.07 
0.27 1.27 
0.24 0.84 
0.43 0.87 
0.09 0.66 
0.18 057 
0.07 0.64 
0.04 1.09 
0.09 0.96 
0.20 0.69 
0.09 0.58 
0.44 0.36 
0.\0 0.32 
-0.01 0.40 
0.13 0.33 
0.81 0.76 
OAO 0.33 
0.45 0.29 
0.56 0.28 
0.37 0.28 
0.04 1.34 
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Country Interest Rates Rolling Sample Intercept Slope 
From To Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Adj. R2 DW 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 12.14 ' .86 0.43 2.47 0.08 1.48 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 14.09 14.06 0.27 3.71 0.18 1.79 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 13.57 15.86 0.3 1 4.58 0.25 1.92 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 12.16 14.70 0.39 6.24 0.24 0.82 
Rwanda Dcposit Rates 1999 2003 8.65 10.50 0.06 0.85 0.00 0. 18 
Dcposit Rates 2000 2004 I J.23 23.65 -0.13 -3.66 0. 17 0.3' 
Deposit Rates 2001 2005 11.38 14.22 -0.27 -2.57 0.09 0.23 
Deposit Rates 2002 2006 5.80 4.89 0.24 2.69 0. 10 0.22 
Deposit Rates 2003 2007 -0.05 -0.06 -0.31 10.43 0.65 0.64 
Deposit Rates 2004 2008 -0.72 -0.63 -0.23 7.71 0.50 0.43 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 6.23 5.97 -0.15 2.33 0.0' 0.08 
Lending Rates 1999 2003 16.78 17.82 -0.04 -0.54 -0.01 2.18 
Lending Rates 2000 200' 17. 12 19.06 -0.07 -1.02 0.00 2.22 
Lending Rates 2001 2005 16.20 15.42 -0.01 -0.13 -0.02 2. 15 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 15.99 12.06 0.00 -0.01 -O.Q2 2.17 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 15.25 13.87 0.05 0.61 -0.01 2.20 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 16.71 26.53 -0.06 - 1.l6 om 1.56 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 17.08 30.39 -0.08 -1.70 0.Q2 1.97 
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APPENDIXG: 
SHORT-RUN ROLLING REGRESSION MODEL SUMMARY 
Table G I: Short-Run Model Analysis 
Country Interest Rates Rolling Sample Intercept Slope Lag Dep 
Kenya Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Tanzania Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
From I To Coeff It-stat Coeff It-stat Coef It-stat 
1999 2003 -0.10 -1.38 0.25 5.08 0.11 1.15 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
-0.14 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
-0.21 
-0.11 
-0.21 
-0.10 
-0.09 
-0.10 
0.03 
-0.06 
-0.09 
-0.07 
-0.03 
0.04 
0.10 
0.06 
-0.01 
-0.14 
-0.09 
-0.14 
0.00 
0.01 
-2.59 
-0.52 
-0.35 
0.26 
2.13 
-5.82 
-1.53 
-2.89 
-1.53 
-1.28 
1.64 
0.85 
-1.63 
-1.38 
-0.90 
-0.43 
0.54 
1.22 
0.71 
-0.19 
-1.62 
-1.08 
-2.01 
-0.07 
0.24 
0.19 
0.04 
0.04 
0.06 
0.09 
0.23 
o~ 
0.1 I 
0.10 
om 
0.00 
o.~ 
o~ 
0.12 
0.10 
on 
o~ 
0.01 
~m 
0.03 
0.07 
0.06 
~.07 
-0.03 
0.02 
3.88 
1.02 
0.92 
1.39 
2.40 
6.68 
1.32 
1.67 
1.34 
0.91 
0.27 
0.43 
1.88 
2.11 
1.08 
1.89 
0.86 
0.22 
-0.45 
0.83 
0.90 
055 
-0.62 
-0.45 
0.48 
-0.14 
0.03 
0.10 
0.06 
0.03 
0.08 
0.08 
-0.04 
0.00 
0.03 
0.05 
0.05 
0.04 
-0.31 
-0.28 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.13 
-0.17 
0.07 
0.01 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.18 
-1.41 
0.26 
0.82 
1.39 
0.31 
l.l0 
0.69 
-0.36 
-0.03 
0.20 
0.37 
0.33 
0.53 
-2.66 
-2.28 
-0.01 
-0.12 
-0.38 
-0.99 
-1.99 
0.90 
0.06 
-0.35 
-0.11 
-1.26 
Adj. R2 
0.45 
0.47 
0.26 
0.25 
0.27 
0.45 
0.46 
0.39 
025 
0.10 
O.® 
0.14 
~.D3 
035 
O~ 
~6 
0.14 
o.~ 
0.00 
oM 
014 
-0.03 
-0.02 
0.12 
0.01 
0.04 
DW 
2.09 
1.65 
1.99 
2.02 
2.19 
2.07 
2.05 
1.90 
1.93 
2.05 
2.04 
2.04 
1.85 
I. 95 
2.04 
1.98 
1.91 
1.97 
2.05 
2.06 
2.02 
1.98 
1.98 
1.87 
2.01 
1.90 
ECT,., 
Coeff It-stat 
-0.20 -3.80 
-0.29 -4.93 
-0.23 -4.26 
-0.20 -3.80 
-0.16 -3 .43 
-0.20 -5.20 
-0.21 -;.82 
-0.12 -2.32 
-0.14 -3.40 
-0.06 -2.15 
-0.07 -2.14 
-0.12 -2.56 
-0 .06 -3.76 
-0.19 -3.80 
-0.21 -2.32 
-0.16 -2.05 
-0.10 -2.19 
-0.14 -4.01 
-0.11 -3.21 
ML 
3.68 
2.82 
4.16 
4.73 
-5.87 
4.55 
3.67 
7.73 
6.40 
13.82 
13.83 
8.17 
15.03 
4.57 
3.72 
5.67 
9.51 
7.13 
8.27 
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Country Interest Rates Rolling Sample Intercept Slope Lag Oep Adj. R2 OW ECT 1-1 ML 
Uganda 
Burundi 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
From I To Coeff It-stat Coeff It-stat Coef It-stat Coeff It-stat 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
200 1 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
1999 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2008 
0.05 
-0.03 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.05 
0.01 
0.06 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.19 
0.00 
0.04 
-0.06 
-0.02 
-om 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.07 
0.03 
0.04 
0.05 
0.04 
-0.01 
-0.03 
0.04 
0.01 
0.80 
-1.69 
-0.\0 
-0.05 
-0.12 
-0.33 
0.04 
0.44 
-0.08 
-0.12 
-0.25 
- 1.07 
-0.03 
0.26 
-0.56 
-0.21 
-1.13 
0.37 
-0.03 
0.91 
1.14 
2. 10 
1.92 
0.48 
0.69 
0.24 
-0.05 
-0.19 
0.22 
0.12 
0.03 
0.03 
0.15 
0.26 
0.28 
0.51 
0.49 
0.60 
0.23 
-0.10 
0.07 
-0.14 
-0.21 
-0.18 
0.06 
-0.07 
-0.01 
-0 .01 
-0 .01 
-0.02 
-0.0 1 
0.06 
0.05 
0.38 
0.38 
0.83 
0.55 
0.38 
0.44 
0. 17 
0.73 
0.68 
2.4 1 
3.98 
3.53 
4.37 
4.20 
5.39 
4.29 
-1.19 
0.88 
- 1.38 
-1.61 
-1.55 
0.65 
-1.24 
-0.26 
-0.20 
-0.22 
-0.63 
-0.29 
0.86 
1.1\ 
I. 75 
1.68 
1.06 
1.12 
0.95 
1.1\ 
0.67 
-0.19 
-0.07 
-0.13 
-0.1 I 
-0.06 
-0.13 
-0.14 
-0.27 
-0.1 6 
-0.3 1 
-0.19 
-0.13 
0.03 
0.10 
0.05 
-0.25 
-0.13 
-0. 14 
-0.09 
-0.12 
-0.08 
0.63 
0.55 
-0.21 
-0.16 
-0.20 
-0.17 
-0.06 
0.0 1 
-0.33 
-1.23 
-0.74 
-1.06 
-0.96 
-0.50 
-1.01 
-1.08 
-2.25 
-1.86 
-2.57 
-1.59 
- 1. 15 
0.20 
0.81 
0.36 
-2.9 1 
-0.96 
-0.92 
-0.65 
-0.92 
-0.52 
2.61 
3.48 
-1.13 
-1.20 
-1.49 
-1.21 
-0.43 
0. 10 
-3.80 
0.07 
0.01 
0.31 
0.37 
0.38 
0.39 
0.42 
0.41 
0.3 1 
0.29 
0.21 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.21 
0.26 
0.11 
-0.0 1 
0.06 
0.06 
0.09 
0.38 
0.31 
0.09 
0.06 
0.34 
0.3 5 
0.43 
0.45 
0.28 
1.77 
1.92 
1.96 
1.95 
I. 73 
2.08 
2.09 
2.33 
2.01 
2.10 
2.D7 
2m 
2~ 
I.n 
1~5 
2.03 
2.\0 
1.89 
2.01 
2.07 
1.72 
2.04 
1.9 1 
1.90 
1.92 
2.06 
2.07 
2.03 
1.97 
2.\2 
~ 
-0.47 -3.94 
-0.48 -3.76 
-0.52 -3.98 
-0.48 -3.52 
-0.54 -3.49 
-0.33 -2.71 
-0.39 -4.60 
-0.22 -2.04 
-0.29 -2.81 
-0.55 -4.60 
-0.74 -4.72 
-0.73 -5.09 
-0.41 -3.86 
-0.21 -3.03 
-0.19 -2.23 
-0.15 -1.97 
-0.29 -2.58 
-0.55 -3.46 
-0.6 1 -3.58 
-0.88 -4 .63 
-1.0 I -4.94 
-0.28 -3.53 
1.80 
1.55 
lAO 
1.0 I 
0.94 
1.20 
1.99 
4.11 
3.24 
1.56 
1.06 
1.12 
2.28 
4.42 
5.10 
6.36 
3.38 
0.30 
0.74 
0.65 
0.55 
2.94 
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Country Interest Rates Rolling Sample Intercept Slope LagOep Adj. R2 OW ECT t-1 ML 
From To Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coef t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Rwanda Deposit Rates 1999 2003 0.03 0.81 0.02 0.35 0.02 0. 16 0.06 2.01 -0.15 -2.60 h.66 
Deposit Rates 2000 2004 0.01 0.27 -0.05 1.09 -0.13 -0.98 0.06 1.99 -0.15 -1.98 6.28 
Deposit Rates 2001 2005 -0.04 -1.29 -0.07 -1.18 -0.29 -1.94 0.04 1.99 
Deposit Rates 2002 2006 -0.04 -1.30 -0.02 -0. 17 -0.25 -1.96 0.11 2.00 -0.12 -2.06 8.26 
Deposit Rates 2003 2007 -0.05 - 1.30 0.01 0.04 -0.31 -2.22 0.12 1.85 
Deposit Rates 2004 2008 -0.05 -1.16 0.04 0.59 -0.22 -1.57 0.02 1.83 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 -0.01 -0.45 0.02 0.46 -0.15 -1.51 0.00 1.95 
Lending Rates 1999 2003 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.69 0.52 1.95 -1.20 -5.84 0.82 
Lending Rates 2000 2004 -0.01 -0. 13 -0.03 -0.19 0.13 0.95 0.54 1.96 -1.26 -6.14 0.77 
Lending Rates 2001 2005 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 0.43 0.04 0.26 0.52 2.01 -1.11 -5 .58 0.83 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 -0.02 -0.17 -0.28 -1.06 0.03 0.19 0.53 1.98 -1.13 -5.75 0.64 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 -0.02 -0.34 -0.40 -1.3 3 -0.07 -0.56 0.56 1.79 -1.08 -5.47 0.55 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.38 0.35 2.00 -0.74 -4.25 1.35 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.01 -0.07 0.48 2.01 -0.97 -7.38 1.01 
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APPENDIXH: 
ASYMMETRIC ERROR CORRECTION TERMS AND MEAN ADJUSTMENT LAGS SUMMARY 
Table HI': Asymmetric error correction terms and mean adjustment lags 
Asymmetric error correction terms 
-Country Interest Rates Rolling Sample ECT+ I-I ECT"I_I Wald Test ML 
From To Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat F-stat py ML+ ML-
Kenya Deposit Rates 1999 2003 -0.30 -3.04 -0.04 -0.23 1.28 0.26 2.60 20.97 
Deposit Rates 2000 2004 -0 .37 -4.05 -0.12 -0.76 1.38 0.25 2.20 6.87 
Deposit Rates 2001 2005 -0.23 -2.08 -0.23 -2.08 0.00 0.96 4.24 4.08 
Deposit Rates 2002 2006 -0.23 -2.00 -0.18 -1.74 0.10 0.76 4.05 5.42 
Deposit Rates 2003 2007 -0.24 -1.97 -0.10 -1.16 0.50 0.48 3.88 8.85 
Deposit Rates 2004 2008 -0.17 -1.70 -0.22 -3.26 0.14 0.71 5.49 4.14 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 -0.27 -5 .20 -0.10 -1.37 2.58 0.11 2.83 7.47 
Lending Rates 1999 2003 -0.21 -2.36 0.02 0.15 1.47 0.23 4.56 48 .80 
Lending Rates 2000 2004 -0.27 -4.16 0.04 0.48 6.28 0.02 3.34 22.93 
Lending Rates 2001 2005 -0.22 -2.83 0.04 0.64 4.68 0.04 4.10 26 .28 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 -0.09 -1.30 -0.03 -0.36 0.16 0.69 10.09 28.40 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 -0.13 -2.32 -0.09 -0.69 0.06 0.80 7.69 10.90 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 -0.16 -4.94 0.04 1.12 12.04 0.00 5.79 25.53 
Tanzania Deposit Rates 1999 2003 -0.31 -3.06 -0.07 -0.69 1.78 0.19 2.82 12.18 
Deposit Rates 2000 2004 -0.27 -4.16 0.04 0.48 6.28 0.02 3.34 22.93 
Deposit Rates 2001 2005 -0.08 -0.43 -0.34 -1.79 0.60 0.44 9.42 2.26 
Deposit Rates 2002 2006 0.02 0.13 -0.43 -2.68 3.63 0.06 61.56 2.27 
Deposit Rates 2003 2007 
Deposit Rates 2004 2008 -0.16 -1.61 -0.03 -0.27 0.44 0.51 6.04 31.03 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 0.16 -2.47 -0.11 -1.44 0.21 0.65 6.00 9. !3 
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Country Interest Rates Rolling Sample ECT+ '-I ECT'_I Wald Test ML 
From To Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat F-stat py ML+ I ML-
Lending Rates 1999 2003 
Lending Rates 2000 2004 
Lending Rates 2001 2005 -0.13 -2 .09 -0.09 -1.02 0.07 0.80 7.46 10. 18 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 
Uganda Deposit Rates 1999 2003 -0.73 -3.39 -0.22 -1.02 2.05 0.16 1.16 3.91 
Deposit Rates 2000 2004 -0.64 -2.91 -0.29 -1.14 0.81 0.37 1.15 2.59 
Deposit Rates 2001 2005 -0.60 -2.54 -0.43 -1.73 0.18 0.68 1.21 1.69 
Deposit Rates 2002 2006 -0.80 -3.31 -0.20 -0.89 2.47 0.12 0.61 2.42 
Deposit Rates 2003 2007 -0.93 -3.47 -0.26 -1.16 3.07 0.09 0.53 1.91 
Deposit Rates 2004 2008 -0.29 -1.32 -0.37 -1.71 0.05 0.83 1.35 1.07 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 -0.51 -3.20 -0.28 -1.89 0.83 0.36 1.52 2.79 
Lending Rates 1999 2003 -0.18 -0.84 -0.25 -1.37 0.05 0.82 5.05 3.56 
Lending Rales 2000 2004 -0.23 -1.l4 -0.35 -1.82 0.13 0.72 4.12 2.69 
Lending Rates 2001 2005 -0.57 -2.87 -0.53 -2.55 0.01 0.93 1.5 1 1.60 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 -0.72 -2.99 -0 .77 -2.83 0.01 0.91 1.09 1.03 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 -0.69 -3 .26 -0.79 -3.30 0.08 0.77 1.20 1.05 
Lend ing Rates 2004 2008 -0.41 -2.36 -0.42 -1.66 0.00 0.98 2.31 2.25 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 -0.21 -1.77 -0.19 -1.28 0.01 0.93 4.49 4.96 
Burundi Deposit Rates 1999 2003 
Deposit Rates 2000 2004 
Deposit Rates 2001 2005 -0.14 -0.84 -0.26 -1.38 0.16 0.69 7.11 3.78 
Deposit Rates 2002 2006 -0.38 -2.21 -0.01 -0.08 2.14 0.15 2.60 97.06 
Deposit Rates 2003 2007 -0.46 -1.71 -0.19 -0.98 0.46 0.50 2.16 5.26 
Deposit Rates 2004 2008 
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Country J nterest Rates Rolling Sample ECT+ t-l ECr t-l Wald Test ML 
From To Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat F-stat PV ML+ ML-
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 
Lending Rates 1999 2003 
Lending Rates 2000 2004 
Lending Rates 2001 2005 -0.22 -0.71 -0.79 -3. 15 1.49 0.23 0.33 0.09 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 -0.26 -0.78 -0.83 -3.43 1.57 0.22 1.67 0.52 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 -0.77 -2. 11 -0.92 -3.81 0.10 0.75 0.82 0.68 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 -1.00 -2.48 -1.0 I -4.21 0.00 0.98 0.56 0.55 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 -0.04 -0.25 -0.48 -3 .32 2.72 0.10 20.88 1.81 
Rwanda Deposit Rates 1999 2003 -0.03 -0.21 -0.26 -2.35 1.42 0.24 38.93 3.74 
Deposit Rates 2000 2004 -0.12 -0.77 -0.19 -1.15 0.07 0.79 8.17 5.02 
Deposit Rates 2001 2005 
Deposit Rates 2002 2006 -0.10 -1.08 -0.15 -1.25 0.09 0.77 9.97 6.56 
Deposit Rates 2003 2007 
Deposit Rates 2004 2008 
Deposit Rates 1999 2008 
Lending Rates 1999 2003 -1.10 -3.41 -1.16 -4.19 0.02 0.90 0.89 0.85 
Lending Rates 2000 2004 -1.31 -4.27 -1.22 -4.25 0.05 0.82 0.74 0.80 
Lending Rates 2001 2005 -1.23 -4.14 -1.00 -3.38 0.27 0.60 0.75 0.92 
Lending Rates 2002 2006 -1.15 -3.43 -1.13 -3.90 0.00 0.96 0.63 0.64 
Lending Rates 2003 2007 -1.36 -4.14 -0.86 -3 .00 1.14 0.29 0.50 0.78 
Lending Rates 2004 2008 -0.83 -2.31 -0.68 -2.61 0.08 0.78 1.20 1.46 
Lending Rates 1999 2008 -1.01 -4.99 -0.94 -4.94 0.05 0.82 0.98 1.04 
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Table II: Interest Rate Pass·through Anruysis 
Rolling Sample 
Country Interest Rates 
Kenya Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Ratcs 
Deposit Rates 
Deposit Rate~ 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Rates 
Lending Ra t~ 
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Lending Rates 
Tanzania Deposit Rates 
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200 1 
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Lending Rates 200 I 
Lending Rates 2002 
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Lending Rates 1999 
Uganda Deposit Rates 1999 
Deposit Rates 2000 
Deposit Rates 2001 
Deposit Rates 2002 
Deposit Rates 2003 
Deposit Rates 2004 
To 
2003 
2004 
200S 
2006 
2007 
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2008 
Z003 
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2005 
2006 
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2003 
ZO().I 
2005 
2006 
2007 
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2003 
2004 
2005 
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'0 
yeo 
y" 
y" 
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"0 
"0 
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'0 
'0 
' 0 
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y" 
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yo. 
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Y" 
yo. 
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Y" 
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no 
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yes yes 
yes no 
no 
on 
no 
no 
"" 
00 
yes 
yo. 
"" 
yes 
yes 
yos 
~ es 
yos 
yes 
yes 
res 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
"" 
no 
"" 
y" 
yes 
yeo 
yo< 
yos 
ye, 
Long·Run PT 
Coeff 
0.39 
0.42 
0.33 
0.33 
0.34 
0.47 
0.44 
0.49 
0.64 
0.49 
0.3 \ 
0.03 
0.05 
0.12 
0.47 
0 .4 1 
0.13 
0.31 
-0.05 
0.27 
0.38 
0.08 
0.01 
-0.38 
-0.02 
-0.18 
-0.20 
-0.07 
0.28 
0.32 
0.35 
0.34 
0.25 
0.36 
t-stat 
8.82 
13.94 
14.99 
10.61 
9. 18 
12.88 
16.10 
10.59 
11 .86 
6.38 
2.92 
0.27 
2.97 
11.78 
10.27 
7.% 
3.19 
7.27 
9.66 
3.35 
9.88 
4.08 
1.17 
-3.85 
-1.24 
6.14 
5.58 
-0.02 
8.12 
iO.I3 
9.83 
8.61 
4.76 
4.37 
Short-Run PT 
Coeff 
0.25 
0.1 9 
0.04 
0.04 
0.06 
0.09 
0.23 
0.07 
0. 1I 
0. 10 
0.08 
0.03 
0.02 
0.07 
0.12 
0.10 
0.2] 
0.07 
0.01 
-0.Q2 
0.03 
0.07 
0.06 
-0.07 
-0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
O. IS 
0.26 
0.28 
0.51 
0.49 
0.60 
t-stat 
5.08 
3.88 
1.02 
0.92 
1.39 
2.40 
6.68 
1.32 
1.67 
iJ4 
0.91 
0.27 
0.43 
1.88 
2.11 
1.08 
1.89 
0.86 
0.22 
-0.45 
0.83 
0.90 
0.55 
-0.62 
-0.45 
0.48 
0.73 
0.68 
2.41 
3.98 
3.53 
4.37 
4.20 
SJ9 
ECT ,_,(sJ 
Coeff 
-0.20 
-0.29 
-0.23 
-0.20 
-0.16 
-0.20 
-0.21 
-0.12 
-0.14 
-0.06 
-0.07 
-0.1 2 
-0.06 
-0.19 
-0.22 
-0.21 
-0.16 
-0.10 
-0.14 
-0.11 
...{l.47 
-0.48 
-0.52 
-0.48 
-0.54 
-0.33 
t-stat 
-3.80 
-4.93 
-4.26 
-3.80 
-3.43 
-5.20 
-5.82 
-2.32 
-3.40 
-2. 15 
-2. 14 
-2.56 
-3 .76 
-3 .80 
-3.40 
-2.32 
-2.05 
-2.19 
-4.01 
-3.21 
-3.94 
-3.76 
-3.98 
-3.52 
-3.49 
-2.7 1 
ML 
3.68 
2.82 
4.16 
4.73 
-5.87 
4.55 
3.67 
7.73 
6.40 
13.82 
13.83 
8.17 
15.03 
4.57 
4.11 
3.72 
5.67 
9.51 
7. 13 
8.27 
1.80 
1.55 
1.40 
1.01 
0.94 
1.20 
Eel._, 
CoefT 
-0.30 
-OJ7 
-0.23 
-0.23 
-0.24 
-0.17 
-0.27 
-0.21 
-0.27 
-0.22 
-0.09 
-0.13 
-0.16 
-0.31 
-0.32 
-0.08 
0.02 
-0.\6 
0.16 
-0.13 
-0.73 
-0.64 
-0.60 
-0.80 
-0.93 
-0.29 
t-stat 
-3.04 
-4 .05 
-2.08 
-2.00 
-1.97 
-1.70 
-5.20 
-2.36 
-4.16 
-2.83 
-1.30 
-2.j2 
-4.94 
-3.06 
-2.43 
...{l.43 
0.13 
-1 .61 
-2.47 
-2.09 
-3.39 
·2.91 
-2.54 
-3.31 
-3.47 
-1.32 
ECT 1_. 
Coeff 
-0.04 
-0.12 
-0.23 
-0.18 
-0.10 
-0.22 
-0.10 
0.02 
0.04 
0.04 
-0.03 
-0.09 
0-"' 
-0.07 
..0.12 
-0.34 
-0.43 
-O.Q3 
-0.11 
...{l.09 
-0.22 
-029 
..0.43 
-0.20 
-0.26 
..0.37 
I-stat 
-0.23 
-0.76 
-2.08 
-1.74 
-1.l6 
-3.26 
-1.37 
0.15 
0.48 
0.64 
-0.36 
...{l.69 
1.12 
-0.69 
-0.91 
-1.79 
-2 .68 
-0.27 
-1.44 
-1.02 
-1.02 
-1.14 
-1.73 
...{l.89 
-1.1 6 
-1.71 
ML' 
2.60 
2.20 
4.24 
4.05 
HR 
5.49 
2.83 
4.56 
3.34 
4.10 
10.09 
7.69 
5.79 
2.82 
6.04 
9.42 
61.56 
6.04 
6.00 
7.46 
1.16 
1.15 
1.21 
0.61 
0.53 
1.35 
ML 
ML-
20.97 
6.S7 
4.0S 
5.42 
S.85 
4.14 
7.47 
48.80 
22.93 
26.28 
2840 
10.90 
25.53 
12.18 
1580 
2.26 
2.27 
31.03 
9.13 
10.18 
3.91 
2.59 
1.69 
2.42 
1.91 
1.07 
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Country Interest Rates 
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)'es 
Long-RunPT 
Coeff It-stat 
0.29 
0.13 
0. 17 
0 .12 
0 .07 
0.13 
0.27 
0. 14 
-0.13 
-139 
0.02 
-0.06 
-0.11 
0.67 
0.58 
-0.34 
-0.26 
0.60 
0.43 
0.27 
0.31 
0.39 
0.06 
-0.13 
-0.27 
0.24 
-0.31 
-0.23 
-0. 15 
-0.04 
-0.07 
-O.Ot 
0.00 
0 .05 
-0.06 
-0.08 
9.57 
2.59 
3.69 
2.36 
1.88 
2.62 
3.93 
3.50 
-6.86 
-2.69 
0.76 
-3. 15 
-1 6.06 
-6.30 
-9.87 
8.68 
5.93 
1.84 
2.47 
3.7 1 
4.58 
6.24 
0.85 
-3.66 
-2.57 
2.69 
10.43 
7.71 
2.33 
-0.54 
-1.02 
-0.13 
-0.01 
0.61 
-1.16 
-1.70 
Short-Run PT 
Coeff I t-stat 
0.23 
-0.10 
0.07 
-0. 14 
-0.21 
-0.18 
0.06 
-0.07 
-0.01 
·O.OJ 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.0\ 
0.06 
0.05 
0.38 
0.38 
0.83 
0.55 
0.38 
0.44 
0.17 
0.02 
-0.05 
-0.07 
-0.02 
0.01 
0 .04 
0.02 
0.01 
-0.03 
0.07 
..{J.28 
-0.40 
0.00 
0 .01 
4.29 
-1.19 
0.88 
-138 
-1 .61 
-US 
0.65 
-1.24 
-0.26 
-0.20 
-0.22 
-0.63 
-0.29 
0.86 
1.11 
1.75 
1.68 
1.06 
Ll2 
0.95 
1.11 
0,67 
0.35 
1.09 
-1.18 
-0. 17 
0.04 
0.59 
0.46 
0.05 
-0. 19 
0.43 
-1.06 
-1.33 
-0.04 
0.15 
EeT ,_,(s) 
Coeff. t-stat 
-0.39 -4.60 
-0.22 -2 .04 
-0.29 -2.81 
-0.55 -4.60 
-0.74 -4.72 
-0.73 -5.09 
-0.41 -3.86 
-0.21 -3.03 
-0. 19 -2.23 
-0. 15 -1.97 
-0.29 -2.58 
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-0 .61 -3.58 
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-1.08 -5.47 
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ML 
1.99 
4.11 
3.24 
1.56 
1.06 
1.12 
2.28 
4.42 
5.10 
6.36 
3.38 
0 .30 
0.74 
0.65 
0.55 
2.94 
6.66 
6.28 
8.26 
0.82 
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0.83 
0.64 
0.55 
1.35 
1.01 
ECT+ t_1 
Coeff It-stat 
-0.5 1 
-0.18 
-0.23 
-0.57 
-0.72 
-0.69 
-0.41 
-0.21 
-0.14 
-0.38 
-0.46 
-0.22 
-0.26 
-0.77 
-1 .00 
-0.04 
-0.03 
-0.12 
-0.10 
-1.10 
-1.31 
-1.23 
-1.1 5 
-1.36 
-0.83 
-1.01 
-3 .20 
-0.84 
-1.14 
-2.87 
-2.99 
-3 .26 
-236 
-1.77 
-0.84 
-2.21 
-1.71 
-0.7 1 
-0.78 
-2.11 
-2.48 
-0.25 
-0.21 
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-1.08 
-3.41 
-4.27 
-4 .14 
-3 .43 
-4.14 
-2.31 
-4 .99 
EeT t_1 
CoefT I I-stat 
-0.28 
-0.25 
-0.35 
-0.53 
-0.77 
-0.79 
-0.42 
-0.19 
-0.26 
-00\ 
-0. \9 
·0.79 
-0.83 
-0.92 
-1.01 
-0.48 
-0.26 
-0.19 
-0.15 
-1.16 
-1 .22 
-1.00 
-1.13 
-0.86 
-0.68 
-0.94 
-1.89 
-137 
-1.82 
-2.55 
-2.83 
<UO 
-1.66 
-1.28 
-1.38 
·0.08 
-0.98 
-3.15 
-3.43 
-3.81 
-4.21 
-3.32 
-2.35 
-LIS 
-1.25 
-4. 19 
-4.25 
-3.38 
-3.90 
-3.00 
·2.61 
-4.94 
ML 
ML' I ML-
l.52 
5.05 
4.12 
\.51 
1.09 
1.20 
2.31 
4.49 
7.11 
2.60 
2.16 
0 .33 
1.67 
0 .82 
0.56 
20.88 
38.93 
8.17 
9.97 
0.89 
0.74 
0.75 
0.63 
0.50 
1.20 
0.98 
2.79 
3.56 
2.69 
1.60 
1.03 
1.05 
2.25 
4.96 
3.7Ii 
97.06 
5.26 
0.09 
0.52 
0 .68 
0.55 
1.81 
3.74 
5.02 
6.56 
0.85 
0.80 
0.92 
0.64 
0.78 
1.46 
1.04 
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